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HUSTISYA NATIN
FOREWORD
In 2016, we launched Hustisya Natin, a three-year project funded by the European Union, that envisioned to 
enhance the integrity of the justice system 
through increased accountability and 
transparency, and improved performance 
of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies                    
in the Philippines.
As the project comes to an end, we hope 
to leave a concrete contribution with this 
publication. Experts from our partner legal-
resource organizations have teamed up to 
work on their sectors of specialization.
The research found on this book aim 
to understand the underlying processes 
and issues in five particular thematic 
cases (labor, women, agrarian reform, 
environment, and extrajudicial killings) 
that have gone through judicial and quasi-
judicial procedures.  It is important to look 
into findings on how the Supreme Court 
and quasi-judicial bodies ruled on these 
cases as it is essential in knowing how we 
could further formulate policy reforms in 
the justice sector.
As we continue our work towards an 
accountable and transparent judiciary, this 
book is intended to be a reference material 
for lawyers, law students and the general 
public alike.  We hope that there would 
be more opportunities to write materials 
like this in the future as the topic of the 
improvement of the justice system will 
always be an evolving issue.
This research would not be possible 
without the support of the European 
Union and our partners: Ateneo Human 
Rights Center (AHRC), Environmental Legal 
Assistance Center (ELAC), Kaisahan tungo 
sa Kaunlaran ng Kanayunan at Repormang 
Pansakahan (KAISAHAN), Philippine 
Alliance of Human Rights Advocates 
(PAHRA), and Sentro ng Alternatibong 
Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN).
Atty. Maria Generosa T. Mislang
National Coordinator
Alternative Law Groups
LABOR
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SALIGAN (Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panligal or Alternative Legal Assistance Center) 
is a legal resource non-governmental organization doing developmental legal work with 
farmers, workers, the urban poor, women, and local communities.
 SALIGAN1 2019
A. Introduction
The right to freedom of association is fundamental in the exercise of workers’ rights. When the Philippines ratified International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Convention No. 87, it committed to adopt domestic 
policies to attain the objectives of the Convention. While 
the Philippine Constitution and various national laws 
have adopted certain measures to uphold the freedom 
of association, the Convention’s role in Philippine 
jurisprudence must be examined. This paper analyzes 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines from 
2010 to 2017, focusing on the four fundamental rights 
under the Convention: (1) the right to organize; (2) the 
right to organizational autonomy; (3) the right against 
dissolution and suspension; and (4) the right to affiliate.
While its judiciary is limited by domestic law, the 
Philippines recognizes international conventions and treaties, 
and adopts them as part of the law of the land. As such, the 
paper provides recommendations on how advocates can push 
for their rights not only in the realm of the lawmakers and 
implementers, but also in courts as right-holders.
B. Freedom of Association
International instruments and the Philippine Constitution
On December 29, 1953, the Philippines ratified ILO 
Convention No. 87, or the Convention Concerning Freedom 
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize. 
It was originally signed on July 9, 1948, predating the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which 
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 
December 10, 1948. As of April 2019, 155 countries, including 
the Philippines, have ratified the Convention.2 
Under this Convention, both workers and employers 
have four fundamental rights: (1) the right of all workers 
and employers, without distinction, to establish and join 
organizations of their own choosing without previous 
authorization;3 (2) the right of workers’ and employers’ 
organizations to freely decide on internal matters;4 (3) the 
right of workers’ and employers’ organizations against 
dissolution or suspension by administrative authority;5 and (4) 
the right of workers’ and employers’ organizations to establish 
and join federations and confederations, as well as affiliate 
with international workers’ and employers’ organizations.6 
The same rights are extended to workers’ and 
employers’ federations and confederations, and the 
acquisition of legal personality by workers’ and employers’ 
organizations, federations, and confederations may not be 
made subject to conditions of such a character as to restrict 
the same rights.7 While domestic law must be respected 
in exercising such rights, it may not be applied to impair 
these rights.8 This ensures legislative conformity of parties 
to the Convention. Meanwhile, the extent of application of 
the same rights to military and police personnel is left to 
national law and regulations.9
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The right to form or join organizations under the 
Convention is not the same as the general right to form 
or join any organization. As used in the Convention, 
“organisation” refers to “any organisation of workers or 
of employers for furthering and defending the interests of 
workers or of employers.”10 Indeed, the UDHR recognizes the 
right to form and join trade unions11 separately from the 
general freedom of association.12 It is specifically protected 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)13 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),14 both of which were 
ratified by the Philippines. These two Conventions echo the 
rights enshrined in ILO Convention No. 87, including the 
mandate of legislative conformity.
The Philippine Constitution adopts the generally 
accepted principles of international law as part of the law 
of the land.15 These principles include the rights declared 
in the UDHR.16 In particular, Article XIII, Section 317 of the 
Constitution protects the rights of all workers, without 
distinction, to self-organization, collective bargaining and 
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including 
the right to strike in accordance with law. Section 8 of the 
Bill of Rights protects “[t]he right of the people, including 
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form 
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary 
to law.” Meanwhile, Article IX-B, Section 2(5) states that 
“[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to 
government employees.”
Philippine legislation
The Labor Code of the Philippines18 defines a labor 
organization as “any union or association of employees 
which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and 
conditions of employment.”19 Unlike ILO Convention No. 87, the 
UDHR, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the Philippine Constitution, 
Philippine laws make several distinctions among workers 
on their right to form and join labor organizations. These 
include: (1) the presence of employer-employee relationship; 
(2) private and public sector workers; (3) the level of 
employment; and (4) employees’ citizenship.
Presence of employer-employee relationship. Under 
Article 253 of the Labor Code, only workers with employer-
employee relationships20 may form, join, and assist labor 
organizations.21 In contrast, other workers may only 
form and join workers’ organizations “for their mutual aid 
and protection,” which do not fall under the definition of 
workers’ organizations in ILO Convention No. 87. 
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Private and public sector workers. The Labor Code grants 
the right to form, join, and assist labor organizations only 
to employees “in commercial, industrial and agricultural 
enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or 
educational institutions, whether operating for profit 
or not” and to “[e]mployees of government corporations 
established under the Corporation Code.”22 
On the other hand, civil service employees, or those 
who work in the various branches and instrumentalities of 
government, including government-owned or controlled 
corporations with original charters,23 may not form or join 
labor organizations.24 Instead, they may only form or join 
employees’ organizations.25 Under Executive Order (EO) 
No. 180 (1987), the rights of employees’ organizations are 
limited and incomparable to those of labor organizations.26 
They may negotiate only terms and conditions of 
employment that are not fixed by law,27 and may not 
conduct any strike.28 Moreover, high-level civil service 
employees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 
police officers, firefighters, and jail guards may not form or 
join employees’ organizations.29
Level of employment. Under Article 255 of the Labor Code, 
“[m]anagerial employees are not eligible to join, assist 
or form any labor organization.” Supervisory employees 
may form, join, or assist labor organizations of their 
own, but they are not eligible for membership in labor 
organizations of rank-and-file employees. Nonetheless, 
labor organizations of both supervisory employees and 
rank-and-file employees within the same establishment 
“may join the same federation or national union.”
Employees’ citizenship. Under Article 284 of the Labor 
Code, aliens working in the Philippines are “strictly 
prohibited” from forming or joining labor organizations. 
The narrow exception is when a working alien: (1) has 
a valid permit issued by the Department of Labor and 
Employment (DOLE); and (2) is a national of a country that 
grants Filipino workers the right to organize.
These statutory distinctions run counter to the 
mandate of Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 87, which grants 
all workers “without distinction whatsoever” the right to 
form or join organizations “of their own choosing.” The 
Convention allows for a distinction between members 
of the armed forces and police,30 and other workers. 
However, it does not allow for any distinction in trade 
union matters and the right to organize between workers 
without employer-employee relationships,31 public sector 
employees,32 firefighters,33 prison staff,34 managerial staff,35 
and aliens36 on one hand, and other workers on the other.
Notably, certain Philippine regulations further limit the 
workers’ exercise of their right to freedom of association. 
Among these is the requirement of union registration. 
Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 87 allows workers to 
form or join workers’ organizations “without previous 
authorisation.” However, for such organizations to acquire 
legal personality and rights, they have to comply with the 
numerous requirements under the Labor Code. In 2008, the 
Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the approval 
of union registration is “not ministerial.” According 
to the Court, “[i]f the union’s application is infected by 
falsification and like serious irregularities, especially 
those appearing on the face of the application and its 
attachments, a union should be denied recognition as a 
legitimate labor organization.”37 
The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has 
ruled:
Even in cases where registration is optional 
but where such registration confers 
on the organization the basic rights 
enabling it to “further and defend the 
interests of its members”, the fact that the 
authority competent to effect registration 
has discretionary power to refuse this 
formality is not very different from 
cases in which previous authorization is 
required.38
As to organizational autonomy, domestic law does 
not prohibit labor organizations from drawing up their 
own constitutions and by-laws, electing their officers and 
representatives, organizing their own administration 
and activities, and formulating their own programs. 
Notably, however, the exercise of the right to strike is 
heavily regulated under the Labor Code.39 Nonetheless, the 
law recognizes that an employer’s interference with the 
workers’ exercise of their right to self-organization is an 
unfair labor practice tantamount to a criminal offense.40
Contrary to the plain text of Article 4 of ILO Convention No. 
87, labor organizations in the Philippines may be dissolved by 
administrative authority through petitions for revocation or 
cancellation of registration. DOLE Regional Directors and the 
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) are authorized 
to cancel the certificates of registration of legitimate labor 
organizations, federations, national unions, industry unions, 
trade union centers, and workers’ associations.41 
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There are three grounds for cancellation of registration: 
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or 
fraud in connection with the adoption or 
ratification of the constitution and by-laws 
or amendments thereto, the minutes of 
ratification, and the list of members who 
took part in the ratification;
(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or 
fraud in connection with the election of 
officers, minutes of the election of officers, 
and the list of voters;
(c) Voluntary dissolution by 
the members.42
Another limitation is the minimum membership 
requirement for unions to federate. The right of labor 
organizations to form and join federations is protected 
under Philippine law. However, Article 244 of the Labor Code 
requires a federation or national union to have a minimum 
membership of 10 legitimate labor organizations, “each 
of which must be a duly recognized collective bargaining 
agent in the establishment or industry in which it 
operates.” This minimum requirement is excessively 
high according to the ILO Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR).43
Lastly, foreign assistance to labor organizations is 
heavily regulated. While the law does not expressly prohibit 
labor organizations and federations from affiliating with 
any international organization, foreign assistance to “any 
labor organization, group of workers or any auxiliary 
thereof” is strictly regulated. Under Article 285 of the Labor 
Code, assistance in any form, “in cash or in kind, directly or 
indirectly,” from any foreign individual, organization, or 
entity must have prior permission from the DOLE Secretary. 
Such strict regulation is “incompatible with the principles 
set out in Article 5 of [ILO] Convention No. 87.”44
Impact and outcomes
Philippine legislation, therefore, serves to prevent 
workers, their organizations, and international 
organizations from consolidating into a trade union 
movement. It prevents workers from joining labor 
organizations by not only limiting the right to organize 
to a narrowly specific category, but also making union 
registration difficult and discretionary. Federations 
are required to have an excessively high minimum 
membership. Foreign assistance, which would help 
develop local unions and federations, is strictly regulated. 
Philippine law, it would seem, favors small, isolated, 
exclusive, and nuclear unions.
This is contrary to the principles and provisions 
of ILO Convention No. 87, which specifically mandates 
legislative conformity. The UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR 
all reaffirm the right to freedom of association under 
the Convention. No less than the Philippine Constitution 
recognizes the same right in a number of its provisions. Yet, 
66 years after it had been ratified, the Convention’s impact 
on Philippine legislation remains uncertain. 
These legal obstacles have likely contributed to the 
massive decline of unionism in the Philippines. From 30.5% 
in 1995, the private sector’s union density rate declined to 
20.2% in 2003; 10.6% in 2010; and 7.7% in 2014. Likewise, 
the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) coverage rate 
declined from 19.7% in 2003 to 10.9% in 2010, and 8.1% in 
2014.45 As of 2016, the private sector’s union density rate was 
at 6.5%, while the CBA coverage rate was at 7.2%.46
C. Recent Jurisprudence
Philippine jurisprudence reflects just how small a 
role ILO Convention No. 87 has played in cases of workers’ 
freedom of association. The Convention rarely figures 
in decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines. 
Unsurprisingly, it is seldom pleaded by any party before the 
Court. Jurisprudence and practice, along with contradictory 
legislation, reveal the extent to which the Philippines has 
failed to comply with its obligations under the Convention. 
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court from 2010 to 2017 
affirm these observations.
Right to organize
In the 2010 case of Bank of the Philippine Islands v. BPI 
Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI 
Unibank,47 the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and 
Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) entered into a 
merger in 2000. This transferred all of FEBTC’s assets and 
liabilities to BPI as the surviving corporation. BPI absorbed 
FEBTC employees as its own, with their status, tenure, 
salaries, and benefits maintained.
In Davao City, the rank-and-file employees of BPI were 
unionized under BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-
Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank. The union had a CBA 
with BPI, which included a union shop clause that required 
“[n]ew employees . . . who may hereafter be regularly 
employed” to “join the Union as a condition of their 
continued employment.” Some of the FEBTC employees 
absorbed in BPI Davao City joined the union, while others 
did not. Pursuant to the clause, the union requested BPI to 
terminate the employment of the FEBTC employees who did 
not join the union. BPI did not act on the request.
The Court resolved whether the former FEBTC 
employees should be covered by the union shop clause. BPI 
argued that the clause covered only new employees who 
were initially hired on a temporary or probationary status 
and later qualified for regular employment. The Court 
disagreed, explaining that BPI only became an employer of 
the absorbed employees upon the merger’s effectivity. Thus, 
the absorbed employees were new employees of BPI. 
The Court also found no basis in the CBA for the 
alleged requirement that, to be covered by the clause, 
new employees should have been hired on a temporary 
or probationary status first before being regularized. 
According to the Court, “the Union Shop Clause did not 
distinguish between new employees who are non-regular at 
their hiring but who subsequently become regular and new 
employees who are ‘absorbed’ as regular and permanent 
from the beginning of their employment.”
Further, the Court explained that a contrary ruling 
would endanger the status of the union as the rank-and-file 
employees’ exclusive bargaining agent and as a legitimate 
labor organization:
Indeed, a union security clause in a CBA 
should be interpreted to give meaning 
and effect to its purpose, which is to afford 
protection to the certified bargaining agent 
and ensure that the employer is dealing 
with a union that represents the interests 
of the legally mandated percentage of the 
members of the bargaining unit.
The union shop clause offers protection to 
the certified bargaining agent by ensuring 
that future regular employees who (a) enter 
the employ of the company during the life of 
the CBA; (b) are deemed part of the collective 
bargaining unit; and (c) whose number 
will affect the number of members of the 
collective bargaining unit will be compelled 
to join the union. Such compulsion has 
legal effect, precisely because the employer 
by voluntarily entering in to a union shop 
clause in a CBA with the certified bargaining 
agent takes on the responsibility of 
dismissing the new regular employee who 
does not join the union.
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Without the union shop clause or with 
the restrictive interpretation thereof as 
proposed in the dissenting opinions, the 
company can jeopardize the majority 
status of the certified union by excluding 
from union membership all new regular 
employees whom the Company will 
“absorb” in future mergers and all new 
regular employees whom the Company 
hires as regular from the beginning of 
their employment without undergoing 
a probationary period. In this manner, 
the Company can increase the number of 
members of the collective bargaining unit 
and if this increase is not accompanied 
by a corresponding increase in union 
membership, the certified union may lose 
its majority status and render it vulnerable 
to attack by another union who wishes to 
represent the same bargaining unit.
Or worse, a certified union whose 
membership falls below twenty percent 
(20%) of the total members of the 
collective bargaining unit may lose its 
status as a legitimate labor organization 
altogether, even in a situation where 
there is no competing union. In such a 
case, an interested party may file for the 
cancellation of the union’s certificate 
of registration with the Bureau of Labor 
Relations. (Citations omitted.)
The Court recognized that the union shop clause 
impinged upon a worker’s freedom of association, as 
it restricted a worker’s right not to join a union. Citing 
precedents, the Court said that such a restriction was valid. 
It explained:
The rationale for upholding the validity of 
union shop clauses in a CBA, even if they 
impinge upon the individual employee’s 
right or freedom of association, is not to 
protect the union for the union’s sake. Laws 
and jurisprudence promote unionism 
and afford certain protections to the 
certified bargaining agent in a unionized 
company because a strong and effective 
union presumably benefits all employees 
in the bargaining unit since such a union 
would be in a better position to demand 
improved benefits and conditions of work 
from the employer. This is the rationale 
behind the State policy to promote 
unionism declared in the Constitution […]
In the case at bar, since the former FEBTC 
employees are deemed covered by the 
Union Shop Clause, they are required 
to join the certified bargaining agent, 
which supposedly has gathered the 
support of the majority of workers within 
the bargaining unit in the appropriate 
certification proceeding. Their joining 
the certified union would, in fact, be in 
the best interests of the former FEBTC 
employees for it unites their interests 
with the majority of employees in the 
bargaining unit. It encourages employee 
solidarity and affords sufficient 
protection to the majority status of the 
union during the life of the CBA which 
are the precisely the objectives of union 
security clauses, such as the Union Shop 
Clause involved herein. We are indeed not 
being called to balance the interests of 
individual employees as against the State 
policy of promoting unionism, since the 
employees, who were parties in the court 
below, no longer contested the adverse 
Court of Appeals’ decision. Nonetheless, 
settled jurisprudence has already swung 
the balance in favor of unionism, in 
recognition that ultimately the individual 
employee will be benefited by that policy. 
In the hierarchy of constitutional values, 
this Court has repeatedly held that the 
right to abstain from joining a labor 
organization is subordinate to the policy of 
encouraging unionism as an instrument 
of social justice.
Notably, the Court did not mention ILO Convention No. 
87, let alone use it as basis for any of its rulings or policy 
considerations. In its decisions, the ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association has left the admissibility of union 
security clauses—like the union shop clause in this case—to 
the discretion of state parties, as long as the clauses were 
agreed upon fairly.48
The Court gave the former FEBTC employees 30 days 
from notice of finality of the decision to join the union, 
or the union may validly request for their employment 
termination. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the Court 
further resolved that in addition to the 30-day period, the 
employees should “be accorded full procedural due process 
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before their employment may be terminated.”49
Meanwhile, in the 2015 decision of University of the 
Immaculate Conception v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,50 
the Court resolved a case that involved a dispute between 
University of the Immaculate Conception (UIC) and its 
rank-and-file employees’ exclusive bargaining agent, the UIC 
Teaching and Non-Teaching Employees Union-FFW.
In 1994, the union filed a notice of strike against UIC 
on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor 
practice. Through the National Conciliation and Mediation 
Board (NCMB), the parties reached an agreement to grant the 
workers a pay hike. However, UIC demanded the exclusion of 
secretaries, registrars, accounting personnel, and guidance 
counselors from the bargaining unit, claiming that these 
were confidential employees. 
On voluntary arbitration, the arbitration panel ruled in 
favor of UIC. Accordingly, UIC gave the affected employees 
the option to choose between keeping their positions or 
their union membership. When the employees chose to 
keep both, UIC sent them notices of termination. This led to 
another notice of strike filed by the union.
What followed was a long judicial dispute that reached 
the Supreme Court multiple times. In this particular 
decision, the Court resolved, among others, whether the 
affected employees’ refusal to resign from the union can be 
validly invoked as basis for their employment termination. 
The Court ruled in the affirmative:
We hold that the willful act of refusing to 
leave the Union is sufficient basis for UIC to 
lose its trust and confidence on Respondent 
Employees. There was just cause for 
dismissing the Respondent Employees. Our 
conclusion follows the same reasoning 
why we finally adopted the doctrine that 
confidential employees should be excluded 
from the bargaining unit and disqualified 
from joining any union: employees should 
not be placed in a position involving a 
potential conflict of interests. In this regard, 
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
Respondent Employees are allowed to join 
the Union. If Respondent Employees were 
allowed to retain their union membership, 
UIC would not be assured of their loyalty 
because of the apparent conflict between 
the employees’ personal interests and their 
duty as confidential employees. Such a 
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result is likely to create an atmosphere of 
distrust between UIC and the confidential 
employees, and it would be nigh 
unreasonable to compel UIC to continue in 
employment persons whom it no longer 
trusts to handle delicate matters.
Finally, the Secretary cites Article 248 
[now 259] of the Labor Code to support his 
conclusion that Respondent Employees 
were illegally dismissed. Article 248(a) [now 
259(a)] considers as unfair labor practice 
an employer’s act of interfering with, 
restraining or coercing employees in the 
exercise of their right to self-organization. 
However, it is well established that the 
right to self-organization under the Labor 
Code does not extend to managerial and 
confidential employees, while supervisory 
employees are not allowed to join the rank-
and-file union. In view of the limitation 
imposed upon these specific classes of 
employees, Article 248(a) [now 259(a)] 
should therefore be interpreted to cover 
only interference with the right to self-
organization of bona fide members of the 
bargaining unit. The provision finds no 
application in this case which involves 
confidential employees who are, by law, 
denied the right to join labor unions. 
(Citations omitted.)
The Court held that confidential employees may not 
form or join unions—an additional layer of distinction 
among workers with respect to their right to organize. 
This distinction is established purely by jurisprudence. 
Explaining that such a distinction was only created in its 
earlier decisions, the Court itself conceded that no such 
distinction exists in the Labor Code.
The distinction can be traced back to the 1989 case of 
Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja,51 which has been cited by 
University of the Immaculate Conception and other decisions. 
Interestingly, Golden Farms did not really interpret the 
provisions of the Labor Code. It only focused on a specific 
stipulation in a CBA between Golden Farms, Inc. and the 
National Federation of Labor. The relevant stipulation read:
Section 1. The COMPANY and the UNION 
hereby agree that the recognized 
bargaining unit for purposes of this 
agreement shall consist of regular 
rank-and-file workers employed by the 
COMPANY at the plantation presently 
situated at Alejal, Carmen, Davao. 
Consequently, all managerial personnel 
like, superintendents, supervisor, 
foremen, administrative, professional 
and confidential employees, and those 
temporary, casual, contractual, and seasonal 
workers are excluded from the bargaining 
unit and therefore, not covered by this 
agreement. (Emphases supplied.)
In upholding the exclusions in the CBA, the Court ruled:
Respondents do not dispute the existence 
of said collective bargaining agreement. We 
must therefore respect this CBA which was 
freely and voluntarily entered into as the law 
between the parties for the duration of the 
period agreed upon. Until then no one can 
be compelled to accept changes in the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreement.
Furthermore, the signatories to the petition 
for certification election are the very 
type of employees by the nature of their 
positions and functions which We have 
decreed as disqualified from bargaining 
with management in case of Bulletin 
Publishing Co. Inc. vs. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, 
etc. (144 SCRA 628) reiterating herein the 
rationale for such ruling as follows: if these 
managerial employees would belong to or 
be affiliated with a Union, the latter might 
not be assured of their loyalty to the Union 
in view of evident conflict of interests or 
that the Union can be company-dominated 
with the presence of managerial employees 
in Union membership. A managerial 
employee is defined under Art. 212 (k) of 
the new Labor Code as “one who is vested 
with powers or prerogatives to lay down 
and execute management policies and/
or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, 
discharge, assign or discipline employees, or 
to effectively recommend such managerial 
actions. All employees not falling within 
this definitions are considered rank-and-
file employees for purposes of this Book.”
This rationale holds true also for 
confidential employees such as accounting 
personnel, radio and telegraph operators, 
who having access to confidential 
information, may become the source of 
undue advantage. Said employee(s) may 
act as a spy or spies of either party to a 
collective bargaining agreement. This is 
specially true in the present case where the 
petitioning Union is already the bargaining 
agent of the rank-and-file employees in the 
establishment. To allow the confidential 
employees to join the existing Union of 
the rank-and-file would be in violation 
of the terms of the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement wherein this kind of employees 
by the nature of their functions/positions 
are expressly excluded. (Emphases supplied.)
Clearly, Golden Farms did not set any precedent to 
deprive all confidential employees of their right to organize. 
It merely disqualified the confidential employees of a 
particular company, Golden Farms, Inc., from joining the 
union therein based solely on the CBA, which provided for     
such disqualification.
Nonetheless, Golden Farms was cited in the 1994 case of 
National Association of Trade Unions (NATU)-Republic Planters 
Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torres.52 In this case, which was 
also cited by University of the Immaculate Conception, the 
Court disqualified all confidential employees in the private 
sector from the right to organize under the doctrine of 
necessary implication. It ruled:
While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles 
out managerial employees as ineligible to 
join, assist or form any labor organization, 
under the doctrine of necessary implication, 
confidential employees are similarly 
disqualified. This doctrine states that 
what is implied in a statute is as much a 
part thereof as that which is expressed, 
as elucidated in several cases the latest of 
which is Chua v. Civil Service Commission 
where we said:
No statute can be enacted 
that can provide all the 
details involved in its 
application. There is always 
an omission that may not 
meet a particular situation. 
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What is thought, at the 
time of enactment, to be an 
all-embracing legislation 
may be inadequate to 
provide for the unfolding 
events of the future. 
So-called gaps in the 
law develop as the law is 
enforced. One of the rules 
of statutory construction 
used to fill in the gap is 
the doctrine of necessary 
implication . . . . Every 
statute is understood, by 
implication, to contain all 
such provisions as may 
be necessary to effectuate 
its object and purpose, 
or to make effective 
rights, powers, privileges 
or jurisdiction which it 
grants, including all such 
collateral and subsidiary 
consequences as may 
be fairly and logically 
inferred from its terms. Ex 
necessitate legis . . . .
In applying the doctrine of necessary 
implication, we took into consideration 
the rationale behind the disqualification 
of managerial employees expressed in 
Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, 
thus: “. . . if these managerial employees 
would belong to or be affiliated with a 
Union, the latter might not be assured 
of their loyalty to the Union in view of 
evident conflict of interests. The Union can 
also become company-dominated with 
the presence of managerial employees in 
Union membership.” Stated differently, 
in the collective bargaining process, 
managerial employees are supposed to 
be on the side of the employer, to act as 
its representatives, and to see to it that its 
interests are well protected. The employer 
is not assured of such protection if these 
employees themselves are union members. 
Collective bargaining in such a situation 
can become one-sided. It is the same reason 
that impelled this Court to consider the 
position of confidential employees as 
included in the disqualification found in 
Art. 245 [now 255] as if the disqualification 
of confidential employees were written in 
the provision. If confidential employees 
could unionize in order to bargain for 
advantages for themselves, then they 
could be governed by their own motives 
rather than the interest of the employers. 
Moreover, unionization of confidential 
employees for the purpose of collective 
bargaining would mean the extension of 
the law to persons or individuals who are 
supposed to act “in the interest of” the 
employers. It is not farfetched that in the 
course of collective bargaining, they might 
jeopardize that interest which they are 
duty-bound to protect. Along the same line 
of reasoning we held in Golden Farms, Inc. v. 
Ferrer-Calleja reiterated in Philips Industrial 
Development, Inc. v. NLRC, that “confidential 
employees such as accounting personnel, 
radio and telegraph operators who, having 
access to confidential information, may 
become the source of undue advantage. 
Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies 
of either party to a collective bargaining 
agreement.” (Citations omitted, emphases 
supplied.)
In its decisions, the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association is silent on the right to organize of confidential 
employees in the private sector as a specific class of workers. 
Nonetheless, the general rule should prevail:
Article 2 of Convention No. 87 is designed 
to give expression to the principle of non-
discrimination in trade union matters, 
and the words “without distinction 
whatsoever” used in this Article mean 
that freedom of association should be 
guaranteed without discrimination of any 
kind based on occupation, sex, colour, race, 
beliefs, nationality, political opinion, etc., 
not only to workers in the private sector 
of the economy, but also to civil servants 
and public service employees in general.53 
(Emphases supplied.)
The additional distinction, therefore, is contrary 
to Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 87. Unfortunately, 
the Convention was neither invoked nor mentioned in 
University of the Immaculate Conception.
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Meanwhile, in the 2015 case of Samahan ng Manggagawa 
sa Hanjin Shipyard v. Bureau of Labor Relations,54 the Court 
clarified what organizations may be formed by employees 
on one hand, and workers without employer-employee 
relationships on the other. In 2010, the DOLE issued Samahan 
ng mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard (Samahan) a 
certificate of registration as a workers’ association. Hanjin 
Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines 
(Hanjin) filed a petition for cancellation of registration of 
Samahan, claiming that a third of the latter’s members had 
definite employers. The second sentence of Article 253 of 
the Labor Code states that “[a]mbulant, intermittent and 
itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers 
and those without any definite employers may form labor 
organizations for their mutual aid and protection.”
In this case, the Court ruled that while the right to form 
and join labor organizations is limited to workers with 
employer-employee relationships, those without may still 
form and join “workers’ associations.” As discussed earlier, the 
former is a “union or association of employees which exists 
in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions 
of employment.” Meanwhile, the latter can only be formed for 
the purpose of “mutual aid and protection.” 
The Court noted, however, that the law does not limit 
membership in workers’ associations only to workers 
without employers, or those listed in the second sentence 
of Article 253. Thus, in addition to their right to form and 
join labor organizations, employees with definite employers 
also have the right to join workers’ associations. The Court 
ruled in favor of Samahan and upheld its registration as a 
workers’ association.
While it never mentioned ILO Convention No. 87, 
Samahan ng Manggagawa has implications on the freedom 
of association. The primordial question is whether a 
workers’ association qualifies as an “organisation” under 
the Convention. It does not. Article 10 of the Convention 
defines an “organisation” as “any organisation of workers 
or of employers for furthering and defending the interests of 
workers or of employers.” Meanwhile, a workers’ association is 
an organization formed by workers merely “for their mutual 
aid and protection”—a concept far too different from the 
idea of furthering and defending their interests.
Thus, while the Labor Code protects the right of 
employees to form and join labor organizations in 
accordance with the Convention, the same cannot be said 
for workers without definite employers. The Labor Code 
grants workers without definite employers the right to form 
and join workers’ associations not because of any specific 
right of workers to organize, but only because of the general 
right of any person to form and join any organization. 
Indeed, any group of persons, workers or not, can form 
any association for their mutual aid and protection under 
this general right. The ruling in Samahan ng Manggagawa 
is telling: The specific right to unionize is limited to 
employees, while the general right to organize is accorded to 
both employees and workers without employers. From this 
perspective, the second sentence of Article 253 of the Labor 
Code is a mere superfluity.
Therefore, in Samahan ng Manggagawa, the Court did not 
advance or promote the freedom of association of workers, 
which is separately protected by ILO Convention No. 87, 
the various international instruments, and the Philippine 
Constitution from the general right to organize. It merely 
upheld the existing distinction in domestic law between 
employees and workers without employers, as well as the 
general right of any person to organize.
 
In the 2016 case of Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water 
Employees Union,55 petitioner Allan M. Mendoza was a 
member of Manila Water Employees Union (MWEU), a labor 
organization of rank-and-file employees in the Manila 
Water Company. On three successive occasions, the MWEU 
Executive Board charged and found Mendoza guilty of 
nonpayment of union dues. After being suspended for the 
first two violations, he was finally expelled on the third. 
For each finding, Mendoza demanded that the General 
Membership Assembly convene to allow him to appeal 
under Article V, Section 2(g) of MWEU’s Constitution and By-
Laws (CBL). Yet, all of Mendoza’s pleas for appeal were ignored.
In interpreting the CBL, the Court found that the 
MWEU Executive Board did not comply with its obligation 
to act on each of Mendoza’s appeals. Therefore, the 
suspension and expulsion imposed on Mendoza were 
illegal. The Court found the members of the Board 
guilty of unfair labor practice under Article 260(a) and 
(b) of the Labor Code56 for violating Mendoza’s right to 
self-organization, unlawful discrimination, and illegal 
termination of his union membership.
Like the other cases earlier discussed, Mendoza did 
not mention—much less use—ILO Convention No. 87, it 
demonstrated how a worker’s right to organize may be 
invoked not just against an employer or the government, 
but also against labor organizations.
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Right to organizational autonomy
Nonetheless, ILO Convention No. 87 is not completely 
disregarded in jurisprudence. In two recent cases where the 
right to organizational autonomy was at issue, the Court 
either mentioned or ruled consistently with the Convention. 
Notably, in the 2013 case of Baptista v. Villanueva,57 the 
Court cited the Convention in resolving the case filed by 
petitioners Minette Baptista, Bannie Edsel San Miguel, and 
Ma. Fe Dayon against their then union, the Radio Philippines 
Network Employees Union (RPNEU). The union was a 
legitimate labor organization and the sole and exclusive 
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Radio 
Philippines Network (RPN). 
On suspicion of union mismanagement, the petitioners 
filed before the RPN Executive Board a complaint for 
impeachment of RPNEU President Reynato Siozon. Later, 
they filed before DOLE another impeachment complaint 
against all RPNEU officers. They likewise filed multiple 
petitions for audit covering the years 2000 to 2004.
Within months, three complaints were filed against the 
petitioners before RPNEU for violating: (1) Article IX, Section 
2.2 of the CBL, in joining or forming another union; and (2) 
Article IX, Section 2.5, in urging a member to start an action 
in any court of justice or external investigative body against 
the union or its officers without first exhausting all internal 
remedies available under the CBL. 
RPNEU’s Board of Directors found the petitioners guilty 
and expelled them from the union. Under the union security 
clause in RPNEU’s CBA with RPN, they were terminated from 
employment. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed complaints 
against RPNEU’s officers for unfair labor practice.
The Court upheld the petitioners’ expulsion after 
finding that the respondents were not guilty of unfair 
labor practice. In so ruling, the Court cited Article 3 of ILO 
Convention No. 87, fully quoting the provision, which 
recognizes the right of workers’ organizations to autonomy: 
It is well-settled that workers’ and 
employers’ organizations shall have 
the right to draw up their constitutions 
and rules, to elect their representatives 
in full freedom, to organize their 
administration and activities and to 
formulate their programs. In this case, 
RPNEU’s Constitution and By-Laws expressly 
mandate that before a party is allowed 
to seek the intervention of the court, it 
is a pre-condition that he should have 
availed of all the internal remedies within 
the organization. Petitioners were found 
to have violated the provisions of the 
union’s Constitution and By-Laws when 
they filed petitions for impeachment 
against their union officers and for audit 
before the DOLE without first exhausting 
all internal remedies available within 
their organization. This act is a ground 
for expulsion from union membership. 
Thus, petitioners’ expulsion from the 
union was not a deliberate attempt to 
curtail or restrict their right to organize, 
but was triggered by the commission of an 
act, expressly sanctioned by Section 2.5 of 
Article IX of the union’s Constitution and 
By-Laws. (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied.)
The citation is significant. In this case, the Court used 
the Convention as basis for ruling in the respondents’ favor. 
Perhaps, this was due to the absence of any constitutional 
or statutory provision that expressly grants workers’ 
organizations the right to autonomy, particularly the 
“right to draw up their constitutions and rules.” The Labor 
Code merely refers to CBLs of labor organizations without 
expressly recognizing their right to draw up their own CBLs.
Unlike Baptista, the 2014 case of T&H Shopfitters Corp./Gin 
Queen Corp. v. T&H Shopfitters Corp./Gin Queen Workers Union58 
made no mention of the Convention. Nonetheless, in this 
case, the Court protected union autonomy in accordance 
with the Convention. 
The case stemmed from a complaint for unfair labor 
practice by way of union busting and illegal lockout filed 
by T&H Shopfitters Corporation/Gin Queen Workers Union 
against T&H Shopfitters Corporation (T&H Shopfitters) and 
Gin Queen Corporation (Gin Queen). The union claimed that 
before it was even formed, the corporations had been trying 
to prevent unionization. When employees started discussing 
the formation of the union, 17 of them were transferred 
to another workplace and repeatedly ordered to go on 
forced leave due to unavailability of work. In the meantime, 
subcontractors were continuously hired to perform their 
functions. When the employees finally formed the union, 
filing a petition for certification election to become the 
exclusive bargaining agent, the corporations transferred 
union officers and members to another workplace where 
they were made to work as grass cutters. On the eve of the 
certification election, the corporations sponsored a field trip 
for its employees—excluding union officers and members—
 11   HUSTISYA NATIN
where a sales officer of the corporations campaigned 
against the union. The employees who joined the field trip 
were escorted the next day to the polling center for the 
certification election. The votes for “no union” won.
The Supreme Court found the employers guilty of unfair 
labor practice under Article 259(a), (c), and (e) of the Labor 
Code.59 It said:
Indubitably, the various acts of petitioners, 
taken together, reasonably support an 
inference that, indeed, such were all 
orchestrated to restrict respondents’ free 
exercise of their right to self-organization. 
The Court is of the considered view that 
petitioners’ undisputed actions prior 
and immediately before the scheduled 
certification election, while seemingly 
innocuous, unduly meddled in the affairs 
of its employees in selecting their exclusive 
bargaining representative. In Holy Child 
Catholic School v. Hon. Patricia Sto. Tomas, the 
Court ruled that a certification election was 
the sole concern of the workers, save when 
the employer itself had to file the petition 
x x x, but even after such filing, its role in 
the certification process ceased and became 
merely a bystander. Thus, petitioners had 
no business persuading and/or assisting 
its employees in their legally protected 
independent process of selecting their 
exclusive bargaining representative. The 
fact and peculiar timing of the field trip 
sponsored by petitioners for its employees 
not affiliated with THS-GQ Union, although 
a positive enticement, was undoubtedly 
extraneous influence designed to impede 
respondents in their quest to be certified. 
This cannot be countenanced.
Not content with achieving a “no union” 
vote in the certification election, petitioners 
launched a vindictive campaign against 
union members by assigning work on 
a rotational basis while subcontractors 
performed the latter’s functions regularly. 
Worse, some of the respondents were 
made to work as grass cutters in an effort 
to dissuade them from further collective 
action. Again, this cannot be countenanced. 
(Citation omitted.)
Right against dissolution and suspension
Concerning the right of workers’ organizations against 
dissolution and suspension by administrative authority, the 
Supreme Court decided three cases within the period 2010 to 
2017.
 
In the 2010 case of Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club v. 
Court of Appeals,60 the Eagle Ridge Employees Union filed 
on January 10, 2006 a petition for certification election 
after registering as a legitimate labor organization in 
Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club (Eagle Ridge). Eagle Ridge 
opposed the petition and filed a petition for cancellation of 
registration of the union, alleging that the union committed 
misrepresentation, false statements, or fraud by falsely 
claiming that it had more than the minimum number of 
required members. It further contended that five members 
withdrew from the union on February 15, 2006, bringing 
union membership to below the minimum.
The Court ruled that the union did not make any 
misrepresentation in its application for registration, 
finding the declared number of members to be correct as of 
the filing of the application. It also found no merit in Eagle 
Ridge’s claim on the alleged withdrawal of members since 
it happened after the petition for certification election had 
been filed. The Court quoted S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. 
S.S. Ventures Labor Union:
We have in precedent cases said that the 
employees’ withdrawal from a labor union 
made before the filing of the petition for 
certification election is presumed voluntary, 
while withdrawal after the filing of such 
petition is considered to be involuntary 
and does not affect the same. Now then, if a 
withdrawal from union membership done 
after a petition for certification election has 
been filed does not vitiate such petition, 
is it not but logical to assume that such 
withdrawal cannot work to nullify the 
registration of the union? Upon this light, 
the Court is inclined to agree with the CA 
that the BLR did not abuse its discretion 
nor gravely err when it concluded that the 
affidavits of retraction of the 82 members 
had no evidentiary weight.61 (Emphases 
omitted.)
The Court also observed that Eagle Ridge was using the 
petition for cancellation of the union’s registration as a 
subterfuge to prevent a certification election. It ruled:
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Indeed, where the company seeks the 
cancellation of a union’s registration 
during the pendency of a petition for 
certification election, the same grounds 
invoked to cancel should not be used to bar 
the certification election. A certification 
election is the most expeditious and fairest 
mode of ascertaining the will of a collective 
bargaining unit as to its choice of its 
exclusive representative. It is the fairest and 
most effective way of determining which 
labor organization can truly represent 
the working force. It is a fundamental 
postulate that the will of the majority, if 
given expression in an honest election with 
freedom on the part of the voters to make 
their choice, is controlling. (Citations omitted.)
The Court in this case did not mention ILO Convention 
No. 87. Notably, the DOLE Regional Director, with whom the 
petition for cancellation of union registration was filed, 
ruled in favor of Eagle Ridge and ordered the delisting of 
the union from the roster of legitimate labor organizations. 
Under Article 4 of ILO Convention No. 87, the DOLE Regional 
Director, who was an administrative officer, should not have 
had the authority to cancel the union’s registration in the 
first place. In its decisions, the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association has ruled that “the cancellation of registration 
of an organization by the registrar of trade unions or their 
removal from the register is tantamount to the dissolution 
of that organization by administrative authority.”62 
According to the Committee, the “[c]ancellation of a trade 
union’s registration should only be possible through 
judicial channels.”63
In the 2011 case of The Heritage Hotel Manila v. National 
Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries-
Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter,64 the National Union 
of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries–
Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter filed in 1995 a 
petition for certification election in Heritage Hotel Manila, 
which was granted. However, before the certification election, 
Grand Plaza Hotel Corporation (Grand Plaza), which owned 
the hotel, filed a petition for cancellation of registration 
of the union on the ground of the latter’s failure to submit 
annual financial reports and the list of its members.
The union, however, did submit the said documents, 
albeit belatedly. Nonetheless, Grand Plaza argued that it was 
the ministerial duty of the DOLE Regional Director to cancel 
the registration of a labor organization upon determination 
that a ground for cancellation was present. 
The Court disagreed, ruling that the power to cancel a 
union’s registration is discretionary, and the late filing of 
the said documents may be validly treated as sufficient 
compliance with the requirements of the law. The Court said:
Labor authorities should, indeed, act 
with circumspection in treating petitions 
for cancellation of union registration, 
lest they be accused of interfering with 
union activities. In resolving the petition, 
consideration must be taken of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 
XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, i.e., the 
rights of all workers to self-organization, 
collective bargaining and negotiations, 
and peaceful concerted activities. Labor 
authorities should bear in mind that 
registration confers upon a union the 
status of legitimacy and the concomitant 
right and privileges granted by law to a 
legitimate labor organization, particularly 
the right to participate in or ask for 
certification election in a bargaining unit. 
Thus, the cancellation of a certificate of 
registration is the equivalent of snuffing 
out the life of a labor organization. For 
without such registration, it loses - as a rule 
- its rights under the Labor Code.
In this case, the Court cited ILO Convention No. 87, 
but only to contextualize R.A. No. 9481, which deleted the 
ground upon which the petition for cancellation of union 
registration relied, and to “fortify” its ruling. The Court said:
It is worth mentioning that the Labor 
Code’s provisions on cancellation of 
union registration and on reportorial 
requirements have been recently amended 
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9481, An Act 
Strengthening the Workers’ Constitutional 
Right to Self-Organization, Amending 
for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 
442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as 
the Labor Code of the Philippines, which 
lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and 
became effective on June 14, 2007. The 
amendment sought to strengthen the 
workers’ right to self-organization and 
enhance the Philippines’ compliance with 
its international obligations as embodied 
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in the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) Convention No. 87, pertaining to the 
non-dissolution of workers’ organizations 
by administrative authority. […]
  x x x
ILO Convention No. 87, which we have 
ratified in 1953, provides that “workers’ 
and employers’ organizations shall not 
be liable to be dissolved or suspended by 
administrative authority.” The ILO has 
expressed the opinion that the cancellation 
of union registration by the registrar of 
labor unions, which in our case is the 
BLR, is tantamount to dissolution of the 
organization by administrative authority 
when such measure would give rise to 
the loss of legal personality of the union 
or loss of advantages necessary for it to 
carry out its activities, which is true in our 
jurisdiction. Although the ILO has allowed 
such measure to be taken, provided that 
judicial safeguards are in place, i.e., the 
right to appeal to a judicial body, it has 
nonetheless reminded its members that 
dissolution of a union, and cancellation 
of registration for that matter, involve 
serious consequences for occupational 
representation. It has, therefore, deemed it 
preferable if such actions were to be taken 
only as a last resort and after exhausting 
other possibilities with less serious effects 
on the organization.
The aforesaid amendments and the ILO’s 
opinion on this matter serve to fortify our 
ruling in this case. (Citations omitted.)
The third case, resolved in 2014, involved the same 
employer and union. The Heritage Hotel Manila v. Secretary 
of Labor and Employment65 stemmed from the Med-Arbiter’s 
Order dismissing Grand Plaza’s protest with motion to defer 
the certification of the election results and the winner after 
the victory of the union in the certification election. 
Grand Plaza contended that the union had no right 
to file a petition for certification election because it had 
a mixed membership of supervisory and rank-and-file 
employees. It cited the Supreme Court’s decisions in Toyota 
Motor Philippines Corp. v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Labor 
Union66 and Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), Inc. v. Secretary of Labor 
and Employment.67
The applicability of the rulings in Toyota Motor and 
Dunlop Slazenger, as previously explained by the Court in 
Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg. Philippines, Inc.,68 depends 
on when the petition for certification election was filed in 
each case. While both of these cases applied to petitions filed 
under the 1989 Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 
No. 6715, a different rule applied to petitions filed under 
DOLE Department Order (D.O.) No. 9, s. 1997. Per the latter rule, 
commingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in 
the membership of a union can no longer affect its legitimacy 
and right to file a petition for certification election. This 
is because D.O. No. 9 removed the requirement to indicate 
in a petition for certification election that the appropriate 
bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees does not 
include supervisory employees and/or security guards. 
Relevantly, R.A. No. 9481, which took effect on June 14, 
2007, inserted new provisions in the Labor Code. Articles 256 
and 271 state:
Article 256. Effect of Inclusion as Members of 
Employees Outside the Bargaining Unit. — The 
inclusion as union members of employees 
outside the bargaining unit shall not 
be a ground for the cancellation of the 
registration of the union. Said employees 
are automatically deemed removed from 
the list of membership of said union.
Article 271. Employer as Bystander. — In all 
cases, whether the petition for certification 
election is filed by an employer or a 
legitimate labor organization, the employer 
shall not be considered a party thereto with 
a concomitant right to oppose a petition 
for certification election. The employer’s 
participation in such proceedings shall be 
limited to: (1) being notified or informed of 
petitions of such nature; and (2) submitting 
the list of employees during the pre-
election conference should the Med-Arbiter 
act favorably on the petition.
The new provisions dispelled any doubt on the effect of 
commingling in union membership. An employer may no 
longer raise it as a ground to cancel a union’s registration or 
to prevent certification elections since the employer has no 
more standing to do so, and the law deems employees not 
belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit removed from 
membership in a union.
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In this 2014 case of The Heritage Hotel Manila, the petition 
for certification election was filed on October 11, 1995, under 
the 1989 Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 
6715. Toyota Motor and Dunlop Slazenger, therefore, applied. 
Nonetheless, the Court ruled against Grand Plaza, explaining 
that it failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove the 
commingling of membership in the union. The Court upheld 
the union’s right to file a petition for certification election.
Unlike the 2011 decision, this decision did not directly 
cite ILO Convention No. 87. The Convention was mentioned 
only in the portion directly quoted from the 2011 decision, 
clarifying that the 2011 decision had already disposed of the 
question of the union’s legitimacy.
Right to affiliate
In the period 2010 to 2017, two cases involving the right 
of workers’ organizations to establish and join federations 
and confederations were decided by the Supreme Court. 
No decision was rendered on the right to affiliate with 
international workers’ and employers’ organizations. The 
first case was Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of 
Free Workers v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc.69 The case was decided 
by the Court on November 15, 2010, while the respondent’s 
motion for reconsideration was resolved on June 6, 2011. The 
resolution, not the decision, discussed the right of the union 
to affiliate with a federation.
The case involved Cirtek Employees Labor Union 
(CELU), which was affiliated with the Federation of Free 
Workers (FFW) and which had a CBA with Cirtek Electronics, 
Inc. (Cirtek Electronics). When the renegotiations over the 
CBA reached a bargaining deadlock, CELU filed a notice of 
strike against Cirtek Electronics. Another notice of strike 
was filed when seven officers of CELU were placed under 
preventive suspension. 
Three days after CELU went on strike, the DOLE Secretary 
assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. Meanwhile, 
Cirtek Electronics and CELU executed a Memorandum 
of Agreement (MOA) providing for wage increases. CELU 
submitted the MOA to the Secretary, alleging that its officers 
signed the MOA under the assurance of Cirtek Electronics 
that it would comply should the Secretary award higher 
wage increases. The Secretary awarded wage increases 
higher than those in the MOA. Cirtek Electronics, however, 
questioned the Secretary’s order before the Court of Appeals. 
When the employer won at the Court of Appeals, FFW, 
on behalf of CELU, filed the subject petition for certiorari 
before the Supreme Court. In its 2010 decision, the Court 
ruled in favor of CELU. Cirtek Electronics filed a motion for 
reconsideration questioning, among others, the standing 
of FFW to file the subject petition. It alleged that CELU had 
already filed before DOLE a resolution of disaffiliation from 
FFW. Thus, FFW lacked personality to represent CELU.
The Court ruled against Cirtek Electronics. It said that 
the issue of whether CELU had validly disaffiliated from FFW 
was a question of fact which could not be brought before 
the Supreme Court. Moreover, it found that the resolution of 
disaffiliation allegedly filed by CELU was signed on February 
23, 2010, or two months after the subject petition was filed on 
December 22, 2009. Therefore, the belated resolution could not 
have affected FFW’s standing or the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the issue of 
disaffiliation was an intra-union dispute over which the 
Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction and in which 
the employer had no standing. It also said:
Indeed, as respondent-movant itself argues, 
a local union may disaffiliate at any time 
from its mother federation, absent any 
showing that the same is prohibited under 
its constitution or rule. Such, however, does 
not result in it losing its legal personality 
altogether. Verily, Anglo-KMU v. Samahan Ng 
Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa Sa Manila 
Bay Spinning Mills At J.P. Coats enlightens:
A local labor union is 
a separate and distinct 
unit primarily designed 
to secure and maintain 
an equality of bargaining 
power between the 
employer and their 
employee-members. A 
local union does not 
owe its existence to the 
federation with which it is 
affiliated. It is a separate 
and distinct voluntary 
association owing its 
creation to the will of its 
members. The mere act 
of affiliation does not 
divest the local union of its 
own personality, neither 
does it give the mother 
federation the license to 
act independently of the 
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local union. It only gives 
rise to a contract of agency 
where the former acts 
in representation of the 
latter. […]
Whether then, as respondent claims, FFW “went 
against the will and wishes of its principal” 
(the member-employees) by pursuing the case 
despite the signing of the MOA, is not for the 
Court, nor for respondent to determine, but 
for the Union and FFW to resolve on their own 
pursuant to their principal-agent relationship. 
In this resolution, the Court did not cite or mention ILO 
Convention No. 87. Nonetheless, the pronouncements of the 
Court regarding the retention of legal personality of a local 
union upon disaffiliation from its federation are consistent 
with the principles embodied in the Convention. The ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association has ruled that “[t]he 
acquisition of legal personality by workers’ organizations, 
federations and confederations shall not be made subject to 
conditions of such a nature as to restrict the exercise of the 
right to establish and join federations and confederations 
of their own choosing.”70
The 2013 case of National Union of Bank Employees v. 
Philnabank Employees Association71 made similar conclusions. 
In this case, Philnabank Employees Association (PEMA) 
was a union in the Philippine National Bank (PNB). When it 
affiliated with National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), 
a federation of unions in the banking industry, it changed 
its name to NUBE-PNB Employees Chapter (NUBE-PEC). This 
union became the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of 
the rank-and-file employees of PNB, and later executed a CBA 
with PNB. 
When the CBA expired, another union, the Philnabank 
Employees Association-FFW (PEMA-FFW), filed a petition for 
certification election among the rank-and-file employees 
of PNB. During the pendency of the petition, NUBE-PEC 
registered itself as an independent labor organization and 
adopted a resolution of disaffiliation from NUBE, which 
was ratified by about 81% of the total union membership. 
Later, NUBE-PEC filed a motion before the Med-Arbitration 
Unit of DOLE for its name to appear in the official ballots 
of the certification election as “Philnabank Employees 
Association (PEMA)” in light of its independent registration 
and disaffiliation from NUBE. In the alternative, NUBE-PEC 
asked that it be denominated as “PEMA-Serrana Group” and 
PEMA-FFW as “PEMA-Bustria Group.”
The question of whether there was a valid disaffiliation 
from NUBE reached the Supreme Court. As in Cirtek 
Employees, the Court ruled here that the question, being one 
of fact, could not be brought before it. Nonetheless, it upheld 
the right of NUBE-PEC to disaffiliate from NUBE. The Court 
quoted a portion of Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa 
sa M. Greenfield v. Ramos,72 which read:
A local union has the right to disaffiliate 
from its mother union or declare its 
autonomy. A local union, being a separate 
and voluntary association, is free to serve 
the interests of all its members including 
the freedom to disaffiliate or declare its 
autonomy from the federation which it 
belongs when circumstances warrant, 
in accordance with the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of association.
After a survey of other cases, the Court ruled:
These and many more have consistently 
reiterated the earlier view that the right 
of the local members to withdraw from 
the federation and to form a new local 
union depends upon the provisions of 
the union’s constitution, by-laws and 
charter and, in the absence of enforceable 
provisions in the federation’s constitution 
preventing disaffiliation of a local union, 
a local may sever its relationship with its 
parent. In the case at bar, there is nothing 
shown in the records nor is it claimed by 
NUBE that PEMA was expressly forbidden 
to disaffiliate from the federation nor 
were there any conditions imposed for a 
valid breakaway. This being so, PEMA is not 
precluded to disaffiliate from NUBE after 
acquiring the status of an independent 
labor organization duly registered before 
the DOLE. (Citation omitted.)
NUBE, however, also argued that NUBE-PEC’s 
disaffiliation was invalid because it was not decided upon 
by the union members through secret ballot and after due 
deliberation, as supposedly required by Article 250(d) of 
the Labor Code.73 The Court disagreed. It noted that NUBE 
did not cite any provision of law or rule requiring a union’s 
disaffiliation from a federation to follow Article 250(d). 
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Nonetheless, the Court said:
Granting, for argument’s sake, that Article 
241 [now 250] (d) is applicable, still, We 
uphold PEMA’s disaffiliation from NUBE. 
First, non-compliance with the procedure 
on disaffiliation, being premised on purely 
technical grounds cannot rise above the 
employees’ fundamental right to self-
organization and to form and join labor 
organizations of their own choosing for the 
purpose of collective bargaining. Second, 
the Article nonetheless provides that when 
the nature of the organization renders 
such secret ballot impractical, the union 
officers may make the decision in behalf 
of the general membership. In this case, 
NUBE did not even dare to contest PEMA’s 
representation that “PNB employees, from 
where [PEMA] [derives] its membership, are 
scattered from Aparri to Jolo, manning more 
than 300 branches in various towns and cities 
of the country,” hence, “[to] gather the general 
membership of the union in a general 
membership to vote through secret balloting 
is virtually impossible.” It is understandable, 
therefore, why PEMA’s board of directors 
merely opted to submit for ratification of the 
majority their resolution to disaffiliate from 
NUBE. Third, and most importantly, NUBE 
did not dispute the existence of the persons 
or their due execution of the document 
showing their unequivocal support for the 
disaffiliation of PEMA from NUBE. Note 
must be taken of the fact that the list of 
PEMA members (identifying themselves as 
“PEMA-Serrana Group”) who agreed with the 
board resolution was attached as Annex “H” 
of PEMA’s petition before the CA and covered 
pages 115 to 440 of the CA rollo. While fully 
displaying the employees’ printed name, 
identification number, branch, position, and 
signature, the list was left unchallenged by 
NUBE. No evidence was presented that the 
union members’ ratification was obtained 
by mistake or through fraud, force or 
intimidation. Surely, this is not a case where 
one or two members of the local union 
decided to disaffiliate from the mother 
federation, but one where more than a 
majority of the local union members decided 
to disaffiliate.
Akin to Cirtek Employees, the decision here did not 
cite or mention ILO Convention No. 87, but is nonetheless 
consistent with the principle of freedom of association 
under the Convention. Indeed, no union should be forced to 
affiliate or remain affiliated with any federation. This is but 
a logical consequence of the right of workers’ organizations 
to form and join federations of their own choosing. As the 
ILO Committee on Freedom of Association explained, “[t]he 
principle laid down in Article 2 of Convention No. 87 that 
workers and employers shall have the right to establish and 
join organizations of their own choosing implies for the 
organizations themselves the right to establish and join 
federations and confederations of their own choosing.”74
D. Conclusions and Recommendations
Of the Supreme Court decisions surveyed from 2010 to 
2017, only three—Baptista, Heritage Hotel, and 2014 Heritage 
Hotel—mentioned ILO Convention No. 87. Of these three, 
only Baptista directly applied the Convention to decide 
a controversy. The 2011 Heritage Hotel case only cited the 
Convention to contextualize R.A. No. 9481 and “fortify” the 
Court’s ruling. The 2014 Heritage Hotel case mentioned the 
Convention only in directly quoting 2011 Heritage Hotel.
Moreover, at least one decision squarely contradicted 
the Convention. University of the Immaculate Conception 
affirmed the additional distinction disallowing confidential 
employees from forming and joining unions. The 
distinction is purely by judicial fiat; no law in the country 
expressly provides for such prohibition. As discussed, 
the additional distinction runs counter to Article 2 of 
the Convention, which grants the right to organize to all 
workers “without distinction whatsoever.” Meanwhile, 
Samahan ng Manggagawa affirmed the legislative distinction 
between employees and workers without employer-
employee relationships: The former is granted the specific 
right to form and join labor organizations as well as the 
general right to organize, while the latter is only granted the 
general right. Thus, workers without employer-employee 
relationships may only form or join workers’ associations, 
not labor organizations.
Despite mentioning the Convention, the 2011 Heritage 
Hotel case may be incompatible with the Convention, 
as it allows unions to be subjected to dissolution by 
administrative authority. Even if the Court warned labor 
authorities to “act with circumspection” in deciding 
petitions for cancellation of union registration, it still 
upheld the rule allowing the administrative cancellation of 
union registration. The Court declared here that the power 
of administrative authorities to cancel a union’s registration 
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is discretionary. Notably, the Court said this only for the 
purpose of rejecting the employer’s claim that cancellation 
becomes a ministerial duty upon determination that a 
ground for it exists. The same may be said of Eagle Ridge. 
There, while the Court did not allow the petition for 
cancellation of union registration to be used to prevent 
the certification election, it still affirmed the power of 
administrative authorities to order such cancellation.
Still, many of the surveyed decisions were consistent 
with the principle of freedom of association protected 
by the Convention. Baptista correctly applied Article 3 of 
the Convention to uphold the CBL of RPNEU. Interestingly, 
however, by upholding RPNEU’s CBL, the Court also upheld 
the employees’ expulsion from the union and dismissal 
from work. Mendoza, T&H Shopfitters, 2014 Heritage Hotel, 
Cirtek Employees, and National Union were also consistent 
with the principles laid down by the Convention. BPI 
Employees Union likewise did not contradict the Convention, 
considering that the ILO Committee on Freedom of 
Association has left the admissibility of union security 
clauses to the discretion of the parties to the Convention.
Despite all these, the troubling fact remains that there 
is a dearth of use and citations of ILO Convention No. 
87. Jurisprudence betrays the near insignificance of the 
Convention in labor cases concerning freedom of association. 
This is largely due to domestic law. When the Supreme 
Court may use constitutional or statutory provisions to 
decide cases, whether they be consistent with the Convention 
or not, it noticeably fails or refuses to use the Convention. 
This predicament is telling. After all, in the Philippines, 
the status of a treaty is merely equivalent to domestic 
legislation. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant;75 
a later statute prevails over an earlier conflicting statute. 
The Labor Code and the Philippine Constitution took effect 
decades after the Philippines had ratified the Convention. 
Thus, the Convention only sneaks its way into jurisprudence 
for questions not already addressed by the Constitution 
and domestic law. For one, the Court used the Convention in 
Baptista because no provision of law expressly grants unions 
the right to organizational autonomy. 
This is unfortunate. As discussed above, the Convention 
mandates legislative conformity. Article 8 (2) of the 
Convention states: “The law of the land shall not be such 
as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the 
guarantees provided for in this Convention.”
Nonetheless, this reasoning does not explain University 
of the Immaculate Conception. No law currently in effect 
disallows confidential employees from forming and joining 
unions. Yet, the Court ignored the express provision of 
Article 2 of the Convention granting all workers, “without 
distinction whatsoever,” the right to form and join unions. 
In this case, judicial fiat prevailed over a treaty.
Indeed, much work remains to be done in the quest 
for full compliance with ILO Convention No. 87 in the 
Philippines. Amendatory legislation must be enacted. 
Specifically: (1) distinctions among workers with respect to 
their right to form and join labor organizations must be 
abolished; (2) union registration must be made ministerial 
and less difficult, and the power of cancellation should be 
transferred from administrative authorities to courts of law; 
(3) the minimum membership of federations and national 
unions must be reduced to reasonable levels to encourage, 
rather than discourage, their formation; and (4) strict 
regulations on foreign assistance to and cooperation with 
unions must be eased and, ultimately, removed.
Just as important is judicial advocacy. The scant mention 
of the Convention in jurisprudence is not only attributable to 
the Supreme Court, but also to legal practitioners’ reluctance 
to plead it. The Supreme Court may strike down doctrines 
contrary to the Convention through judicial advocacy. An 
example is the doctrine on confidential employees. 
The enactment of R.A. No. 9481 and the development 
of progressive jurisprudence favoring unionism should 
encourage advocates to push for the full realization of 
the Convention. With appropriate reforms, the decline 
and nuclearization of unions in the Philippines may be 
stopped and, eventually, reversed. The 66-year delay in full 
compliance underscores the urgency of advocacy work.
Ultimately paramount, then, is advocacy in all branches 
of government to enable workers to fully enjoy their rights 
under ILO Convention No. 87. The Philippine government, 
as the duty bearer, must effectively discharge its mandate 
of promoting, respecting, and fulfilling workers’ rights to 
freedom of association. But just as indispensable is the role 
of workers, advocates, and other stakeholders to claim these 
rights. By pleading the Convention in cases filed in court, they 
will have already advanced the advocacy one step forward.
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I. Introduction
This research paper builds on the writer’s previous study1 on Philippine Supreme Court decisions on rape and other crimes involving violence against women. As with 
the prior study, this looks into fairly recent decisions of the 
Court (2010–2017) with a focus on rape and sexual assault. It 
assesses whether the doctrines and pronouncements made 
by the Court in these cases comply with the Philippines’ 
mandate under the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) to eliminate gender 
discrimination and promote gender equality.
Two of the CEDAW’s more substantive provisions, which 
are most relevant to this study, are found in Articles 2(c) and 
(f) and 5(a), which require the following of State Parties:
Article 2
States Parties condemn discrimination 
against women in all its forms, agree to 
pursue by all appropriate means and 
without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women and, to this 
end, undertake:
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights 
of women on an equal basis with men and 
to ensure through competent national 
tribunals and other public institutions the 
effective protection of women against any 
act of discrimination;
  . . . .
(f) To take all appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to modify or abolish 
existing laws, regulations, customs and 
practices which constitute discrimination 
against women;
  . . . .
Article 5
States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures:
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns 
of conduct of men and women, with a view 
to achieving the elimination of prejudices 
and customary and all other practices which 
are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
the superiority of either of the sexes or on 
stereotyped roles for men and women[.]2
In concrete terms, these obligations need to be 
reflected not only in a de facto environment, but also 
in laws and jurisprudence, for their full realization and 
implementation.  A legal framework that facilitates the 
removal of barriers which cause discrimination of women 
by addressing the different forms of violence perpetrated 
against them is crucial to the achievement of gender equality.
As far as the law is concerned, the most reflective of the 
country’s obligations with CEDAW is Republic Act No. 9710, or 
the Magna Carta of Women, which took effect in 2009.  
It provides:
SEC. 9. Protection from Violence. — The 
State shall ensure that all women shall 
be protected from all forms of violence 
as provided for in existing laws. Agencies 
of government shall give priority to the 
defense and protection of women against 
gender-based offenses and help women 
attain justice and healing.3
This study focuses on the role of jurisprudence in 
promoting gender equality through case law.  Hence, in 
reviewing Supreme Court’ cases for compliance with CEDAW, 
it examines the language used by the Court to characterize 
overt acts of crimes such as rape and sexual assault, its 
general treatment of perpetrators, and most important, 
the factors it considered in assessing the credibility of rape 
or sexual assault victims.  The study further examines the 
presence of gender bias and stereotypes, and to what extent 
these have affected the resolution of cases.
The study likewise analyzes the Supreme Court’s 
views on the prosecution of these offenses and the ordeal 
that the involved parties have undergone.  The Court has 
expressly acknowledged that rape victims suffer a generally 
harrowing ordeal during trials, which, our previous 
study has found, adds to the stigmatization and double 
victimization of the victims:
Courts have taken judicial notice that it 
is not easy for women and girls to report 
the commission of rape and other acts 
of violence against their persons. One of 
the factors to which such reluctance is 
attributed is the way women have been 
treated in investigations and trials. The 
lack of sensitivity, as well as gender bias, 
often result in the blaming of the victims 
or, at the very least, in their feeling exposed 
and humiliated. This experience of double 
victimization affects their ability to access 
the justice system. If, in the process of 
seeking remedies for the violation of 
their rights, the environment remains 
hostile to the victims/survivors, then the 
justice systems become less accessible and 
available for and to them, a situation that 
could ultimately result in the perpetuation 
of more gender-based violence since 
the system of making the perpetrators 
accountable is not effective.4
II. The Legal Framework: Definition of 
Rape and Sexual Assault
Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Act of 1997, amended 
the Revised Penal Code’s provision on rape and reclassified 
it from being a crime against chastity to a crime against 
persons.  The law states in part:
SEC. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. 
— The crime of rape shall hereafter be 
classified as a Crime Against Persons under 
Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, 
otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code. 
Accordingly, there shall be incorporated 
into Title Eight of the same Code a new 
chapter to be known as Chapter Three on 
Rape, to read as follows:
‘Chapter Three’ ‘Rape’
‘Article 266-A. Rape: When and How 
Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal 
knowledge of a woman under any 
of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or 
intimidation;
b) When the offended party 
is deprived of reason or 
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent 
machination or grave 
abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party 
is under twelve (12) years 
of age or is demented, 
even though none of the 
circumstances mentioned 
above be present.
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2) By any person who, under any 
of the circumstances mentioned 
in paragraph 1 hereof, shall 
commit an act of sexual assault by 
inserting his penis into another 
person's mouth or anal orifice, or 
any instrument or object, into the 
genital or anal orifice of another 
person.5
The amended law has reclassified rape as a crime against 
persons and adding the second paragraph on sexual assault, 
which states that it can be committed against both women 
and men.  Not only are these welcome developments; they 
also challenge the courts to make the appropriate and 
corresponding paradigm shift on rape cases.
After the amendment, it was expected that case law on 
rape would henceforth concentrate more on “the offense’s 
nature as a violation of a person rather than as a violation 
of a woman’s honor,”6 and that the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements would have “less emphasis on the ‘shame,’ 
‘humiliation,’ ‘dishonor,’ ‘embarrassment’ and ‘stigma’ 
befalling the [victim of rape].”7
Further, in a previous research paper, the writer posited:
The change in the law should result in the 
promotion of the rights of women and girls. 
The woman and girl-child must be believed 
on the basis of an appreciation of their own 
testimony and other evidence, if available, 
but not on how chaste or innocent they 
have remained or how well they have taken 
care of their reputation. Courts have the 
responsibility of reflecting this change, not 
only because they have the duty to interpret 
the law but also because those in charge of 
enforcing and implementing it, every so 
often rely on jurisprudence for guidance.8
Yet, the definition of rape remains problematic: it does 
not categorically state that the offense is committed when 
there is sexual intercourse with a woman without her 
consent.  Although the law implies that nonconsensual sex 
is punishable, the manner by which the lack of consent is 
manifested has been defined and, to an extent, limited by 
the circumstances enumerated in the law.  This has required 
the prosecution to prove at least one of these circumstances 
for the commission of rape, and even sexual assault.
The CEDAW Committee has already made 
a recommendation for this problem in its 
Concluding Observations on the Combined 
Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports of the 
Philippines:9
26. The Committee recommends that the 
State [P]arty:
(a) Adopt comprehensive legislation on 
gender-based violence against women 
covering all forms of violence;
(b) Expedite the amendment of the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997,  putting lack of consent 
as the primary element of the  definition  
of rape and raising the minimum age of 
sexual consent, currently set too low at 12 
years, to at least 16 years[.]10
The flaw in the law becomes especially problematic for 
mature women who are in possession of their full cognitive 
faculties when manifesting their non-consent to sexual 
intercourse.  This is despite the fact that, as early as 2002, the 
Supreme Court has already ruled in People v. Dulay11 that:
[a]ny physical overt act manifesting 
resistance against the rape in any degree 
from the victim is admissible as evidence 
of lack of consent. Tenacious resistance, 
however, is not required. Neither is a 
determined and persistent physical 
struggle on the part of the victim necessary.
At the Bicameral Conference Committee 
Meeting on the disagreeing provisions 
of S.B. No. 950 and H.B. No. 6265, the 
forerunners of R.A. No. 8353, the legislators 
agreed that Article 266-D is intended to 
soften the jurisprudence of the 1970s 
when resistance to rape was required to 
be tenacious. The lawmakers took note of 
the fact that rape victims cannot mount a 
physical struggle in cases where they were 
gripped by overpowering fear or subjugated 
by moral authority. Article 266-D tempered 
the case law requirement of physical 
struggle by the victim with the victim’s 
fear of the rapist or incapacity to give valid 
consent. Thus, the law now provides that 
resistance may be proved by any physical
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 overt act in any degree from the offended 
party.12 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
The issue of resistance in rape shall be discussed further 
in this research paper.
III. The Supreme Court Rulings
A.  Language
In several cases, the Court has referred to rape as 
“defloration.”  In People v. Gaduyon,13 the Court noted that 
inconsistencies in a victim’s testimony are expected because 
“she was a minor child during her defloration.”14  It further 
described the perpetrator’s carnal lust as that “which 
deflowered and got [the victim] pregnant.”15  Likewise, in 
People v. Agustin and Hardman,16the Court described what the 
victim had gone through as a deflowering and continuous 
ravaging.
As to the credibility of the offended party, the Court has 
also repeatedly referred to the latter’s testimony as “a story 
of defloration” or “a tale of defloration.”  Thus:
1. “A young girl would not usually concoct a 
tale of defloration[.]”17
2. “No woman would concoct a story of 
defloration[.]”18
3. “No young woman, especially of 
tender age, would concoct a story of 
defloration.”1919
If the Court attempts to sanitize the language of its 
decisions, it should not do so by diminishing the gravity 
of the violation involved in rape and sexual assault cases.  
It should not try to use language that underplays the 
seriousness of the violence inflicted on the offended party.  
Rape and sexual assault survivors deserve better treatment, 
including an accurate depiction of the wrong committed 
against them.  Calling rape a “deflowering” or the victims’ 
testimonies as tales of defloration not only trivializes their 
ordeal; it also diminishes the viciousness and perversity of 
the perpetrators.20
Furthermore, comparing the female genitalia to a flower 
may lead to gender stereotypes of young women and girls 
as delicate, fragile, and weak.  This may, in turn, lead to their 
stigmatization, such that their “defilement” practically robs 
them of their chance to grow and blossom, just like what is 
expected from a flower bud.  Thus:
A bud plucked from the stalk would never 
have its chance to blossom. A young plant 
prematurely clipped of its branches would 
never develop and grow to its full and 
natural potential. Both would need care and 
attention to be able to recover and mend. In 
the ultimate end, however, what has been 
lost could never be regained or restored.21
This pronouncement is reminiscent of an old case 
where the Court has also stigmatized the offended party:
She was also aware that by testifying, she 
made public a painful and humiliating 
secret which others would have simply 
kept to themselves forever, jeopardized 
her chances of marriage or foreclosed the 
possibility of a blissful married life, as her 
husband may not fully understand the 
excruciatingly painful experience which 
would haunt her.22
It is, thus, important that courts use gender-sensitive 
language especially in their decisions on rape and sexual 
assault cases.  Sanitizing terms with metaphors can lead to 
gender stereotypes.  It can create stigma against the victim 
while trivializing the crime and acts of the perpetrator.
B. Stereotyping 
Most of the rape cases examined accorded credibility to 
the offended parties mainly because they were “minors,” “of 
tender age,” “young and immature,” or “not yet exposed to 
the ways of the world.”
There is merit in finding that young children—
specifically in the context of the reviewed cases, girls—could 
not possibly concoct a story about being raped or sexually 
assaulted considering their youth and innocence.  Indeed, 
the younger and more “unexposed” they are to the world, 
the more unlikely they are to fabricate the sordid details of 
the ordeal that they have undergone.  From these truisms, 
generalizations have been created about children’s behavior, 
attributes,23 and reactions to rape and sexual assault, which 
facilitated the Court’s creation of doctrines regarding 
children’s credibility when they testify in court.  Thus, if 
the victims were minors, young and immature, and not 
exposed to the world, they were accorded credibility by all 
levels of the judiciary.  Relying on earlier pronouncements 
about credibility of the offended parties, doctrines have 
been enunciated repeatedly in rape cases involving young 
and immature offended parties.  Again, there is nothing 
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intrinsically wrong with these doctrines or their consistent 
application.  However, in so doing, courts also risk failing to 
make more nuanced observations and distinctions about 
and between child-victims.
In People v. Tejero:24
[W]hen the offended parties are young and 
immature girls, as in this case, courts are 
inclined to lend credence to their version of 
what transpired, considering not only their 
relative vulnerability, but also the shame 
and embarrassment to which they would 
be exposed if the matter about which they 
testified were not true.25
In People v. Biala:26
The Court has held time and again that 
the testimony of child-victim is normally 
given full weight and credit considering not 
only her relative vulnerability but also the 
shame to which she would be exposed if the 
matter to which she testified was not true. 
Youth and immaturity are generally badges 
of truth and sincerity.27
In People v. Estrada:28
Moreover, the testimony of a rape victim, 
especially one who is young and immature, 
deserves full credit considering that 
no woman would concoct a story of 
defloration, allow an examination of her 
private parts and thereafter allow herself to 
be perverted in a public trial if she was not 
motivated solely by the desire to have the 
culprit apprehended and punished.29
In People v. Relanes:30
[N]o young girl would concoct a sordid 
tale of so serious a crime as rape at the 
hands of her own father, undergo medical 
examination, then subject herself to the 
stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, 
if her motive [was] other than a fervent 
desire to seek justice.31
In People v. Tolentino:32
[N]o young woman, especially of tender age, 
would concoct a story of defloration, allow 
an examination of her private parts, and 
thereafter pervert herself by being subjected 
to public trial, if she was not motivated 
solely by the desire to obtain justice for the 
wrong committed against her.33
In People v. Baraoil:34
A young girl would not usually concoct a 
tale of defloration; publicly admit having 
been ravished and her honor tainted; allow 
the examination of her private parts; and 
undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, 
not to mention the trauma and scandal 
of a public trial, had she not in fact been 
raped and been truly moved to protect and 
preserve her honor, and motivated by the 
desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts 
committed against her.35
In People v. Buca:36
The Court has held time and again that 
testimonies of rape victims who are young 
and immature deserve full credence, 
considering that no young woman, 
especially of tender age, would concoct a 
story of defloration, allow an examination 
of her private parts, and thereafter pervert 
herself by being subject to a public trial, if 
she was not motivated solely by the desire 
to obtain justice for the wrong committed 
against her. Youth and immaturity are 
generally badges of truth. It is highly 
improbable that a girl of tender years, one 
not yet exposed to the ways of the world, 
would impute to any man a crime so serious 
as rape if what she claims is not true.37
Aside from youth and immaturity, the offended parties 
in the above cases have been further attributed with the 
following motivations for telling the truth..  In Tejero and 
Salvador, where the offended parties were 14 and 15 years 
old, respectively, it was “shame and embarrassment to which 
they would be exposed if the matter about which they 
testified were not true.”  The possibility of shame befalling 
them was also the motivation attributed for the credibility 
of the offended parties in Biala and Llanas, who were 11 and 
15 years old, respectively.
In Tolentino, Estrada, Relantes, Baraoil, and Buca, the 
reasons given for the offended parties’ motivations for 
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telling the truth were not only the general desire to obtain 
justice and have themselves vindicated for the wrong done 
to them, but also their taking the risk of undergoing a 
trial where they are expected to be “perverted,” subjected 
to scandal, and stigmatized.  In Tolentino, Estrada, and 
Relantes, the offended parties were 11, 12, and 13 years old, 
respectively, but in Baraoil and Buca, the offended parties 
were merely five and seven years old, respectively.  
Certainly, these last two victims, assuming that they 
feared being in a trial, could not possibly be thinking about 
the stigma, shame, scandal, or perversion associated with 
rape and sexual assault trials where victims are insensitively 
made to relive what was done to them and be “victims” 
again just so they could successfully prosecute the accused.  
It cannot also be said that their ability to comprehend the 
vindication of rights is the same as older victims.  
Hence, to attribute their credibility to a profound sense of 
justice, and further rule that risking double victimization is 
also proof of truthful testimony coming from a five or seven-
year old girl, would be inaccurate.  Yet, this has become part of 
jurisprudence because stereotypes and generalizations have 
found themselves broadly applied to cases, despite a need for 
a far more nuanced and differentiated examination of parties 
and application of doctrine.
It is more plausible that the parents would be the 
ones to deeply feel the hurt and sense of retribution to the 
extent that they would be willing to subject their child to 
the humiliation and stigma associated with trials involving 
rape and sexual assault.  In People v. Batula:38
In People v. Geraban, we held:
It is unnatural for a parent, more so for a 
mother, to use her offspring as an engine 
of malice especially if it will subject her 
child to the humiliation, disgrace and even 
stigma attendant to a prosecution for rape, 
if she were not motivated solely by the 
desire to incarcerate the person responsible 
for her child’s defilement.39
Worse, however, is the Court’s tendency to measure 
the credibility of an offended party only within already 
established parameters of who is a truthful witness, 
according to stereotyped attributes found in previous 
decisions.  In other words, victims who do not fit the 
stereotype of a credible witness find themselves with the 
onus of showing additional proof to qualify as credible.
In Gaduyon:
Thus, an errorless recollection of a 
harrowing experience cannot be expected 
of a witness, especially when she is 
recounting details from an experience 
as humiliating and painful as rape. 
Furthermore, rape victims, especially child 
victims, should not be expected to act the 
way mature individuals would when placed 
in such a situation. Verily, in this case, 
minor inconsistencies in the testimony of 
‘AAA’ are to be expected because (1) she was a 
minor child during her defloration; (2) she 
was to testify on a painful and humiliating 
experience; (3) she was sexually assaulted 
several times; and, (4) she was examined on 
details and events that happened almost six 
months before she testified.40
In Alcober:
It is not uncommon for a young girl to 
conceal for some time the assault on her 
virtue. Her initial hesitation may be due 
to her youth and the molester’s threat 
against her. Besides, rape victims, especially 
child victims, should not be expected to act 
the way mature individuals would when 
placed in such a situation. It is not proper 
to judge the actions of children who have 
undergone traumatic experience by the 
norms of behavior expected from adults 
under similar circumstances ... It is, thus, 
unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from 
them. Certainly, the Court has not laid down 
any rule on how a rape victim should behave 
immediately after she has been violated. 
This experience is relative and may be dealt 
with in any way by the victim depending on 
the circumstances, but her credibility should 
not be tainted with any modicum of doubt. 
Indeed, different people react differently to a 
given stimulus or type of situation, and there 
is no standard form of behavioral response 
when one is confronted with a strange or 
startling or frightful experience. 41
In Tejero:
One should not expect a fourteen-year 
old girl to act like an adult or mature and 
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experienced woman who would know what 
to do under such difficult circumstances 
and who would have the courage and 
intelligence to disregard a threat on her 
life and complain immediately that she 
had been forcibly deflowered. It is not 
uncommon for young girls to conceal 
for sometime the assaults on their virtue 
because of the rapist’s threat on their lives, 
more so when the rapist is living with her.42
In Llanas:
As we have repeatedly held, there is no 
standard norm of behavior for victims of 
rape immediately before and during the 
forcible coitus and its ugly aftermath. This 
is especially true with minor rape victims.43
In these cases, the Court did not just attribute to youth 
and immaturity the inconsistencies in the witnesses’ 
testimonies, reluctance to report the crime, and state of 
fearfulness.  It further rationalized that such behavior 
and responses, while not expected from children, are to 
be expected from adult, mature, or experienced women.  
Although the Court may have correctly ruled that “different 
people react differently to a given stimulus or type of 
situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral 
response when one is confronted with a strange or startling 
or frightful experience,” it seems that as far as rape and 
sexual assault cases are concerned, there is a “standard form” 
of behavior: on one hand, that which is expected from young 
and immature girls; on the other, that which is expected 
from mature women.
Notably, these pronouncements about stereotypical 
mature women being more consistent in testifying, less 
fearful of threats, and less likely to delay reporting crimes, 
as compared to girls, are mostly applied to rape and sexual 
assault cases only.  In other crimes such as murder, the Court 
has not found it necessary to use youth and immaturity as 
explanations for the witnesses’ minor inconsistencies, delays 
in reporting, or fear of reprisal.  At most, it has acknowledged 
the young age of witnesses as one factor, but the explanation 
excluded the inclusion of constructed stereotypes on the 
supposedly contrary behavior or response expected from 
adults who find themselves in the same situation.  Thus, in  
People v. Berondo, Jr. 44the Court ruled:
Accused-appellants guilt is anchored 
only on the testimony of Nietes. Accused- 
appellant, however, faults Nietes for 
belatedly reporting the identities of 
the assailants. He claims that the delay 
impaired Nietes credibility; thus, the latter’s 
testimony should be disregarded.
We disagree. Delay in revealing the identity 
of the perpetrators of a crime does not 
necessarily impair the credibility of 
a witness, especially where sufficient 
explanation is given (citing People v. 
Castillo y Masangkay and Castillo y Arce,
G.R. No. 118912, May 28, 2004). No standard 
form of behavior can be expected from 
people who had witnessed a strange 
or frightful experience (citing People v. 
Dulanas, G.R. No. 159058, May 3, 2006). 
Jurisprudence recognizes that witnesses 
are naturally reluctant to volunteer 
information about a criminal case or 
are unwilling to be involved in criminal 
investigations because  of  varied  reasons. 
Some fear for their lives and that of their 
family (citing People v. Zuniega, G.R. No. 
126117, February 21, 2001); while others 
shy away when those involved in the 
crime are their relatives (citing People v. 
Paraiso, G.R. No. 131823, January 17, 2001) 
or townmates (citing People v. Ignas, G.R. 
Nos. 140514-15). And where there is delay, it 
is more important to consider the reason 
for the delay, which must be sufficient or 
well-grounded, and not the length of delay 
(citing People v. Natividad, G.R. No. 138017, 
February 23, 2001).
In this case, although it took Nietes more 
than two years to report the identity of 
the assailants, such delay was sufficiently 
explained. Nietes stated that he feared for his 
life because the three accused also lived in 
the same town and the incident was the first 
killing in their area. He only had the courage 
to reveal to Dolores what he had witnessed 
because his conscience bothered him.45
In all but one of the cases cited in Berondo, Jr., the 
witnesses involved who had minor inconsistencies 
in their testimonies, experienced fear of reprisal, and 
belatedly reported the crime, were all adults.  In Castillo v. 
Masangkay,46however, the witness whose credibility was 
questioned was a 13-year old boy.  While the Court took 
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note of his youth, it elaborated further why he should be 
considered a credible witness:
Appellants conviction depends on the 
credibility of the lone eyewitness, Romeo 
Hernandez, whose testimony, appellant 
maintained, is unnatural and improbable. 
He regarded Romeo’s failure to aid the 
victim while being attacked and to report 
the crime immediately as suspicious and 
contrary to human experience, considering 
that they were brothers.
Romeo cannot be faulted for not helping 
his brother even as the latter was being 
stabbed and struck to death. No standard 
form of behavioral response can be 
expected from anyone when confronted 
with a startling or frightful occurrence 
(citing People v. Lachica, G.R. No. 131915, 
September 3, 2003). Moreover, this Court 
does not find anything unnatural in 
Romeo’s failure to help his brother as he 
was only thirteen years old when the crime 
happened. Furthermore, as also observed by 
the Court of Appeals, Romeo did plead with 
appellants to stop beating his brother. He 
simply had to flee when appellants turned 
to him.
Neither can appellant cast suspicion on 
Romeos failure to report immediately the 
crime and the identities of his brother’s 
assailants. As correctly pointed out by the 
Court of Appeals, Romeo in his testimony 
attributed his silence to his confusion 
upon seeing his mother cry hysterically 
and afterwards faint. He also feared that if 
he disclosed the identities of the assailants 
right away, his father might look for them 
and figure into more trouble. It was for 
these reasons that he waited until after 
the interment of the victim before issuing  
a  statement  to  the authorities. Delay in 
revealing the identity of the perpetrator of 
a crime, when sufficiently explained, does 
not impair the credibility of a witness.47
It is clear that there were other circumstances which 
contributed to Romeo’s credibility in Castillo, as with other 
decisions on rape cases.  What is glaringly absent, however, is 
the comparison between the behavior of 13-year old Romeo 
and an adult witness to further strengthen his testimony.  
The Court has simply found plausible explanations to 
bolster the witnesses’ credibility, without resorting to 
stereotypes. The same cannot be said of most of the Court’s 
decisions in rape and sexual assault cases, where the Court’s 
decisions have been replete with comparisons between 
the expected response or behavior from a girl and that of a 
mature woman.
Nonetheless, stereotypes are not always present in the 
Court’s decisions.  People v. Brioso,48 the Supreme Court 
discussed fear as a factor in delayed reporting, but did not 
merely attribute the same to the young age of the victim:
Further, it has been written that a rape 
victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed 
by fear rather than by reason. It is this fear, 
springing from the initial rape, that the 
perpetrator hopes to build a climate of 
extreme psychological terror, which would, 
he hopes, numb his victim into silence 
and submissiveness. Moreover, delay in 
reporting an incident of rape is not an 
indication of a fabricated charge and does 
not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility 
of the complainant. It is likewise settled 
in jurisprudence that human reactions 
vary and are unpredictable when facing a 
shocking and horrifying experience such as 
sexual assault, thus, not all rape victims can 
be expected to act conformably to the usual 
expectations of everyone. In the instant 
case, AAA, being only four (4) years old at the 
time that she was violated and threatened 
with death if she reports the incident, would 
naturally be cowed into silence because of 
fear for her life.49
In People v. Dayapdapan,50 the Court was also able to do 
away with stereotypes:
A young girl like complainant cannot 
be expected to have the intelligence to 
defy what she may have perceived as the 
substitute parental authority that appellant 
wielded over her. That complainant had to 
bear more sexual assaults from appellant 
before she mustered enough courage to 
escape his bestiality does not imply that 
she willingly submitted to his desires. 
Neither was she expected to follow the 
ordinary course that other women in the 
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same situation would have taken. There is 
no standard form of behavior when one is 
confronted by a shocking incident. Verily, 
under emotional stress, the human mind is 
not expected to follow a predictable path.51
C. Double Victimization 
As mentioned, the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that in rape and sexual assault cases, offended parties 
undergo a difficult and humiliating ordeal.  Aside from 
having to repeat in detail what a woman or girl-child has 
experienced, the condition of the victim’s “anatomy” in 
the aftermath of the crime is revealed through a medico-
legal expert and scrutinized during the trial.  To aggravate 
matters, victim blaming has almost always been a key 
strategy adopted by the defense.  
People v. Gersamio52 sums up several decisions on the re-
victimization of the offended party.  There, the Court stated 
that “no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow 
an examination of her private parts and submit herself to 
public humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if her 
sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to 
have the culprit apprehended and punished.”53
The Court has effectively taken judicial notice of the re-
victimization of offended parties in rape and sexual assault 
cases in a long list of cases.
In Estrada:
Moreover, the testimony of a rape 
victim, especially one who is young and 
immature, deserves full credit considering 
that no woman would concoct a story of 
defloration, allow an examination of her 
private parts and thereafter allow herself to 
be perverted in a public trial if she was not 
motivated solely by the desire to have the 
culprit apprehended and punished.54
In People v. Saludo:55
As it has been repeatedly held, no woman would want 
to go through the process, the trouble and the humiliation 
of trial for such a debasing offense unless she actually has 
been a victim of abuse and her motive is but a response to 
the compelling need to seek and obtain justice.56
In Relanes:
As has been repeatedly held, ‘no young girl 
would concoct a sordid tale of so serious 
a crime as rape at the hands of her own 
father, undergo medical examination, 
then subject herself to the stigma and 
embarrassment of a public trial, if her 
motive [was] other than a fervent desire to 
seek justice.’57
In People v. Tubat:58
No woman would go through the process 
and humiliation of trial had she not been 
a victim of abuse and her only motive is to 
seek and obtain justice; xxx
In Tejero:
A young girl would not usually concoct a 
tale of defloration; publicly admit having 
been ravished and her honor tainted; allow 
the examination of her private parts; and 
undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, 
not to mention the trauma and scandal 
of a public trial, had she not in fact been 
raped and been truly moved to protect and 
preserve her honor, and motivated by the 
desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts 
committed against her.59
In People v. Baraoil:
A young girl would not usually concoct a 
tale of defloration; publicly admit having 
been ravished and her honor tainted; allow 
the examination of her private parts; and 
undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, 
not to mention the trauma and scandal 
of a public trial, had she not in fact been 
raped and been truly moved to protect and 
preserve her honor, and motivated by the 
desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts 
committed against her.60
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In Batula:
In People v. Geraban (G.R. No. 137048. May 24, 
2001) we held:
It is unnatural for a parent, more so for a 
mother, to use her offspring as an engine 
of malice especially if it will subject her 
child to the humiliation, disgrace and even 
stigma attendant to a prosecution for rape, 
if she were not motivated solely by the 
desire to incarcerate the person responsible 
for her child’s defilement.
  . . . .
it is unnatural for a parent, more so for a 
mother, to use her offspring as an engine 
of malice especially if it will subject her 
child to the humiliation, disgrace and even 
stigma attendant to a prosecution for rape, 
if she were not motivated solely by the 
desire to incarcerate the person responsible 
for her child’s defilement.61
In Tolentino:
The rationale of this jurisprudential 
principle is that, ‘no young woman, 
especially of tender age, would concoct a 
story of defloration, allow an examination 
of her private parts, and thereafter pervert 
herself by being subjected to public trial, if 
she was not motivated solely by the desire 
to obtain justice for the wrong committed 
against her.’62
In People v. Court of Appeals:63
No woman, especially one of tender age, 
would concoct a story of defloration, allow 
an examination of her private parts, and be 
subjected to public trial and humiliation if 
her claim were not true.64
People v. Buca:
The Court has held time and again that 
testimonies of rape victims who are young 
and immature deserve full credence, 
considering that no young woman, especially 
of tender age, would concoct a story of 
defloration, allow an examination of her 
private parts, and thereafter pervert herself 
by being subject to a public trial, if she was 
not motivated solely by the desire to obtain 
justice for the wrong committed against her.65
Acknowledging what transpires during trial and 
characterizing the proceedings as perverse, humiliating, 
disgraceful, and stigmatizing are not enough.  Compliance 
with CEDAW in eliminating discrimination at the de jure level 
entails adopting measures to ensure that courts conduct 
more gender and child-sensitive criminal proceedings.  
Women and girl-children should be able to access justice 
without fear of being re-victimized and stigmatized.  This 
should be the end goal of all courts.  Unfortunately, based on 
how the doctrine on rape cases has been consistently applied, 
there is no discernible improvement in the situation of 
victims who opt to bring their cases to court.  As early as 1999, 
a study published by the Ateneo Human Rights Center has 
already made this observation regarding sexual abuse cases 
involving children:
This analysis also shows that the court 
proceedings and examinations expose 
victims and their families to great 
embarrassment and social censure. The mere 
fact that one has been raped places a stigma 
on the victim despite the fact that she was 
unwillingly violated. In effect, there was 
less social repercussions on the perpetrator 
who has been acquitted than there were 
on the victim herself regardless of the final 
outcome of the case. In these instances, 
the court seems to display insensitivity to 
gender and child issues as shown in the 
language and manner of interrogation.66
More lamentable, the Court has found a beneficial 
purpose for such insensitive handling of a rape case.  Citing 
the Court of Appeals, it pronounced in People v. Gersamio:67 
Undergoing all of the humiliating and 
invasive procedures for the case – the 
initial police interrogation, the medical 
examination, the formal charge, the public 
trial and the cross-examination – proves 
to be the litmus test for truth, especially 
when endured by a minor who gives her 
consistent and unwavering testimony on 
the details of her ordeal.68
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IV. A Gendered Assessment of Supreme Court Doctrines
1. Paradigm Shift 
As stated earlier, jurisprudence should reflect a 
paradigm shift in deciding cases because of the changes 
in the law on rape and the introduction of the concept of 
sexual assault.  Generally, there has been due emphasis on 
the witnesses’ demeanor or manner of testifying in the 
reviewed cases, on how they remained consistent in their 
narratives, and how minor contradictions were not material 
enough to discredit the victims.  “[T]here is no standard norm 
of behavior for victims of rape immediately before and during 
the forcible coitus and its ugly aftermath. This is especially 
true with minor rape victims.”69  In People v. Morante,70 the Court 
summed up the established rule in rape cases:
Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually 
a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more 
often than not, the victim is left to testify 
for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape 
cases, the victim’s credibility becomes the 
primordial consideration. It is settled 
that when the victim’s testimony is 
straightforward, convincing, and consistent 
with human nature and the normal course 
of things, unflawed by any material or 
significant inconsistency, it passes the 
test of credibility, and the accused may 
be convicted solely on the basis thereof. 
Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony 
do not impair her credibility, especially if 
the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters 
that do not alter the essential fact of the 
commission of rape. The trial court’s 
assessment of the witnesses’ credibility is 
given great weight and is even conclusive 
and binding.71
2. Language 
However, these pronouncements have also been 
laced with inappropriate language, referring to rape as 
defloration and the victims as having been deflowered.  
Aside from the descriptions being inappropriate per se, it 
also casts doubt on whether courts, including trial courts, 
have actually changed their mindsets on rape as a crime 
against persons instead of being a crime against chastity.  As 
a matter of fact, in some cases, the Court still refers to rape as 
a crime against chastity; it has cited previous rulings where 
the old rape law was still in effect and, therefore, applied.72
3. Stereotypes
Moreover, stereotypes that juxtapose expected behaviors 
and responses of girl- children against adult women 
abound.  Not only do these comparisons undermine young 
victims’ ability to establish their credibility outside their 
youth and immaturity; such comparisons also prejudice 
mature women as courts now require a higher quantum of 
proof for their own credibility and lack of consent in rape.  
For instance, since it has been consistently ruled that delay 
in reporting is understandable in children because of fear, 
shame, or other reasons, a mature woman who may feel the 
same would be required to provide further explanation for 
her delay in reporting as she is expected to be less fearful 
and hesitant.  The Court has emphasized in Tejero that “[o]
ne should not expect a fourteen-year old girl to act like an 
adult or mature and experienced woman who would know 
what to do under such difficult circumstances and who 
would have the courage and intelligence to disregard a 
threat on her life and complain immediately that she had 
been forcibly deflowered.”73
4. Rape Definition, Elements and Proof Required to Convict 
That the definition of rape is ambiguous with regard to 
non-consent further aggravates the problem.
As earlier stated, the law does not categorically define 
rape as sexual intercourse with a woman without her 
consent.  Instead, “without her consent” is substituted by 
the ways enumerated under the law as to how rape was 
committed.  There is rape when either “force, threat, or 
intimidation,” or “fraudulent machination[,] or grave abuse of 
authority” is present.  There is also rape when the “offended 
party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.”  
Lastly, when the offended party is below 12, statutory rape is 
committed and consent becomes irrelevant.
The Court has been more generous in appreciating 
that lack of resistance is not indicative of consent in cases 
where children are the offended parties.   It has often found 
that intimidation substitutes for resistance.  Likewise, 
the doctrine of each person reacting in varied ways when 
faced with a traumatic experience has been applied more 
frequently to child victims.  In People v. Velasco,74 where the 
offended party was 14 years old, the Court said:
The failure of the victim to shout for help 
does not negate rape and the victim’s lack 
of resistance especially when intimidated 
by the offender into submission does 
not signify voluntariness or consent. 
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It is likewise settled in jurisprudence 
that human reactions vary and are 
unpredictable when facing a shocking 
and horrifying experience such as sexual 
assault, thus, not all rape victims can be 
expected to act conformably to the usual 
expectations of everyone.75
In People v. Quintos,76 the Court elaborated on the 
concept of consent and its correlation with resistance:
In any case, resistance is not an element of 
the crime of rape. It need not be shown by 
the prosecution. Neither is it necessary to 
convict an accused. The main element of 
rape is ‘lack of consent.’
‘Consent,’ ‘resistance,’ and ‘absence of 
resistance’ are different things. Consent 
implies agreement and voluntariness. It 
implies willfulness. Similarly, resistance is an 
act of will. However, it implies the opposite 
of consent. It implies disagreement.
Meanwhile, absence of resistance only 
implies passivity. It may be a product of 
one's will. It may imply consent. However, 
it may also be the product of force, 
intimidation, manipulation, and other 
external forces.
Thus, when a person resists another's sexual 
advances, it would not be presumptuous 
to say that that person does not consent 
to any sexual activity with the other. 
That resistance may establish lack of 
consent. Sexual congress with a person 
who expressed her resistance by words or 
deeds constitutes force either physically 
or psychologically through threat or 
intimidation. It is rape.
Lack of resistance may sometimes imply 
consent. However, that is not always the 
case. While it may imply consent, there 
are circumstances that may render a 
person unable to express her resistance to 
another's sexual advances. Thus, when a 
person has carnal knowledge with another 
person who does not show any resistance, 
it does not always mean that that person 
consented to such act. Lack of resistance 
does not negate rape.
Hence, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal 
Code does not simply say that rape is 
committed when a man has carnal 
knowledge with or sexually assaults 
another by means of force, threat, or 
intimidation. Article 266-A recognizes that 
rape can happen even in circumstances 
when there is no resistance from the victim.77
Here, where the offended party was 21 years old but had 
a mental age of six, the Court ruled that resistance “is not 
necessary to establish rape, especially when the victim is 
unconscious, deprived of reason, manipulated, demented, or 
young either in chronological age or mental age.”78
While lack of resistance could easily be dismissed as 
immaterial in cases of child victims, the same has not been 
true for adult women.  In their case, the Court considers 
resistance—though not technically an element of rape—as 
vital in proving that the sexual intercourse was against their 
will and, thus, without their consent. 
In cases where force was clearly present, or where a 
woman was patently intimidated because the perpetrator 
had a weapon, or where the woman was rendered 
unconscious, non-consent has not been at issue because it 
was obvious that the sexual intercourse committed against 
her amounted to rape.79  However, where there was no clear 
proof of force or intimidation and the woman possessed 
even an ounce of consciousness, the degree of resistance she 
has exerted would factor into whether she gave consent to 
the sexual intercourse.  
Such degree of resistance required of women has 
become difficult to be satisfied.  This is because the Court 
demands a heavier onus on mature women in proving that 
their “acts of resistance” were tantamount to non-consent or 
indicative that the sexual act was “against their will,” enough 
for their perpetrators to be guilty of rape.
In Dulay, the Court has already abandoned the standard 
of tenacious resistance.  It held that “Article 266-D [of R.A. No. 
8353] is intended to soften the jurisprudence of the 1970s 
when resistance to rape was required to be tenacious.”80 
However, in the 2017 case of People v. Marquez,81 the Court 
reiterated its ruling in People v. Amogis,82 which stated that 
resistance must be tenacious.  Amogis, in turn, cited People v. 
Cabading,83 a case decided when the old law was still in effect 
and where rape was classified as a crime against chastity.  Thus:
Resistance Should be Made Before the Rape 
is Consummated.
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In People v. Amogis, this Court held that 
resistance must be manifested and 
tenacious. A mere attempt to resist is not 
the resistance required and expected of a 
woman defending her virtue, honor and 
chastity. And granting that it was sufficient, 
she should have done it earlier or the 
moment appellant's evil design became 
manifest. In other words, it would be unfair 
to convict a man of rape committed against a 
woman who, after giving him the impression 
thru her unexplainable silence of her tacit 
consent and allowing him to have sexual 
contact with her, changed her mind in the 
middle and charged him with rape.
  . . . .
The Age Gap Between the Victim and 
Appellant Negates Force, Threat or 
Intimidation.
AAA’s state of ‘shivering’ could not 
have been produced by force, threat or 
intimidation. She insinuates that she fell 
into that condition after Meneses had 
sexual intercourse with her. However, 
their age gap negates force, threat or 
intimidation; he was only 14 while she 
was already 24, not to mention that they 
were friends. In addition, per ‘AAA’s’ own 
declaration, Meneses and appellant did not 
also utter threatening words or perform 
any act of intimidation against her.
Drunkenness Should Have Deprived the 
Victim of Her Will Power to Give her Consent.
The fact that AAA was tipsy or drunk at 
that time cannot be held against the 
appellant. Where consent is induced by the 
administration of drugs or liquor, which 
incites her passion but does not deprive her 
of her will power, the accused is not guilty 
of rape.
Here, and as narrated by AAA on the witness 
stand, appellant and Meneses were her 
friends. Thus, as usual, she voluntarily went 
with them to the house of appellant and 
chatted with them while drinking liquor 
for about four hours. And while "AAA" got 
dizzy and was ‘shivering,’ the prosecution 
failed to show that she was completely 
deprived of her will power
‘AAA’s’ degree of dizziness or ‘shivering’ was 
not that grave as she portrays it to be for 
she is used to consuming liquor. And if it 
is true that the gravity of her ‘shivering’ at 
that time rendered her immobile such that 
she could not move her head to signal her 
rejection of appellant's indecent proposal 
or to whisper to him her refusal, then she 
would have been likewise unable to stand 
up and walk home immediately after the 
alleged rape.84
Marquez is disturbing on so many levels.  
First, it resurrects the doctrine of tenacious resistance, 
which had already been  abandoned when the rape law 
was amended.  To reiterate, the Court in Dulay stated 
that resistance need not be tenacious, explaining that 
physical struggle to show resistance may be tempered with 
the “victim’s fear of the rapist or incapacity to give valid 
consent.”  It is, therefore, quite perplexing why the Court 
would revert to its previous ruling in Marquez, where the old 
law was still the legal framework.  
Moreover, the decision is riddled with gender 
stereotypes.  Requiring that resistance be manifested before 
the rape is consummated perpetuates discrimination 
against women.  While it has been held that the “[s]lightest 
penetration of the labia of the female victim’s genitalia 
consummates the crime of rape”85—and therefore it is 
but logical to require that resistance must happen before 
the slightest penetration—this is not the context within 
which the pronouncement was made by the Court in 
Marquez.  That “resistance should be made before the rape is 
consummated” would entail that a woman should say no at 
the beginning of the attempt at sexual intercourse, before the 
man becomes so full of carnal lusts that he no longer is capable 
of stopping.  If the woman changes her mind in the middle, 
and the man still continues, there is no rape because not 
only is it impossible, but also “unfair,” to abruptly curtail a 
man’s libidinous desires.  When the woman resists, but does 
not do so at the start, there is no rape; it is her fault if she later 
changes her mind.
Furthermore, this case also perpetuates the stereotypes 
that rape cannot possibly happen just because the 
woman was older than the perpetrator and that they were 
friends.  An age gap in itself cannot negate force, threat, or 
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intimidation.  While the Court emphasized that the accused 
in Marquez was only 14 years old while the victim was 24, the 
former was a liquor-drinking adolescent who had another 
accused as company.  Friendship has never deterred one 
from committing rape or sexual assault.
Admittedly, the offended party was drinking.  Both 
accused knew that she was intoxicated.  The Court 
concluded that the victim’s intoxication was not enough 
to deprive her of the will to refuse sexual intercourse. The 
issue, however, is whether the offended party’s state of 
drunkenness affected her capacity to give informed consent. 
If we follow the Court’s argument that when “consent is 
induced by the administration of . . . liquor, which incites 
her passion but does not deprive her of her will power, the 
accused is not guilty of rape,” then what kind of free consent 
from the victim is contemplated before rape is committed?  
If a drug or liquor can incite passion and the victim, as 
a consequence, does not protest or does so with little 
tenacity, is there not rape if, despite knowing such state of 
drunkenness, the accused still proceeded to takes advantage 
and have sexual intercourse with the woman whom he 
knows to have had lowered inhibitions?
In People v. Amarela,86 the Court specifically noted the 
gender stereotypes prevailing in rape cases.  It ruled:
[W]e simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara 
stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino 
woman. We, should stay away from such 
mindset and accept the realities of a woman’s 
dynamic role in society today; she who has 
over the years transformed into a strong and 
confidently intelligent and beautiful person, 
willing to fight for her rights. In this way, 
we can evaluate the testimony of a private 
complainant of rape without gender bias or 
cultural misconception.87
In reality, the gender stereotype referred to above has 
been mostly applied to young women and girl-children.  As 
stated, mature women are generally faced with the onus of 
proving non-consent, absent the elements of force, manifest 
intimidation, and deprivation of reason.  In the same 
decision, the Court further said:
Carnal knowledge of the female with 
her consent is not rape, provided she is 
above the age of consent or is capable in 
the eyes of the law of giving consent. The 
female must not at any time consent; 
her consent, given at any time prior to 
penetration, however reluctantly given, or if 
accompanied with mere verbal protests and 
refusals, prevents the act from being rape, 
provided the consent is willing and free of 
initial coercion.88
Amarela is ambiguous. While it says that there is rape 
when consent was not willingly given, it emphasizes that 
the “female must not at any time consent.”89  If this phrase is 
to be construed as the accused having to ascertain that there 
is consent by the woman to sexual intercourse during the 
entire time of the act, what is meant by consent being “free 
of initial coercion?”  It implies that a woman cannot claim 
coercion at a later stage because she has already consented 
at the onset, especially if the consent is accompanied by 
“mere verbal protests and refusals.”  This decision reifies the 
ruling in Marquez.
Furthermore, how much resistance is a mature woman 
required to show and how often, before she is believed?
Moreover, Amarela cites the case of People v. Butiong,90 
which, in turn, draws from the legal encyclopedia of Corpus 
Juris Secundum (CJS).  First of all, there is no need to resort 
to the CJS since there is Dulay, which came to be after R.A. 
No. 8353 became effective. In Dulay, the Supreme Court ruled 
that “the law now provides that resistance may be proved 
by any physical overt act in any degree from the offended 
party.”91 Second, even if we examine the CJS, the restatements 
therein refer to common law.  Nonetheless, it still provided 
that there is no consent if the woman is not in a position to 
exercise any judgment about the matter.92 More important, it 
elucidates the application of the doctrine of consent that is 
initially given by the woman.  Thus:
At common law rape could be committed 
only where the unlawful carnal knowledge 
of a female was had without her consent 
or against her will; lack of consent was an 
essential element of the offense; and there 
can be no rape in the common-law sense 
without the element of lack of consent. 
Under the statutes punishing the offense, 
an essential element of the crime of rape 
is that the act was committed without the 
consent of the female, or, as it is otherwise 
expressed, against her will. The act of sexual 
intercourse is against the female’s will or 
without her consent when, for any cause, 
she is not in a position to exercise any 
judgment about the matter.
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Carnal knowledge of the female with her 
consent is not rape, provided she is above 
the age of consent or is capable in the eyes 
of the law of giving consent. Thus, mere 
copulation, with the woman passively 
acquiescent, does not constitute rape. 
The female must not at any time consent; 
her consent, given at any time prior to 
penetration, however reluctantly given, or 
if accompanied with mere verbal protests 
and refusals, prevents the act from being 
rape, provided the consent is willing and 
free of initial coercion. Thus, where a man 
takes hold of a woman against her will 
and she afterward consents to intercourse 
before the act is committed, his act is not 
rape. However, where the female consents, 
but then withdraws her consent before 
penetration, and the act is accomplished 
by force, it is rape; and where a woman 
offers to allow a man to have intercourse 
with her on certain conditions and he 
refuses to comply with the conditions, but 
accomplishes the act without her consent, 
he is guilty of rape.93
The last underscored sentence, which qualifies consent 
in such a way that rape can still be committed despite initial 
consent having been given, has been omitted in Butiong 
when it quoted CJS.  Thus, when Amarela reiterated the 
same pronouncements, it stops at “provided the consent is 
willing and free of initial coercion”—making the presence or 
absence of such “initial consent” the only basis of whether 
rape was committed.
The Court is setting dangerous precedents in these cases: 
a) they bring back tenacious resistance as a requirement 
to prove non-consent in cases where force or 
intimidation is not glaringly apparent; 
b) resistance is supposed to be manifested before rape 
is consummated which contemplates resistance at the 
initial sexual contact but not during;
c)  based on the second, a woman can no longer 
manifest her non-consent if she consented at the initial 
stage of sexual intercourse but changed her mind later; 
d) if drugs or liquor are administered to induce consent 
or the accused knew that the woman was under the 
influence of either, consent is deemed given as long as 
these substances “[do] not deprive her of her will power” 
even though said drug or liquor “incites her passion”; and 
e) it is generally not likely that rape could be committed 
if the accused is considerably younger than the woman 
and if they are friends.
5.  Marital Rape Established 
The Court has firmly established martial rape in People 
v. Jumawan,94 ruling  that “[h]usbands do not have property 
rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit 
within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.”95 
The accused was charged and found guilty of two counts of 
rape committed by means of force upon a person:
The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, 
recognized that a change in the traditional 
role of men as well as the role of women 
in society and in the family is needed 
to achieve full equality between them. 
Accordingly, the country vowed to take all 
appropriate measures to modify the social 
and cultural patterns of conduct of men 
and women, with a view to achieving the 
elimination of prejudices, customs and all 
other practices which are based on the idea 
of the inferiority or the superiority of either 
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men 
and women (citing CEDAW, Article 5, Part 
I.) One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 
insofar as it eradicated the archaic notion 
that marital rape cannot exist because a 
husband has absolute proprietary rights 
over his wife's body and thus her consent 
to every act of sexual intimacy with him is 
always obligatory or at least, presumed.
  . . . .
A woman is no longer the chattel-
antiquated practices labeled her to be. A 
husband who has sexual intercourse with 
his wife is not merely using a property, he 
is fulfilling a marital consortium with a 
fellow human being with dignity equal 
(citing Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Article 1) to that he accords himself. 
He cannot be permitted to violate this 
dignity by coercing her to engage in a 
sexual act without her full and free consent. 
Surely, the Philippines cannot renege 
on its international commitments and 
accommodate conservative yet irrational 
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notions on marital activities (citing UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
Against Women, Article 4) that have lost 
their relevance in a progressive society.96
This case clearly elucidates how Supreme Court 
decisions can lead in promoting compliance with CEDAW.  
In this particular instance, it is the obligation to remove 
“the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of 
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.”97  As 
the case stated, “[t]he ancient customs and ideologies from 
which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have 
already been superseded by modem global principles on 
the equality of rights between men and women and respect 
for human dignity established in various international 
conventions, such as the CEDAW.”98
This doctrine was reiterated in Quintos, where the 
accused alleged that the victim was his sweetheart.  There, 
the Supreme Court stated that “[R.A. No.] 9262 recognizes 
that wives, former wives, co-parents, and sweethearts may 
be raped by their husbands, former husbands, co-parents, or 
sweethearts by stating that committing acts of rape against 
these persons are considered violence against women.”99
6. Mental Incapacity and Statutory Rape 
The Court has promulgated decisions with different 
pronouncements on rape committed against women whose 
mental ages were below 12 years old.  In Quintos, the offended 
party was a 21-year old woman but her mental age was 6 
years and 2 months. Unfortunately, such mental age was 
not alleged in the information.  Therefore, it was considered 
as a factor in determining consent but not in determining 
whether the crime committed was statutory rape:
However, to qualify the crime of rape 
and increase the penalty of accused from 
reclusion perpetua to death under Article 
266-B in relation to Article 266-(A)(1) of 
the Revised Penal Code, an allegation of 
the victim’s intellectual disability must be 
alleged in the information. If not alleged 
in the information, such mental incapacity 
may prove lack of consent but it cannot 
increase the penalty to death. Neither can it 
be the basis of conviction for statutory rape.
In this case, the elements of sexual congress 
and lack of consent were sufficiently 
alleged in the information. They were 
also clearly and conveniently determined 
during trial. The fact of being mentally 
incapacitated was only shown to prove 
AAA’s incapacity to give consent, not to 
qualify the crime of rape.100
Likewise, in People v. Bangsoy,101 the Court affirmed that 
rape committed against a woman who has a mental age 
below 12 is statutory rape:
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is 
a mental retardate with a mental age of 
below 12 years old constitutes statutory 
rape. Notably, AAA was also below 12 years 
old at the time of the incident, as evidenced 
by the records showing that she was born 
on March 1, 1993.
  . . . .
Nonetheless, the Information averred that 
AAA was a mental retardate and that the 
appellant knew of this mental retardation. 
These circumstances raised the crime from 
statutory rape to qualified rape or statutory 
rape in its qualified form under Article 
266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Since the 
death penalty cannot be imposed in view 
of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting 
the Imposition of the Death Penalty in 
the Philippines), the CA correctly affirmed 
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without 
eligibility for parole imposed by the RTC on 
the appellant.102
However, in the more recent case of People v. Falco,103 the 
Court emphasized that a different ground should be used 
as basis to convict an accused of rape committed against a 
victim who has the mental age of a child.  It stated that the 
correct offense is simple rape under Art. 226-A(b), not (d). Thus:
In this case, it is not disputed that AAA was 
already 22 years old when she was raped 
albeit she has a mental age of 4-5 years old.
  . . . .
 
This Court, in the case of People v. Dalan [ ], explained:
We are not unaware that there have been 
cases where the Court stated that sexual 
intercourse with a mental retardate 
constitutes statutory rape. Nonetheless, the 
Court in these cases, affirmed the accused's 
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conviction for simple rape despite a finding 
that the victim as a mental retardate with 
a mental age of a person less than 12 
years old. Based on these discussions, we 
hold that the term statutory rape should 
only be confined to situations where the 
victim of rape is a person less than 12 years 
of age. If the victim of rape is a person 
with mental abnormality, deficiency, or 
retardation, the crime committed is simple 
rape under Article 266- A, paragraph 1 (b) 
as she is considered "deprived of reason" 
notwithstanding that her mental age 
is equivalent to that of a person under 
12. In short, carnal knowledge with a 
mental retardate whose mental age is 
that of a person below 12 years, while 
akin to statutory rape under Article 266-A, 
paragraph l(d), should still be designated as 
simple rape under paragraph 1(b).104
Moreover, the accused questioned the credibility of the 
victim based on the conflicting answers that she had given:
He insisted that he should be acquitted 
of the charge because doubts linger as to 
whether or not he had sex with AAA or 
the rape incident happened, considering 
AAA's conflicting responses to the queries 
regarding the same. The accused- appellant 
capitalizes on the fact that during AAA’s 
cross-examination, the latter candidly 
stated that accused-appellant did not have 
sex with her.
  . . . .
In the case at bar, even though AAA’s 
testimony was not flawless in all 
particulars, We do not find any justifiable 
reason to deviate from the findings and 
conclusion of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.
The fact that AAA’s testimony was practiced 
and instructed by her mother to impute 
such serious charge against the accused-
appellant does not sway this Court. Given 
the victim's mental condition, being a 
22-year old woman with a mental age of 4-5 
years old, we find it highly improbable that 
she had simply concocted or fabricated the 
rape charge against the accused-appellant. 
We neither find it likely that she was merely 
coached into testifying against accused-
appellant, precisely, considering her 
limited intellect. In her mental state, only 
a very startling event would leave a lasting 
impression on her so that she would be able 
to recall it later when asked.105
Notably, even if the Court used “deprived of reason” as 
basis for the accused’s conviction, its rationale was still 
grounded on the mental age of the offended party. The only 
factor that qualifies the offended party as being deprived of 
reason is her intellectual capacity.
Thus, if the mental age of the victim is below 12, it is 
more appropriate to convict the accused under statutory 
rape rather than under the section of the law describing 
deprivation of reason.  An intellectually disabled woman 
with limited agency to give consent because she has the 
mental age of a child below 12 years old will benefit from 
established doctrines about the credibility of children in 
statutory rape cases.  Adversely, being “deprived of reason” 
at the time the woman was raped or sexually assaulted may 
likely expose her to gratuitous attacks on the accuracy of 
her facts as she was, after all, “deprived of reason” when the 
alleged crime happened.
7. Sexual Assault 
Under the law and current jurisprudence, the crime 
committed is sexual assault if the accused uses a finger or 
any object other than the male genitalia.  In People v. Soria,106 
the Court ruled:
It is evident from the testimony of AAA 
that she was unsure whether it was indeed 
appellant’s penis which touched her labia 
and entered her organ since she was pinned 
down by the latters weight, her father 
having positioned himself on top of her 
while she was lying on her back. AAA stated 
that she only knew that it was the bird 
of her father which was inserted into her 
vagina after being told by her brother BBB. 
Clearly, AAA has no personal knowledge 
that it was appellant’s penis which touched 
her labia and inserted into her vagina. 
Hence, it would be erroneous to conclude 
that there was penile contact based solely 
on the declaration of AAA’s brother, BBB, 
which declaration was hearsay due to BBB’s 
failure to testify. Based on the foregoing, it 
was an error on the part of the RTC and the 
CA to conclude that appellant raped AAA 
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that it was sufficient, she should have done it 
earlier or the moment appellant’s evil design 
became manifest. In other words, it would be 
unfair to convict a man of rape committed 
against a woman who, after giving him the 
impression thru her unexplainable silence of 
her tacit consent and allowing him to have 
sexual contact with her, changed her mind in 
the middle and charged him with rape.109
As highlighted in several of the rape cases in this 
research paper, gender bias still permeates the decisions 
of the Supreme Court.  As the highest court of the land, 
it should rid itself of insensitive language and gender 
stereotypes.  It should also address the problem of double 
victimization of offended parties, instead of regarding 
such practice as a litmus test in examining the credibility 
of women.  As a genuine commitment to the Philippines’ 
obligations with CEDAW, it is incumbent upon the Supreme 
Court to take these steps to erase discrimination in law and 
jurisprudence—and, in effect, society.
through sexual intercourse. Instead, we find 
appellant guilty of rape by sexual assault.107
Likewise, in Salvador, the Court held that rape by sexual 
assault is committed if a finger is inserted in the vagina:
By his act of inserting his finger in BBB’s 
organ, the crime of rape by sexual assault 
has been consummated. The RTC and the 
CA therefore correctly ruled that appellant 
should be found guilty of rape as defined 
in Article266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC. 
Thus, the fact that there were no injuries 
found in the medical exam deserves scant 
attention. As correctly stated by the RTC 
and the CA, the finding of any injury as 
yielded by the physical exam is not a 
requirement in rape cases108
V. Final Word
Although courts have firmly established marital rape, 
and have consistently applied the credibility of girl-children 
in rape and sexual assault cases, the stereotypes embedded 
in their decisions has had a negative impact on mature 
women.  Non-consent as an element of rape and its required 
manifestation, which is usually the degree or extent of 
resistance, is getting difficult to prove especially for these 
women, unless force or intimidation is patently present, or 
unless they are rendered unconscious.  Absent these factors, 
mature women are expected to resist tenaciously and report 
their rape promptly. Further, if courts require that non-
consent be signified “before the rape is consummated,” or at 
the beginning of the sexual intercourse, women tend to be 
precluded from changing their minds after the beginning of 
the crime.  Is there no rape when this happens? The recent 
cases of Marquez and Amarela perpetuate the stereotype that 
men cannot control their biological urges.  As such, women 
should already refuse and clearly manifest non-consent at 
the beginning.  Otherwise, rape is off the table as it would be 
unfair to men to expect them to stop.
Discrimination is present when insensitive criminal 
proceedings prevent women from exercising their right 
to effective remedy and access to justice.  Discrimination 
is also present when decisions maintain the subordinate 
status of women by perpetuating male privilege, which is 
aptly articulated in Marquez and is worth reiterating:
A mere attempt to resist is not the resistance 
required and expected of a woman defending 
her virtue, honor and chastity. And granting 
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ENVIRONMENT
The Environmental Legal Assistance Center (ELAC), Inc. is an environmental non-
government organization committed to helping communities uphold their constitutional 
right to a healthful and balanced ecology.
Many of the issues ELAC works on are related to the access to and use of forestry and 
coastal resources, pollution, and land use and tenure. Through its area offices in Palawan, 
Cebu, Bohol and Leyte, ELAC responds to these issues by addressing the leading social 
causes of environmental degradation: unsound policies, poor resource management and 
governance, weak enforcement of laws, poverty and lack of awareness.
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I.  Introduction 
In 2012, a group of farmers from Calategas, Narra, Palawan filed a civil case for damages and sought the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order (EPO) against 
mining companies2 and some public officials in Palawan.  
In their Memorandum, the farmers argued that: (1) they 
have unjustly suffered environmental harms and risks 
from mining; (2) the public officials neglected performing 
their duties to protect their environmental rights; and 
(3) they have continued to bear such burdens until today. 
The farmers asserted that environmental decisionmakers, 
both public and private, should be accountable for their 
decisions.  Two years later, the regional trial court decided 
that the mining companies must be held liable for damages 
and required the companies to rehabilitate the mined-out 
areas.  However, it dismissed the claims against the public 
officials after not having been convinced of the evidence 
against them.  As the case is still pending before the Court 
of Appeals (CA),   mining companies have yet to compensate 
the affected farmers for the damages they suffered and 
rehabilitate the mined-out areas.
This case is just among several actions taken by 
farmers who continue to fight for environmental justice.  
Can this case become a precedent for public officials to 
seriously consider the nature of an extractive project and 
its impacts, the applicable laws, the precautionary principle 
and tenets of environmental justice when they issue local 
endorsements, clearances, and permits?  
The aforementioned case is illustrative of 
environmental justice,3 which the Supreme Court’s, A.M. 
No. 09-6-8-SC, or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental 
Cases (RPEC), sought to achieve.  The Supreme Court 
aimed to enhance the mechanisms by which victims of 
environmental violations may seek justice and, at the same 
time, uphold the people’s constitutional right to a balanced 
and healthful ecology.  It adopted the rights-based approach 
in effectuating the RPEC, the general framework of which is:
“xxx The Court determines the procedures 
and rules of the judiciary which are 
necessary to facilitate the administration of 
justice and address the obstacles that come 
with specific legal issues. The complexity of 
environmental laws and their enforcement 
requires the Court to rethink its procedures 
in order to facilitate the administration of 
environmental justice. Of the many guiding 
principles in formulating such solutions, 
the participation of the people in enforcing 
environmental rights is key. xxx”4
Issued in April 2010, the RPEC was a “response to the 
long felt need for more specific rules that can sufficiently 
address the procedural concerns that are peculiar to 
environmental cases.”  All Philippine environmental laws 
were covered by the RPEC.  
 
REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CASES1
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II.  Nature, Objectives and Limitations of the Study
The RPEC sought to address procedural issues faced 
by local communities and civil society groups who 
assert their right to a healthy environment, compel 
government to implement its mandate, and hold violators 
of environmental laws liable.  Following its promulgation, 
several cases have been filed by local communities, citizens, 
government officials, and nongovernment organizations.  
While some cases have been resolved, others remain pending 
before the Supreme Court.  
Other environmental cases, which were filed before 
the issuance of the RPEC but were decided after 2010, will 
likewise be covered by this research project.  One such case 
involves the resident marine mammals of Tañon Strait, 
where marine protected areas, legal requirements for oil 
exploration, and the legal standing of marine mammals in 
the marine protected area were discussed.  
This study aims to look into and gain insights from 
the Supreme Court’s decisions since April 2010, when it 
promulgated the RPEC to determine whether the use of the 
rules resulted in the effective enforcement of remedies and 
redress for violations of environmental laws. 
As such, the study is based mainly on the Supreme Court 
decisions.  The petitions for special writs of kalikasan and 
writ of continuing mandamus, as well as environmental cases 
currently on appeal before the CA and the Supreme Court, 
were not covered.  Likewise, no interviews were conducted 
with the parties involved in the cases reviewed to ascertain 
the implementation of the SC decisions on their cases. 
III. Highlights of the Rules of Procedure for 
 Environmental Cases5
Before the Supreme Court promulgated the RPEC, it 
undertook various initiatives related to environmental 
justice.  In July 2006, the High Court organized a roundtable 
discussion on the prosecution of environmental cases.  The 
Asian Environmental Justice Forum followed in 2007.  In 
2008, the Supreme Court created 117 environmental courts 
nationwide through the issuance of Administrative Order 
No. 23-2008.  On April 16 to 17, 2009, the Supreme Court 
conducted a nationwide forum on environmental justice 
in Baguio City, Iloilo City, and Davao City.  The forum aimed 
to address issues on the high cost of litigation, adopting 
innovative rules, and ensuring compliance with the 
decisions of courts.
The RPEC was established with the following objectives:6 
a. Protect and advance the constitutional 
right of the people to a balanced and   
healthful ecology; 
b. Provide a simplified, speedy and 
inexpensive procedure for the enforcement 
of environmental rights and duties 
recognized under the Constitution, 
existing laws, rules and regulations, and 
international agreements; 
c. Introduce and adopt innovations 
and best practices ensuring effective 
enforcement of remedies and redress for 
violation of environmental laws; and 
d. Enable the courts to monitor and exact 
compliance with orders and judgments in 
environmental cases.
Consistent with these objectives, the RPEC had the 
following important features. 
a. Liberalized legal standing and citizen’s suit
Although the Supreme Court recognizes the injury 
aspect of legal standing, it has given standing a more 
liberal interpretation.  This builds upon the case of Oposa v. 
Factoran7 where the High Court allowed parents to file a suit 
on behalf of “their children and generations yet unborn.”
 
b. Speedy Disposition of Cases
Under the RPEC, there are three (3) categories of 
environmental cases filed: civil, criminal, and special civil 
actions.  In civil cases, a complaint must be accompanied by 
all evidence supporting the cause of action which can be in 
the form of affidavits, photographs, video clips, recordings, 
and the like. Certain pleadings are prohibited to avoid delay. 
In civil and criminal cases, pre-trial is extensively used 
to explore the possibility of settlement, simplify issues, 
gather evidence through depositions, and handle the 
administrative side of exhibits.  Moreover, affidavits take 
the place of direct examination, and resolution is limited 
to one year. In criminal cases, a remedy is provided to avoid 
the numerous instances where the accused jumps bail prior 
to arraignment.  To avail of bail, an accused shall execute 
an undertaking authorizing the judge to enter a plea of not 
guilty if he or she fails to appear on arraignment. 
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c. Special remedies in the form of the Writ of Kalikasan, Writ 
of Continuing Mandamus, Environmental Protection Orders 
The Supreme Court has fashioned two special writs 
as special civil actions: the writ of kalikasan and the 
writ of continuing mandamus.  The petition for a writ of 
kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy because the damage 
or threatened damage is of such magnitude—covering such 
a wide area—as to prejudice the ecology in two or more 
cities or provinces.  Since the affected area is not limited 
geographically to one particular city or province, the 
petitioner has to go to the CA or the Supreme Court, both of 
which has nationwide jurisdiction.  The petition for a writ 
of kalikasan bridges the gap between allegation and proof 
by compelling the production of information regarding 
the environmental complaint, such as information related 
to the issuance of a government permit or license, or 
information contained in the Environmental Compliance 
Certificate (ECC) or in government records.  This petition 
may be accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a 
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO).  A 
decision on a petition for writ of kalikasan may or may not 
provide for the other new environmental writ, the writ of 
continuing mandamus. 
On the other hand, the petition for the issuance of 
a writ of continuing mandamus is primarily directed at 
government agencies with respect to the performance of 
their legal duties.  The writ is a command of continuing 
compliance with a final judgment as it “permits the court 
to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the 
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under 
the court’s decision.”8 
The leading case here is MMDA v. Concerned Residents of 
Manila Bay, where the High Court required the MMDA and 
other government agencies to clean up Manila Bay and 
continuously report to the Court the steps they undertook.  
The Court held certain government agencies primarily 
responsible for the cleanup of Manila Bay.  No private 
enterprise was impleaded as a polluter; thus, no private 
entity was charged for the cost of the cleanup.
This petition for a writ of continuing mandamus can 
be accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a TEPO.  A 
TEPO may be issued during the proceedings for the issuance 
of a writ of continuing mandamus.  The issuance of the 
TEPO underscores the sense of immediacy and is used for 
immediate relief.  Upon termination of proceedings, the 
TEPO may be converted to a Permanent Environmental 
Protection Order (EPO). 
d. Consent decree 
Where ordinary civil proceedings have the amicable 
settlement of disputes, the RPEC provides a similar remedy 
called “consent decree.”  Parties in an environmental 
controversy can agree on a consent decree that is judicially 
approved and enforceable.  The settlement may provide, 
among others, for reimbursement for the cost of cleanup 
or an undertaking of response activities by potentially 
responsible parties or some other acceptable relief.  An 
amicable settlement, evidenced by a consent decree, has the 
advantage of being voluntary, mutually acceptable, open to 
public scrutiny, and can be enforced by court order. 
e. Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP)
SLAPP, which is a harassment suit, is a strategy to 
thwart past or anticipated opposition to an action 
with possible environmental implications.  It violates 
people’s constitutional right to seek redress for their 
environmental grievances. It draws attention away from 
the real environmental issues and delays the resolution 
of an otherwise valid environmental complaint.  Parties 
instituting SLAPP are generally capable—financially, 
politically, etc.—to burden well-meaning environmentalists 
with useless litigation.  SLAPP can come in different forms 
such as libel suits, actions for torts and damages, instances 
of grave coercion and threat, claims for sums of money, 
counterclaims, or cross-claims.  As such, the court must 
dismiss a SLAPP upon a showing that it is a “sham petition.”  
f. Provision on Precautionary Principle 
In the RPEC, the formulation of evidence-related 
provisions was made with the guidance of the precautionary 
principle to facilitate access to courts in environmental 
cases and create a more relevant form of court procedure 
tailored to the unique and complex characteristics of 
environmental science.9
As the Supreme Court’s Annotation to the RPEC further 
explains, the precautionary principle bridges the gap in 
cases where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot 
be achieved.  Its effect is to shift the burden of evidence 
of harm away from those who will likely suffer harm and 
onto those desiring to change the status quo.  When the 
features of uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, 
and the possibility of serious harm coincide, the case for 
precautionary principle is strongest.  When doubt arises, the 
case must be resolved in favor of the constitutional right to 
a balanced and healthful ecology.10
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IV.   Summary of Cases Reviewed 
The research team looked into 12 environmental cases 
decided upon by the Supreme Court between 2010 to 2018.  
Among these, four cases were filed before the promulgation 
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.  Of the 
four cases, one involves the aerial spray ban ordinance in 
Davao City; two on mining; and finally, one on the resident 
marine mammals of Tañon Strait, as mentioned. 
The eight other cases that were filed using the RPEC were 
special writs or special civil actions, filed directly before 
the Supreme Court.  One was filed before a regional trial 
court and was raised before the Supreme Court on purely 
questions of law.
(1) Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. The Province of Aklan, 
represented by Governor Carlito S. Marquez, the Philippine 
Reclamation Authority and the DENR-EMB (REGION VI); 
G.R. 196870, June 26, 2012; Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de 
Castro (ponente)11
In a petition for continuing mandamus, the Boracay 
Foundation, Inc. prayed for the issuance of an EPO against 
the Province of Aklan to stop its land reclamation of 2.64 
hectares through beach enhancement of the old Caticlan 
coastline for the rehabilitation and expansion of the 
existing jetty port. 
Petitioner Boracay Foundation cited a preliminary 
geohazard assessment study on the vulnerability of the 
coastal zone within the proposed project site and the 
nearby coastal area due to the effects of sea level rise and 
climate change, which will affect the social, economic, 
and environmental situation of Caticlan and nearby 
communities. 
On June 7, 2011, the Court issued a TEPO.  Pursuant to 
this, respondent Province of Aklan immediately ordered 
the Provincial Engineering Office and the contractor to 
refrain from conducting any construction activities until 
further orders from the Court.  The Court explained that the 
new RPEC provides a relief for petitioner under the writ of 
continuing mandamus, a special civil action “to compel the 
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law,” and 
which provides for the issuance of a TEPO “as an auxiliary 
remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.”
The Court held that the reclamation is classified as 
a national project that affects the environmental and 
ecological balance of local communities, and requires prior 
consultation with the affected local communities, and prior 
approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian—
which were not complied  with. 
Respondent Province of Aklan claimed, among others, 
that the petition was premature because it failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies provided under Section 6 of the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) 
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2003-30.  It also argued 
that the petition became moot and academic because the 
Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang 
Bayan of Malay gave their favorable endorsements to the 
proposed reclamation project.
Ruling in favor of the Boracay Foundation, the Court 
held that: (1) the resolutions of the two LGUs are not 
enough to render the petition moot since there are explicit 
conditions imposed that must be complied with by the 
province; and (2) the petition cannot be dismissed for failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies.  
The Court said that the rule provided in Section 6, Article 
II of DENR DAO 2003-30 does not apply in this case because 
petitioner Boracay Foundation was never made a party to 
the proceedings before the DNER-EMB, RVI.  Accordingly, it 
required the following:
1. that respondents cooperate with the 
DENR in its review of the reclamation 
project proposal, secure approvals from 
local government units, and hold proper 
consultations with other stakeholders;
2. that respondents immediately cease 
from continuing the implementation of 
the project covered by ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 
until further orders from the Court;
3. that respondent Philippine Reclamation 
Authority (PRA) closely monitor the 
submission by respondent Province of 
Aklan of the requirements to be issued 
by respondent DENR-Environmental 
Management Bureau (DENR-EMB) Region VI 
office in connection to the environmental 
concerns raised by petitioner Boracay 
Foundation;
4. that petitioner Boracay Foundation and 
all respondents submit their respective 
reports to the Court regarding their 
compliance with the requirements set 
forth in the decision not later than three 
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months from the date of promulgation of 
the Decision.
(2) Maricris Dolot v. Ramon Paje, in his capacity as the 
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources, Reynulfo A. Juan, Regional Director, Mines And 
Geosciences Bureau, Hon. Raul R. Lee, Governor, Province of 
Sorsogon, Antonio C. Ocampo, Jr., Victoria A. Ajero, Alfredo 
M. Aguilar, And Juan M. Aguilar, Antones Enterprises, Global 
Summit Mines Dev’t Corp., and TR ORE; G.R. No. 199199, August 
27, 2013; Justice Bienvenido Reyes (ponente)12 
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot, 
together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish 
and the officers of the Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog 
(petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, 
damages and attorney’s fees with the Regional Trial Court 
(RTC) of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.  
The petitioners raised the following pertinent allegations: 
(1) sometime in 2009, they protested 
the iron ore mining operations being 
conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global 
Summit Mines Development Corporation, 
and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and 
Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of 
Matnog, to no avail; 
(2) Matnog, a municipality located in the 
southern tip of Luzon, needs protection, 
preservation and maintenance of its 
geological foundation; 
(3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding 
and landslides, and confronted with the 
environmental dangers of flood hazard, 
liquefaction, ground settlement, ground 
subsidence, and landslide hazard; 
(4) Mining operators did not have the 
required permit to operate; 
(5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his 
predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators 
a small-scale mining permit, which they did 
not have authority to issue; 
(6) the representatives of the Presidential 
Management Staff and the DENR, despite 
knowledge, did not do anything to protect 
the interest of the people of Matnog; and 
(7) the respondents violated Republic Act 
(R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale 
Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the 
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and R.A. No. 
7160 or the Local Government Code.  
Petitioners prayed for: (1) the issuance of a writ 
commanding the respondents to immediately stop the 
mining operations in Matnog; (2) the issuance of a TEPO; 
(3) the creation of an inter-agency group to undertake the 
rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and 
(5) return of the iron ore, among others. 
 
The RTC of Sorsogon-Branch 53 dismissed the case.
Petitioner Dolot appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Court on pure questions of law.  The main issue is whether 
the RTC of Sorsogon-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil 
Case No. 2011-8338.  The other  issue  is  whether  the petition 
is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court 
decree, order, or decision that the public officials allegedly 
failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners 
failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the 
complaint to the government or appropriate agency.
Granting the petition, the Supreme Court nullified 
and set aside the RTC of Sorsogon-Branch 53’s September 
16, 2011 Order and October 18, 2011 Resolution.  It directed 
the Executive Judge of the trial court to transfer with 
dispatch the case to the RTC of Irosin-Branch 55 for further 
proceedings.  Petitioner Dolot was also ordered to furnish 
the respondents a copy of the petition and its annexes 
within 10 days from receipt of the Court’s Decision and to 
submit its Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.
The High Court did not sustain the argument that the 
petitioners should have first filed a case with the Panel of 
Arbitrators (PA), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes 
under R.A. No. 7942.  It noted respondents’ claim that 
while the PA has jurisdiction over mining disputes, Dolot’s 
petition did not involve a mining dispute.  
Here, what was being protested were: (1) the alleged 
negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining 
operations being conducted in Matnog; (2) the authority of 
the Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits in favor 
of the companies conducting the operations; and (3) the 
perceived indifference of the DENR and local government 
officials over the issue.  The High Court stated that the 
resolution of these matters did not entail the technical 
knowledge and expertise of the members of the PA but 
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required an exercise of judicial function.  Hence, the resort 
to the PA would be completely useless and unnecessary.  
The High Court reiterated its decision in Olympic Mines and 
Development Corp. v. Platinum Group Metals Corporation, thus: 
“Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators 
is proper only when there is a disagreement 
between the parties as to some provisions 
of the contract between them, which needs 
the interpretation and the application of 
that particular knowledge and expertise 
possessed by members of that Panel. It 
is not proper when one of the parties 
repudiates the existence or validity of such 
contract or agreement on the ground of 
fraud or oppression as in this case. The 
validity of the contract cannot be subject 
of arbitration proceedings. Allegations 
of fraud and duress in the execution of a 
contract are matters within the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary courts of law. These 
questions are legal in nature and require 
the application and interpretation of laws 
and jurisprudence which is necessarily a 
judicial function.”
The Supreme Court also found erroneous the RTC’s 
ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach 
judicial affidavits. According to the Court, Rule 8 requires 
that the petition should be verified, must contain 
supporting evidence, and must be accompanied by a sworn 
certification of non-forum shopping.  There is nothing 
in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, 
albeit not prohibited.  Only when the petitioner’s evidence 
would consist of testimony of witnesses must judicial 
affidavits (in the question and answer form) be attached to 
the petition or complaint.
Lastly, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner’s 
failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents 
was not fatal enough to have the case dismissed.  It ruled 
that the RTC could have just required the petitioners 
to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents.  It 
reiterated that “courts are not enslaved by technicalities, 
and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with 
procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, 
mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily 
put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to an 
opportunity to be heard.”
(3) SR Metals, Inc., San R Mining and Construction Corp. 
and Galeo Eupment and Mining Company, Inc. v. the Honorable 
Angelo Reyes in his capacity as Secretary of the DENR; G.R. No. 
179669; June 4, 2014; Justice Mariano Del Castillo (ponente)13
SR Metals, Inc., SAN R Mining and Construction Corp., 
and Galeo Equipment and Mining Co., Inc. filed a Petition for 
Review on Certiorari assailing the CA’s July 4, 2007 Decision 
and September 14, 2007 Resolution. 
 
The mining companies were each awarded a two-year 
small-scale mining permit (SSMP) by the Provincial Mining 
Regulatory Board of Agusan del Norte. They were allowed 
to extract nickel and cobalt in a 20-hectare mining site in 
Sitio Bugnang, Brgy. La Fraternidad, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. 
The companies received a Notice of Violation (NOV) from 
the DENR-EMB, informing them that they had exceeded the 
allowed annual volume of 150,000 MTs combined production 
as their stockpile inventory of nickeliferous ore had already 
total 177,297 dry metric tons (DMT). 
On November 26, 2004, following the EMB’s NOV, 
then DENR Secretary Angelo T. Reyes issued a Cease and 
Desist Order (CDO) against the mining corporations.  This 
suspended their operations for the following reasons:
1. the excess in annual production of SR 
Metals, Inc., maximum capitalization, and 
labor cost to equipment utilization of 1:1 is, 
in itself, a violation of existing laws;
 
2. the ECCs issued in favor of San R 
Construction Corporation and Galeo 
Equipment Corporation have no legal basis 
and, therefore, are considered void from 
the beginning; and similarly, the SSMPs 
that were issued by reason of such ECCs are 
likewise void.
In a November 30, 2006 opinion, then Justice Secretary 
Raul M. Gonzalez said that Section 1 of P.D. No. 1899 is 
deemed to have been impliedly repealed by the Small Scale 
Mining Act as nothing from the provisions of the latter law 
pertains to an annual production quota for small-scale 
mining.  He categorically concluded that the term ‘ore’ 
should be confined only to nickel and cobalt, and excludes 
soil and other materials that are of no economic value to the 
mining corporations considering that their ECCs explicitly 
specified ‘50,000 MTs of Ni-Co ore.’ 
Thus, the mining corporations filed before the CA a 
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining 
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Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, imputing grave abuse 
of discretion on the part of DENR in issuing the CDO.  The 
CA denied the petition, noting that the ECCs have been 
mooted by their expiration.  In so ruling, it also recognized 
the DENR’s power to issue the CDO, being the agency with the 
duty of managing and conserving the country’s resources.
 
The CA upheld the validity of the provision of 
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1899, which limits the annual 
production/extraction of mineral ore in small-scale mining 
to 50,000 metric tons (MT) despite its being violative of the 
equal protection clause.  It also adopted the Mines and 
Geosciences Bureau’s (MGB) definition of ‘ore,’ which led it 
to conclude that the mining corporation had exceeded the 
aforesaid 50,000 MT limit.
The issue here was whether the 50,000 MT limit as 
provided under existing laws was correctly interpreted. 
The High Court stated that there was an erroneous 
interpretation made by the petitioners. 
The High Tribunal ruled that there are two different 
laws governing small-scale mining; namely, P.D. No. 1899 and 
RA 7076.  Section 1 of P.D. No. 1899 provides that “small-scale 
mining refers to any single unit mining operation having 
an annual production of not more than 50,000 metric tons 
of ore and satisfying the following requisites: 1) The working 
is artisanal, whether open cast or shallow underground 
mining, without the use of sophisticated mining equipment; 
2) Minimal investment on infrastructures and processing 
plant; 3) Heavy reliance on manual labor; and 4) Owned, 
managed or controlled by an individual or entity qualified 
under existing mining laws, rules and regulations.”
The Supreme Court emphasized the following: 
Under Section 3(b) of RA 7076, small-scale 
mining refers to ‘mining activities which 
rely heavily on manual labor using simple 
implements and methods and do not use 
explosives or heavy mining equipment.’ 
Significantly, this definition does not 
provide for annual extraction limit unlike 
in PD 1899.
DOJ Opinion No. 74, Series of 2006 
concluded that as nothing from RA 7076 
speaks of an annual production limit, 
Section 1 of PD 1899 should be considered 
impliedly repealed by RA 7076, the later law. 
However, while these two laws tackle the 
definition of what small-scale mining is, 
both have different objects upon which the 
laws shall be applied to. PD 1899 applies to 
individuals, partnerships and corporations 
while RA 7076 applies to cooperatives.
The Court further stated that the DENR, being the agency 
mandated to protect the environment and the country’s 
natural resources, is authoritative on interpreting the 
50,000- MT limit. 
(4) Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto 
Princesa D.D.; Most Rev. Deogracias S. Iniguez, Jr., Bishop-
Emeritus Of Caloocan, Frances Q. Quimpo, Clemente G. Bautista, 
Jr., Kalikasan-PNE, Maria Carolina P. Araullo, Renato M. 
Reyes, Jr., Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, Hon. Neri Javier 
Colmenares, Bayan Muna Partylist, Roland G. Simbulan, Ph.D., 
Junk VFA Movement, Teresita R. Perez, Ph.D., Hon. Raymond V. 
Palatino, Kabataan Party-List, Peter Gonzales, PAMALAKAYA, 
Giovanni A. Tapang, Ph. D., AGHAM, Elmer C. Labog, Kilusang 
Mayo Uno, Joan May E. Salvador, GABRIELA, Jose Enrique 
A. Africa, Theresa A. Concepcion, Mary Joan A. Guan, Nestor 
T. Baguinon, Ph.D., A. Edsel F. Tupaz, v. Scott H. Swift, in his 
capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice, in his 
capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian, President 
Benigno S. Aquino, in his capacity as Commander-In-Chief 
of the Armed of the Philippines, Hon. Albert F. Del Rosario, 
Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Paquito Ochoa, 
Jr., Executive Secretary, Office of the President, Hon. Voltaire 
T. Gazmin, Secretary, Department of National Defense, Hon. 
Ramon Jesus P. Paje, DENR Secretary, Vice Admiral Jose Luis M. 
Alano, Philippine Navy Flag Officer In Command, Armed Forces 
Of The Philippines, Admiral Rodolfo D. Iso Rena, Commandant, 
Philippine Coast Guard, Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista, 
Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, Major Gen. Virgilio 0. 
Domingo, Commandant of Armed Forces of the Philippines 
Command and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps 
Forces, Pacific, and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-Director, G.R. 
No. 20510, September 16, 2014; Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. 
(ponente)14
This case involves a petition for a writ of kalikasan 
with prayer for the issuance of a TEPO involving violations 
of environmental laws and regulations in relation to the 
grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the 
Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park, as established by Republic Act 
(R.A.) No. 10067.
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The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine 
countermeasures ship of the US Navy. While transiting the 
Sulu Sea on January 17, 2013, the USS Guardian ran aground 
on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, 
about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. 
The petitioners claimed that the USS Guardian’s 
grounding, salvaging, and post-salvaging operations had 
been causing environmental damage of such magnitude as 
to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, 
Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del 
Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.  They alleged that such 
operations have violated their constitutional rights to 
a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive 
from this Court for the institution of civil, administrative, 
and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of 
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the 
grounding incident.  
The petitioners cited violations committed by the US 
respondents under R.A. No. 10067; namely, unauthorized 
entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees 
(Section 21); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 
30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and 
disturbing resources (Section 26[g]).  Similarly, they assailed 
certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), 
asking that it be nullified for being unconstitutional.
At the outset, the High Tribunal stated that there was 
no dispute on the legal standing of the petitioners in this 
case. It explained that the  “liberalization of standing first 
enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and 
generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which 
allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases, 
and that the provision on citizen suits in the Rules ‘collapses 
the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the 
principle that humans are stewards of nature.’”
Other key issues in this case were: (1) whether the US 
government has given its consent to be sued through the 
VFA; (2) whether the US government may still be held liable 
for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reefs; and (3) whether 
the petitioners could claim for damages caused by violation 
of environmental laws.
As to the first issue, the High Court said that the US 
government has not given its consent to be sued; therefore, 
the general rule on a state’s immunity from suit applied.  
However, on the second issue, the High Court stated that the 
US government may still be held liable for damages caused 
to the Tubbataha Reefs.  On the third issue, it pronounced 
that the claim for damages must be filed separately.
Ultimately denying the petition, the Supreme Court 
ruled that it has become moot because it was filed after the 
USS Guardian’s salvage operations, which ran aground over 
the Tubbataha Reefs, had already been accomplished.
The High Court deferred to the executive branch on 
the matter of compensation and rehabilitation measures 
through diplomatic channels as the resolution of these 
issues impinges on relations with another State in the 
context of common security interests under the VFA. 
The High Tribunal also ruled that the writ of kalikasan 
is an improper remedy to assail the constitutionality of a 
treaty, such as the VFA.
(5) Consolidated cases of Paje, et al. vs Casiño, (GR No. 
207257,  GR No. 207276,  GR No. 207282, and GR No. 207366, 
February 3, 2015)
Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his Capacity as DENR Secretary 
v. Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, Hon. Raymond V. Palatino, Hon. 
Rafael V. Mariano, Hon. Emerenciana A. De Jesus, Clemente 
G. Bautista, Jr., Hon. Rolen C. Paulino, Hon. Eduardo Piano, 
Hon. James De Los Reyes, Hon. Aquilino Y. Cortez, Jr., Hon. 
Sarah Lugerna Lipumano-Garcia, Noraida Velarmino, Bianca 
Christine Gamboa Espinos, Charo Simons, Gregorio Llorca 
Magdaraog, Rubelh Peralta, Alex Corpus Hermoso, Rodolfo 
Sambajon, Rev. Fr. Gerardo Gregorio P. Jorge, Carlito A. Baloy, 
Ofelia D. Pablo, Mario Esquillo, Elle Latinazo, Evangeline Q. 
Rodriguez, John Carlo Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 207257.
Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc., v. Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, 
Hon. Raymond V. Palatino, Hon. Rafael V. Mariano, Hon. 
Emerenciana A. De Jesus, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., Hon. Rolen 
C. Paulino, Hon. Eduardo Piano, Hon. James De Los Reyes, Hon. 
Aquilino Y. Cortez, Jr., Hon. Sarah Lugerna Lipumano-Garcia, 
Noraida Velarmino, Bianca Christine Gamboa Espinos, Charo 
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Simons, Gregorio Llorca Magdaraog, Rubelh Peralta, Alex 
Corpus Hermoso, Rodolfo Sambajon, Rev. Fr. Gerardo Gregorio 
P. Jorge, Carlito A. Baloy, Ofelia D. Pablo, Mario Esquillo, Elle 
Latinazo, Evangeline Q. Rodriguez, John Carlo Delos Reyes, 
Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as DENR Secretary and 
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, G.R. No. 207276;
Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, Hon. Raymond V. Palatino, Hon. 
Emerenciana A. De Jesus, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., Hon. Rafael 
V. Mariano, Hon. Rolen C. Paulino, Hon. Eduardo Piano, Hon. 
James De Los Reyes, Hon. Aquilino Y. Cortez, Jr., Hon. Sarah 
Lugerna Lipumano-Garcia, Noraida Velarmino, Bianca 
Christine Gamboa Espinos, Charo Simons, Gregorio Llorca 
Magdaraog, Rubelh Peralta, Alex Corpus Hermosa, Rodolfo 
Sambajon, et al. v. Ramon Jesus P. Paje In His Capacity as DENR 
Secretary, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, and Redondo 
Peninsula Energy, Inc., G.R. No. 207282;
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Hon. Teodoro A. 
Casiño, Hon. Raymond V. Palatino, Hon. Rafael V. Mariano, Hon. 
Emerenciana A. De Jesus, Hon. Rolen C. Paulino, Hon Eduardo 
Piano, Hon. James De Los Reyes, Hon. Aquilino Y. Cortez, Jr., Hon. 
Sarah Lugerna Lipumanogarcia, Noraida Velarmino, Bianca 
Christine Gamboa, Gregorio Llorca Magdaraog, Rubelhperalta, 
Alex Corpus Hermoso, Rodolfo Sambajon, Rev. Fr. Gerardo 
Gregorio P. Jorge, Carlito A. Baloy, Ofelia D. Pablo, Mario 
Esquillo, Elle·Latinazo, Evangeline Q. Rodriguez, John Carlo 
Delos Reyes, Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as DENG 
Secretary and Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc., G.R. No. 207366;
On September 11, 2012, the Casiño group filed a petition 
for writ of kalikasan against the construction of a coal-fired 
thermal powerplant in Subic, Zambales.
  
The group alleged, among others, that: (1) the power 
plant project they complain of would cause grave 
environmental damage; (2) it would adversely affect the 
health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, 
Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo; (3) 
the ECC was issued and the Lease Development Agreement 
(LDA) was entered into without the prior approval of the 
concerned sanggunians as required under Sections 26 and 
27 of the Local Government Code; (4) the LDA was entered 
into without securing a prior certification from the National 
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as required 
under Section 59 of R.A. No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA); (5) Section 8.3 of DENR A.O. No. 
2003-30, which allows amendments of ECCs, is ultra vires 
because the DENR has no authority to decide on requests for 
amendments of previously issued ECCs in the absence of a 
new Environmental Impact Statement (EIS); and (6) due to 
the nullity of Section 8.3 of A.O. No. 2003-30, all amendments 
to RP Energy’s ECC are void.
For the Court’s resolution were the following issues:
1. Whether the DENR Environmental 
Compliance Certificate in favor of RP 
Energy for a 2x150 MW Coal-Fired Thermal 
Power Plant Project and its amendment to 
1x300 MW Power Plant, and the Lease and 
Development Agreement between SBMA and 
RP Energy complied with the Certification 
Precondition as required under Section 59 
of Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous 
People’s Rights Act of 1997; 
2. Whether RP Energy can proceed with the 
construction and operation of the 1x300 
MW Power Plant without prior consultation 
with and approval of the concerned local 
government units pursuant to Sections 26 
and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local 
Government Code; 
3. Whether  Section 8.3 of DENR 
Administrative Order No. 2003-30 (‘DAO No. 
2003-30) providing for the amendment of an 
ECC is null and void for being ultra vires; and 
4. Whether the amendment of RP Energy’s 
ECC under Section 8.3 of DAO No. 2003-30 is 
null and void.15 
In its January 30, 2013 Decision, the CA denied the 
petition and the application for an environment protection 
order, explaining that the Casiño Group failed to prove that 
its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology 
was violated or threatened.  It likewise found no reason to 
nullify Section 8.3 of A.O. No. 2003-30. 
The CA further said that the provision was not ultra vires, 
as it was implied that in having the express power to issue 
an ECC, the Environment Secretary, as well as the Director 
and Regional Directors of the EMB, also has the incidental 
power to amend the ECC.  The CA also ruled that the validity 
of Section 8.3 could not be collaterally attacked in a petition 
for a writ of kalikasan. 
The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s finding that the 
Casiño group had failed to substantiate its claims that the 
operation of the assailed coal-fired power plant in the Subic 
Bay Freeport Zone would cause environmental damage of 
the magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan.  
It also held that the signature requirement in the ECC 
had been substantially complied with pro hac vice, and the 
amendments to the ECC were valid. 
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The High Tribunal also held that since the ECC was not 
the license or permit contemplated under Section 59 of IPRA 
and its implementing rules, there was no need to secure 
the Certification of Non-Overlap (CNO)  beforehand.  For 
reason of equity, the High Court refrained from invalidating 
the LDA between RP Energy and the Subic Bay Metropolitan 
Authority (SBMA) as it was only in this case that it first 
ruled that a CNO should have been secured prior to the 
consummation of the said LDA under Section 59 of IPRA.  It 
also held that under R.A. No. 7227, or the Bases Conversion 
and Development Act of 1992, there was no need to first 
comply with the requirement to seek the approval of the 
concerned sanggunian under Section 27, in relation to 
Section 26, of the Local Government Code.  Finally, the Court 
ruled that it could not resolve the issue as to the third 
amendment to the ECC because it was not among the issues 
set during preliminary conference. 
(6) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape 
Tanon Strait, e.g., Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises, And 
Other Cetacean Species, joined in and represented by Gloria 
Estenzo Ramos And Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio v. DOE Secretary 
Angelo Reyes, DENR Secretary Jose L. Atienza, et al. G.R. No. 
181527; April 21, 2015; 
Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), 
Cerilo D. Engarcial, Ramon Yanong, Francisco Labid, In 
their personal capacity and as representatives of the 
subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan 
and Pinamungajan, Cebu, and their families, and the present 
and future generations of Filipinos whose rights are similarly 
affected v. DOE Secretary Angelo Reyes, DENR Secretary Jose 
L. Atienza, et al.; G.R. No. 181527; April 21, 2015; Justice 
Presbitero Velasco (ponente)16
Here, fisherfolk and stewards, who represent resident 
marine mammals in Tañon Strait, and subsistence 
fisherfolks of two municipalities in Cebu filed a petition 
for certiorari, mandamus, and injunction.  They sought to 
enjoin the Department of Energy (DOE), the DENR, and other 
government agencies  from implementing a service contract 
to explore, develop, and exploit the country’s petroleum 
resources in and around the Tañon Strait.  The DOE had 
allowed, among others, the conduct of a seismic survey and 
oil drilling in 2005.
According to the Court, the need to give the resident 
marine mammals legal standing has been eliminated by 
the RPEC , which allows any Filipino citizen, as a steward 
of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental 
laws.  The Court added that the stewards are joined as real 
parties in the petition and not just in representation of the 
named cetacean species.  It further added that the stewards, 
having shown in their petition that there may be possible 
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the resident 
marine mammals, were declared to possess the legal 
standing to file the petition.
The High Court noted that Service Contract 46 failed 
to comply with the safeguards required under Article XII, 
Section 2(4) of the 1987 Constitution, which required that 
the service contract be: (1) authorized by a general law; (2) 
signed by the President; and (3) reported to Congress. 
The Supreme Court also ruled that the respondents 
committed a violation of the National Integrated Protected 
Areas System Act of 1992 because Tañon Strait is, by virtue 
of Proclamation No. 2146, an environmentally critical 
area.  Likewise, it stated that an ECCs must be secured after 
undergoing an environmental impact assessment (EIA) to 
determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system. 
(7) Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation, 
Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc. and McArthur Mining, 
Inc. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp; G.R. No. 195580; April 
21, 2014; Justice Presbitero Velasco (ponente)17
Narra Nickel and Mining Development Corp. (Narra), 
Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc. (Tesoro), and 
McArthur Mining Inc. (McArthur) filed a petition for review 
on certiorari, seeking to reverse the CA’s October 1, 2010 
Decision and the February 15, 2011 Resolution.
In the Supreme Court decision, the following facts 
were presented: 
In December 2006, respondent Redmont 
Consolidated Mines Corp., made inquiries 
with the DENR on possible areas for 
exploration and mineral development. 
Redmont learned that the areas where 
it wanted to undertake exploration and 
mining activities where already covered 
by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement 
(MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra, 
Tesoro and McArthur.
Petitioner McArthur, through its predecessor-
in-interest Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI), 
filed an application for an MPSA and 
Exploration Permit (EP) with the Mines and 
Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Region IV-B, 
Office of the Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources (DENR). Subsequently, 
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SMMI was issued MPSA-AMA-IVB-153 covering 
an area of over 1,782 hectares in Barangay 
Sumbiling, Municipality of Bataraza, Province 
of Palawan and EPA-IVB-44 which includes an 
area of 3,720 hectares in Barangay Malatagao, 
Bataraza, Palawan. The MPSA and EP were 
then transferred to Madridejos Mining 
Corporation (MMC) and, on November 6, 2006, 
assigned to petitioner McArthur. 
Petitioner Narra acquired its MPSA from 
Alpha Resources and Development 
Corporation and Patricia Louise Mining & 
Development Corporation (PLMDC) which 
previously filed an application for an MPSA 
with the MGB, Region IV-B, DENR on January 
6, 1992. Through the said application, the 
DENR issued MPSA-IV-1-12 covering an area 
of 3,277 hectares in barangays Calategas and 
San Isidro, Municipality of Narra, Palawan. 
Subsequently, PLMDC conveyed, transferred 
and/or assigned its rights and interests over 
the MPSA application in favor of Narra.
Another MPSA application of SMMI was 
filed with the DENR Region IV-B, labeled as 
MPSA-AMA-IVB-154 (formerly EPA-IVB-47) 
over 3,402 hectares in Barangays Malinao 
and Princesa Urduja, Municipality of Narra, 
Province of Palawan. SMMI subsequently 
conveyed, transferred and assigned its 
rights and interest over the said MPSA 
application to Tesoro.
On January 2, 2007, Redmont filed before 
the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the DENR 
three (3) separate petitions for the denial 
of petitioners’ applications for MPSA 
designated as AMA-IVB-153, AMA-IVB-154 
and MPSA IV-1-12.18
Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur averred that they were 
qualified persons under Section 3(aq) of Republic Act No. 
(RA) 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock 
of three other firms, McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are owned 
and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% 
Canadian corporation. Redmont argued that since MBMI is 
a considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving 
force behind petitioners’ filing of the Mineral Production 
Sharing Agreements (MPSAs) over the areas covered by 
applications since it knows that it can only participate in 
mining activities through corporations which are deemed 
Filipino citizens. 
Redmont further argued that since the petitioners’ 
capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were 
likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities 
through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino citizens.
  
The High Court held that petitioners, being foreign 
corporations, were not entitled to MPSAs.  It upheld 
with approval the CA’s finding that there was doubt on 
petitioners’ nationality since a 100% Canadian-owned firm, 
MBMI, effectively owns 60% of the common stocks of the 
petitioners by owning equity interest of petitioners’ other 
majority corporate shareholders. 
The Supreme Court affirmed its ruling on January 28, 2015. 
(8) Tower Condominium Corporation, on behalf of the 
Residents of West Tower Condominium and in representation 
of Barangay Bangkal, and others, including minors and 
generations yet unborn v. First Philippine Industrial 
Corporation (FPIC), First Gen Corporation West (FGC) and their 
respective board of directors and officers; G.R. No. 194239; June 
16, 2015; Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr. (ponente)19
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium 
Corporation (West Tower Corp.) filed a petition for a writ 
of kalikasan, on behalf of the residents of West Tower 
and in representation of the surrounding communities 
in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City.  This was after a leak 
in the oil pipeline owned by First Philippine Industrial 
Corporation (FPIC).  West Tower Corp. claimed that civil 
society and several people’s organizations, nongovernment 
organizations, and public interest groups have expressed 
their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the 
environmental issues involved.
West Tower Corp. alleged that the continued use of FPIC’s 
117-kilometer leaking oil pipeline that transports diesel 
and gasoline, among others, from Batangas to the Manila 
Pandacan oil depot has posed not only a hazard or threat 
to the lives, health, and property of those who live in areas 
where the pipeline is laid—Osmeña highway, Makati—but 
would “also affect the rights of the generations yet unborn 
to live in a balanced and healthy ecology.” 
Petitioners prayed that FPIC and First Gen Corporation 
(FGC), along with both of their boards of directors and 
officers, be directed to: 
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(1) permanently cease and desist from 
committing acts of negligence in the 
performance of their functions as a common 
carrier; (2) continue to check the structural 
integrity of the whole 117-kilometer pipeline 
and to replace the same; (3) make periodic 
reports on their findings with regard to the 
117-kilometer pipeline and their replacement 
of the same; (4) rehabilitate and restore the 
environment, especially Barangay Bangkal 
and West Tower, at least to what it was before 
the signs of the leak became manifest; and 
(5) to open a special trust fund to answer 
for similar and future contingencies in the 
future. Furthermore, petitioners pray that 
respondents be prohibited from opening 
the pipeline and allowing the use thereof 
until the same has been thoroughly checked 
and replaced, and be temporarily restrained 
from operating the pipeline until the final 
resolution of the case.20 
 
On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the writ of 
kalikasan with a TEPO, requiring respondents to: 
(a) cease and desist from operating the white 
oil pipeline (WOPL) system until further 
orders; (b) check the structural integrity 
of the whole span of the 117-kilometer 
WOPL while implementing measures to 
prevent any untoward incident that may 
result from any leak of the pipeline; and (c) 
make a report thereon within 60 days from 
receipt thereof.21
On June 16, 2015, the Supreme Court directed the following:
(a) FPIC to continue gas testing along 
the right of way; (b) DOE to determine if 
the activities and the results of the test 
run would warrant the re-opening of the 
WOPL. In the event that the WOPL is safe 
for continued commercial operations, DOE 
shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume 
the operations of the pipeline; (c) FPIC to 
“continue the remediation, rehabilitation 
and restoration of the affected Barangay 
Bangkal environment until full restoration 
of the affected area to its condition prior 
to the leakage is achieved”; and (d) if 
DOE “is satisfied that the WOPL is safe for 
continued commercial operations, it shall 
issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the 
operations of the pipeline.”22  
FPIC said that it would abide by the order.
(9) International Service v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia 
(Philippines); G.R. No. 209271; 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech 
Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), 
Magsasaka At Siyentipiko Sa Pagpapaunlad Ng Agrikultura 
(MASIPAG), Rep. Teodoro Casiño, Dr. Ben Malayang III, Dr. 
Angelina Galang, Leonardo Avila III, Catherine Untalan, Atty. 
Maria Paz Luna, Juanito Modina, Dagohoy Magaway, Dr. 
Romeo Quijano, Dr. Wenceslao Kiat, Jr., Atty. H. Harry Roque, Jr., 
Former Sen. Orlando Mercado, Noel Cabangon, Mayor Edward 
S. Hagedorn and Edwin Marthine Lopez. Crop Life Philippines, 
Inc., Petitioner-In-Intervention; G.R. No. 209271
Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources, Bureau of Plant Industry 
and Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority of the Department Of 
Agriculture vs. Court Of Appeals, Greenpeace Southeast Asia 
(Philippines), Magsasakaat Siyentipiko Sa Pagpapaunlad Ng 
Agrikultura (MASIPAG), Rep. Teodoro Casiño, Dr. Ben Malayang 
III, Dr. Angelina Galang, Leonardo Avila III, Catherine Untalan, 
Atty. Maria Paz Luna, Juanito Modina, Dagohoy Magaway, Dr. 
Romeo Quijano, Dr. Wenceslao Kiat, Jr., Atty. H. Harry Roque, Jr., 
Former Sen. Orlando Mercado, Noel Cabangon, Mayor Edward 
S. Hagedorn and Edwin Marthine Lopez. Crop Life Philippines, 
Inc. Petitioner-In-Intervention; G.R. No. 209276;
University of the Philippines Los Banos Foundation, Inc. 
v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), Magsasakaat 
Siyentipiko Sa Pagpapaunlad Ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG), Rep. 
Teodoro Casiño, Dr. Ben Malayang III, Dr. Angelina Galang, 
Leonardo Avila III, Catherine Untalan, Atty. Maria Paz Luna, 
Juanito Modina, Dagohoy Magaway, Dr. Romeo Quijano, 
Dr. Wenceslao Kiat, Jr., Atty. Harry R. Roque, Jr., Former Sen. 
Orlando Mercado, Noel Cabangon, Mayor Edward S. Hagedorn 
and Edwin Marthine Lopez; G.R. No. 209301;
University of the Philippines v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia 
(Philippines), Magsasakaat Siyentipiko Sa Pagpapaunlad Ng 
Agrikultura (MASIPAG), Rep. Teodoro Casiño, Dr. Ben Malayang 
III, Dr. Angelina Galang, Leonardo Avila III, Catherine Untalan, 
Atty. Maria Paz Luna, Juanito Modina, Dagohoy Magaway, Dr. 
Romeo Quijano, Dr. Wenceslao Kiat, Atty. Harry R. Roque, Jr., 
Former Sen. Orlando Mercado, Noel Cabangon, Mayor Edward 
S. Hagedorn and Edwin Marthine Lopez; G.R. No. 209430; 
December 8, 2015; Justice Martin Villarama (ponente) 23
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The consolidated petitions lodged before the Supreme 
Court sought the reversal of the CA’s May 17, 2013 Decision 
and September 20, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 00013 
which permanently enjoined the conduct of field trials for 
genetically modified eggplant.
On April 26, 2012, Greenpeace, et al. filed a petition for 
writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus with 
prayer for the issuance of a TEPO.  They alleged that the Bt 
talong field trials violated their constitutional right to 
health and a balanced ecology on the following grounds: 
(1) the required environmental compliance 
certificate under Presidential Decree (PD) 
No. 1151 was not secured prior to the 
project implementation; (2) as a regulated 
article under DAO 08-2002, Bt talong is 
presumed harmful to human health 
and the environment, and there is no 
independent, peer-reviewed study on the 
safety of Bt talong for human consumption 
and the environment; (3) a study conducted 
by Professor Gilles-Eric Seralini showed 
adverse effects on rats who were fed Bt corn, 
while local scientists also attested to the 
harmful effects of GMOs to human and 
animal health; (4) Bt crops can be directly 
toxic to non-target species as highlighted 
by a research conducted in the US which 
demonstrated that pollen from Bt maize 
was toxic to the Monarch butterfly; (5) data 
from the use of Bt CrylAb maize indicate 
that beneficial insects have increased 
mortality when fed on larvae of a maize 
pest, the corn borer, which had been fed 
on Bt, and hence non-target beneficial 
species that may feed on eggplant could 
be similarly affected; (6) data from China 
show that the use of Bt crops (Bt cotton) can 
exacerbate populations of other secondary 
pests; (7) the built-in pesticides of Bt crops 
will lead to Bt resistant pests, thus 
increasing the use of pesticides contrary to 
the claims by GMO manufacturers; and (8) 
the 200 meters perimeter pollen trap area 
in the field testing area set by the Bureau of 
Plant Industry (BPI) is not sufficient to stop 
contamination of nearby non-Bt eggplants 
because pollinators such as honeybees 
can fly as far as four kilometers and an 
eggplant is 48% insect-pollinated. The full 
acceptance by the project proponents of 
the findings in the MAHYCO Dossier was 
strongly assailed on the ground that these 
do not precisely and adequately assess the 
numerous hazards posed by Bt talong and 
its field trial.24
Greenpeace, et al. further claimed that the Bt 
talong field test project did not comply with the required 
public consultation under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local 
Government Code: 
A random survey by Greenpeace on July 21, 
2011 revealed that ten households living 
in the area immediately around the Bt 
talong experimental farm in Bay, Laguna 
expressed lack of knowledge about the field 
testing in their locality.  The Sangguniang 
Barangay of Pangasugan in Baybay, Leyte 
complained about the lack of information 
on the nature and uncertainties of the Bt 
talong field testing in their barangay.  The 
Davao City Government likewise opposed 
the project due to lack of transparency 
and public consultation. It ordered the 
uprooting of Bt eggplants at the trial site 
and disposed them strictly in accordance 
with protocols relayed by the BPI through 
Ms. Merle Palacpac.  Such action highlighted 
the city government›s policy on “sustainable 
and safe practices.”  On the other hand, 
the Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo 
passed a resolution suspending the field 
testing due to the following: lack of public 
consultation; absence of adequate study 
to determine the effect of Bt talong field 
testing on friendly insects; absence of 
risk assessment on the potential impacts 
of genetically modified (GM) crops on 
human health and the environment; 
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and the possibility of cross-pollination 
of Bt eggplants with native species or 
variety of eggplants, and serious threat to 
human health if these products were sold 
to the market.25
Greenpeace, et al. argued that the precautionary 
principle must be applied since the Bt talong field testing 
was an environmental case where scientific evidence as 
to the health, environmental, and socio-economic safety 
is insufficient or uncertain.  Moreover, they claimed its 
preliminary scientific evaluation showed reasonable 
grounds for concern that there were potentially dangerous 
effects on human health and the environment. 
They prayed, among others, that a TEPO be issued to 
enjoin respondents from conducting the field testing and, 
eventually, cancel all Bt talong experiments. 
On May 2, 2012, the Court issued the writ 
of kalikasan against ISAAA, EMB/BPI/Fertilizer and Pesticide 
Authority (FPA) and UPLB, ordering them to make a verified 
return within a non-extendible period of 10 days, as 
provided in Rule 7, Section 8 of the RPEC.
In hearing the merits of the case, the CA adopted the  
“hot-tub” method, where the expert witnesses of both parties 
testified at the same time. 
The Court noted that CA justified its ruling by 
expounding on the theory that introducing a genetically 
modified plant into the ecosystem is an “ecologically 
imbalancing act.” Thus: 
“We suppose that it is of universal and 
general knowledge that an ecosystem is a 
universe of biotic (living) and non-biotic 
things interacting as a living community 
in a particular space and time. In the 
ecosystem are found specific and particular 
biotic and non-biotic entities which 
depend on each other for the biotic entities 
to survive and maintain life. A critical 
element for biotic entities to maintain life 
would be that their populations are in a 
proper and natural proportion to others 
so that, in the given limits of available 
non-biotic entities in the ecosystem, no 
one population overwhelms another. In 
the case of the Philippines, it is considered 
as one of the richest countries in terms 
of biodiversity. It has so many plants and 
animals. It also has many kinds of other 
living things than many countries in the 
world. We do not fully know how all these 
living things or creatures interact among 
themselves. But, for sure, there is a perfect 
and sound balance of our biodiversity 
as created or brought about by God out 
of His infinite and absolute wisdom. In 
other words, every living creature has been 
in existence or has come into being for a 
purpose. So, we humans are not supposed 
to tamper with any one element in this 
swirl of interrelationships among living 
things in our ecosystem. Now, introducing a 
genetically modified plant in our intricate 
world of plants by humans certainly 
appears to be an ecologically imbalancing 
act. The damage that it will cause may be 
irreparable and irreversible. 
 
At this point, it is significant to note that 
during the hearing conducted by this 
Court on November 20, 2012 wherein 
the testimonies of seven experts were 
given, Dr. Peter J. Davies (Ph.D in Plant 
[Physiology]), Dr. Tuskar Chakraborty (Ph.D 
in Biochemistry and Molecular Biology), 
Dr. Charito Medina (Ph.D in Environmental 
Biology), Dr. Reginaldo Ebora (Ph.D in 
Entomology), Dr. Flerida Cariño (Ph.D in 
Insecticide Toxicology), Dr. Ben Malayang 
(Ph.D in Wildland Resource Science) and 
Dr. Saturnina Halos (Ph.D in Genetics) were 
in unison in admitting that bt talong is an 
altered plant. xxx 
 
Thus, it is evident and clear that bt talong is 
a technology involving the deliberate 
alteration of an otherwise natural state 
of affairs. It is designed and intended to 
alter natural feed-feeder relationships 
of the eggplant. It is a deliberate genetic 
reconstruction of the eggplant to alter its 
natural order which is meant to eliminate 
one feeder (the borer) in order to give undue 
advantage to another feeder (the humans). 
The genetic transformation is one designed 
to make bt talong toxic to its pests (the 
targeted organisms). In effect, bt talong kills 
its targeted organisms. Consequently, the 
testing or introduction of bt talong into the 
Philippines, by its nature and intent, is a 
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grave and present danger to (and an assault 
on) the Filipinos› constitutional right to 
a balanced ecology because, in any book 
and by any yardstick, it is an ecologically 
imbalancing event or phenomenon. It is 
a willful and deliberate tampering of a 
naturally ordained feed-feeder relationship 
in our environment. It destroys the balance 
of our biodiversity. Because it violates the 
conjunct right of our people to a balanced 
ecology, the whole constitutional right 
of our people (as legally and logically 
construed) is violated. 
 
Of course, the bt talong’s threat to the 
human health of the Filipinos as of now 
remains uncertain. This is because while, 
on one hand, no Filipinos has ever eaten it 
yet, and so, there is no factual evidence of it 
actually causing acute or chronic harm to 
any or a number of ostensibly identifiable 
perms, on the other hand, there is 
correspondingly no factual evidence either 
of it not causing harm to anyone. However, 
in a study published on September 20, 2012 
in “Food and Chemical Toxicology”, a team 
of scientists led by Professor Gilles-Eric 
Seralini from the University of Caen and 
backed by the France-based Committee of 
Independent Research and Information 
on Genetic Engineering came up with a 
finding that rats fed with Roundup-tolerant 
genetically modified corn for two years 
developed cancers, tumors and multiple 
organ damage. The seven expert witnesses 
who testified in this Court in the hearing 
conducted on November 20, 2012 were duly 
confronted with this finding and they were 
not able to convincingly rebut it. That is 
why we, in deciding this case, applied the 
precautionary principle in granting the 
petition filed in the case at bench. 
 
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, 
therefore, because one conjunct right 
in the whole Constitutional guarantee 
is factually and is undoubtedly at risk, 
and the other still factually uncertain, 
the entire constitutional right of the 
Filipino people to a balanced and healthful 
ecology is at risk. Hence, the issuance of 
the writ of kalikasan and the continuing 
writ of mandamus is justified and 
warranted.”  (Additional emphasis supplied.)
Applying the precautionary principle, the Court held 
that the three features of uncertainty, the possibility of 
irreversible harm, and the possibility of serious harm all 
coincide which justifies the application of that principle.  
It found that there existed a preponderance of evidence 
that the release of genetically modified organisms into the 
environment threatens to not just the field trial sites, but 
also the environment and, eventually, the health of our 
people once the eggplants are consumed as food.
The High Court decided to permanently enjoin the 
conduct of the assailed field testing for Bt talong.  It also 
declared Department of Agriculture A.O. No. 08-02 void, 
temporarily enjoining any application for contained use, 
field testing, propagation and commercialization, and 
importation of genetically modified organisms until a new 
administrative order is promulgated in accordance with law.
However, on July 29, 2016, the Supreme Court set aside 
its decision and ruled to instead dismiss the Greenpeace 
petition for being moot, noting that the Bt talong field trials 
have been completed and terminated, and the biosafety 
permits have expired.
(10) Pilar Cañeda Braga, Peter Tiu Lavina, Antonio H. 
Vergara, Benjie T. Badal, Diosdado Angelo A. Mahipus, And 
Samal City Resort Owners Association, Inc. (Scroa) v. Hon. 
Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, in his capacity as Secretary of the 
Department Of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), 
Pre-Qualification, Bids And Awards Committee (PBAC) and 
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA); G.R. no. 223076; September 
13, 2016; Justice Brion (ponente)26
The petitioners in this case sought the issuance of a writ 
of continuing mandamus and/or writ of kalikasan with a 
prayer for the issuance of a TEPO to stop the Department 
of Transportation and Communication’s (DOTC) project 
to modernize the Davao Sasa Wharf under a Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) scheme.  They alleged that the DOTC 
neither conducted prior consultation and public hearings 
nor secured the approval of the sanggunian concerned 
as required by law.  Moreover, they pointed out that the 
Davao City sanggunian had passed a resolution objecting 
to the project, and the DOTC has not yet obtained an ECC as 
required under P.D. No. 1586. 
The petitioners alleged that the respondents have begun 
the process of transgressing their right to health and a 
balanced ecology through the bidding process.  Citing The 
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Competitiveness of Global Port-Cities: Synthesis Report, they 
claimed that port operations had negative impacts on the 
environment, land use, and traffic, among others, as these 
affect the surrounding localities.  They claimed that the 
environmental impacts of port operations “are within the 
field of air emissions, water quality, soil, waste, biodiversity, 
noise and other impacts. These environmental impacts can 
have consequences for the health of the population of the 
port city, especially the poorer parts of port cities.”
The petitioners also cited Managing Impacts of 
Development in Coastal Zone, a joint publication of the 
DENR, the Bureau of Fisheries Aquatic Resources (BFAR), the 
Department of the Interior and Government (DILG), and the 
DENR Coastal Resource Management Project (CRMP).  The 
study identified the effects of coastal construction and 
reclamation, including ports and offshore moorings.  The 
petition alleges that:
According to Managing Impacts, “Coastal 
construction has been the most widespread 
of activities affecting coastal resources” since 
“Any construction that modifies the shoreline 
will invariably change currents, wave action, 
tidal fluctuations, and the transport of 
sediments along the coast” while “Coastal 
construction that restricts the circulation of 
coastal water bodies can also degrade water 
quality and coastal ecosystems.”
In their defense, respondents claimed that the petition 
was premature because the project was still in the bidding 
process, with no proponent to implement it.
The main issue here was whether the writs prayed for 
should be issued.
According to the Supreme Court, the petition was 
premature. Projects or undertakings that pose a potential 
significant impact to the environment are required to 
undergo impact assessment to secure an ECC. It noted that 
the ECC signifies that the proposed project will not cause 
significant negative impact on the environment. 
The High Court ruled that the Sasa Wharf Modernization 
Project had the potential to significantly affect the quality 
of the environment, putting it within the purview of the 
EIS System. However, there was still no project proponent 
responsible for the EIS and the ECC until the bidding process 
has been concluded and the contract has been awarded. 
The High Court also found the petition for continuing 
mandamus, which would compel the respondents to submit 
an EIS and secure an ECC, premature.   In so ruling, it held 
that the writ cannot be resorted to when the respondent is 
not the person obliged to perform the duty under the law (as 
is the case under the EIS System) or when the period for the 
respondent to perform its legal duty has not yet expired (as 
is the case with the consultation requirements of the Local 
Government Code). 
The High Court also ruled that it cannot issue a writ 
of kalikasan.  It pointed out that the writ may be issued 
when there is a violation involving environmental damage 
of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or 
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces in 
order to arrant the issuance of the writ.  Yet, as the Supreme 
Court explained: 
“First, the petition failed to identify the 
particular threats from the Project itself. 
All it does is cite the negative impacts of 
operating a port inside a city based on the 
Synthesis Report. However, these impacts 
already exist because the Port of Davao has 
been operating since 1900. The Project 
is not for the creation of a new port but 
the modernization of an existing one. 
At best, the allegations in support of the 
application for the writ of kalikasan  are 
hazy and speculative.
Second, the joint publication is 
titled Managing Impacts of Development in 
the Coastal Zone for a reason; it identifies 
the potential environmental impacts and 
proposes mitigation measures to protest 
the environment. The petition is misleading 
because it only identified the risks but 
neglected to mention the existence and 
availability of mitigating measures.
Moreover, this Court does not have the 
technical competence to assess the Project, 
identify the environmental threats, and 
weigh the sufficiency or insufficiency of 
any proposed mitigation measures. This 
specialized competence is lodged in the 
DENR, who acts through the EMB In the EIA 
process. As we have already established, the 
application of the EIS System is premature 
until a proponent is selected.
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Further, we fail to see an environmental 
risk that threatens to prejudice the 
inhabitants of two or more cities or 
municipalities if we do not restrain 
the conduct of the bidding process. The 
bidding process is not equivalent to the 
implementation of the project. The bidding 
process itself cannot conceivably cause any 
environmental damage.
Finally, it is premature to conclude that 
the respondents violated the conditions of 
Resolution No. 118 issued by the Regional 
Development Council of Region XI. Notably, 
the Resolution requires compliance 
before the implementation of the project. 
Again, the project has not yet reached the 
implementation stage.”
(11) Wilfredo Mosqueda, Marcelo Villaganes, Julieta 
Lawagon, Crispin Alcomendras, Corazon Sabinada, Virginia 
Cata-Ag, Florencia Sabandon, and Ledevina Adlawan v. Pilipino 
Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., Davao Fruits 
Corporation, and Lapanday Agricultural and Development 
Corporation; G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016;
City Government of Davao v. Court of Appeals, Pilipino 
Banana Growers & Exporters Association (PBGEA), Davao Fruits 
Corporation, and Lapanday Agricultural and Development 
Corporation; G.R. No. 189305, August 16, 2016; Justice Lucas 
Bersamin (ponente)27
In this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City 
had enacted Ordinance No. 0309, series of 2007, to impose 
a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by 
all agricultural entities within Davao City. The ordinance 
identifies aerial spraying of pesticides as a nuisance because 
of the unstable wind direction during the aerial application.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters 
Association, Inc. (PBGEA), et al. challenged before the RTC 
the constitutionality of the ordinance, alleging that it: (1) it 
is an unreasonable exercise of police power; (2) violated the 
equal protection clause; (3) amounted to the confiscation 
of property without due process of law; and (4) lacked 
publication pursuant to Local Government Code.  
The RTC held that the City of Davao had validly exercised 
police power under the general welfare clause; that the 
ordinance was consistent with the equal protection clause; 
and that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of 
pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a 
higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift.
On appeal, the CA declared the ordinance void for being 
unreasonable and oppressive, particularly in the technical 
requirements of switching from aerial spraying to truck-
mounted boom spraying.
The key issues before the High Court were: (1) whether  
the ordinance violated the due process and the equal 
protection clauses; and (2) whether the prohibition against 
aerial spraying was a lawfully permissible method that the 
Davao City government may adopt to prevent the purported 
effects of aerial drift.
The Supreme Court ruled that the claim that petitioners 
failed to substantiate their claim that aerial spraying 
produces more aerial drift.  It found the ban imposition 
too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of 
the substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of 
the agricultural activity to be conducted.  It further stated 
that ordinance suffers from being “underinclusive,” 
explaining that: (1) its classification does not include all 
individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law 
seeks to eliminate; (2) it discriminates against large farm 
holdings that are the only ideal venues for the investment 
of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying; 
(3) it denies the affected individuals the technology aimed 
at efficient and cost-effective operations and cultivation not 
only of banana but of other crops as well; and (4) it seriously 
hampers the operations of the banana plantations that 
depend on aerial technology to arrest the spread of the Black 
Sigatoka disease and other menaces that threaten their 
production and harvest.
(12) Victoria Segovia, Ruel Lago, Clariesse Jami Chan, 
representing the Carless People of the Philippines; Gabriel 
Anastacio, represented by his mother Grace Anastacio, 
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Dennis Orlandosangalang, represented by his mother May 
Alili Sangalang, Maria Paulina Castaneda, represented by 
her mother Triciaann Castaneda, representing the children 
of the Philippines and children of the future; and Renato 
Pineda, Jr., Aron Kerr Menguito, May Alili Sangalang, and 
Glynda Bathan Baterina, representing car owners who would 
rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe, 
convenient, accessible and reliable, v. The Climate Change 
Commission, represented by its Chairman, His Excellency 
Benigno S. Aquino Iii, and its Commissioners Mary Ann Lucille 
Sering, Heherson Alvarez and Nadarev Sano; Department of 
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) represented by 
its Secretary, Honorable Joseph Abaya; Department of Public 
Works and Highways (DPWH) and The Road Board, represented 
by its Secretary, Honorable Rogelio Singson; Department 
of Interior and Local Government (DILG), represented by 
its Secretary, Honorable Manuel Roxas; Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), represented by its 
Secretary, Honorable Ramon Paje; Department of Budget and 
Management (DBM), represented by its Secretary, Honorable 
Florencio Abad; Metropolitan Manila Development Authority 
(MMDA), represented by its Chairman, Francis Tolentino; 
Department of Agriculture (DA), represented by its Secretary, 
Honorable Proceso Alcala; and John Does, representing as 
yet unnamed Local Government Units and their Respective 
Local Chief Executive, Juridical Entities, and Natural Persons 
who Fail or Refuse to Implement the Law or Cooperate In the 
Implementation of the Law; GR NO. 211010; March 7, 2017; 
Justice Caguioa (ponente) 28
In this case, the petitioners sought the issuance of 
writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus to compel 
the implementation of environmental laws, specifically 
for the respondents to implement the: (1) Road Sharing 
Principle in all roads; (2) divide all roads for all-weather 
sidewalk and bicycling; and (3) submit a time-bound action 
plan for the purpose.
The key issues here are whether the petitioners have 
standing to sue, and whether there is basis to issue the writs.
In their decision, the High Court mentioned that the 
liberalized requirements on standing have allowed the 
filing of citizen’s suit for the enforcement of rights and 
obligations under environmental laws.  They stated that 
in a  writ of kalikasan, it is sufficient that the person filing 
represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental 
damage subject of the writ. However, a writ of continuing 
mandamus is only available to one who is personally 
aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
Moreover, the Court noted that a party petitioning the 
issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule, 
or regulation was violated or would be violated.  But there 
is no showing of that  public respondents are guilty of any 
unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the 
petitioners’ right to a balanced and healthful ecology.  
Likewise, the Court ruled that the petitioners failed 
to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts of the 
respondents to be entitled to the writ of mandamus.  While 
the respondents were able to show that they were actively 
implementing projects and programs that seek to improve 
air quality, the discretion exercised by government agencies 
could not be checked via this petition for continuing 
mandamus.  Petitioners fell short of showing a threat or an 
actual violation of their constitutional right to a balanced 
and healthful ecology arising from an unlawful act or 
omission by, or any unlawful neglect on the part of, the 
respondents that would warrant the writs’ issuance.
V.    Findings
In looking into the  12 environmental cases that the 
Supreme Court has decided for a period of nine years, from 
2010 to 2018, we noted both positive trends and challenges 
for environmental rights.
Gains
 (1) Liberalized citizen’s standing to sue 
In the seven cases where the parties sought the issuance 
of the special writs of kalikasan or continuing mandamus, 
or both, the respondents questioned the petitioners’ legal 
standing.  The Supreme Court, however, consistently upheld 
the petitioners standing to sue, explaining  that Rule 2 of 
RPEC permits any Filipino citizen to file an action before the 
courts for violations of environmental laws.  This collapses 
the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the 
principle that humans are stewards of nature. The Court 
explained that the RPEC’s more liberal interpretation 
concerning environmental claims has been established in 
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.29  
In West Tower Condominium Corporation, petitioner West 
Tower Corp. instituted the action on behalf of the residents 
of West Tower Condominium and in representation of 
Barangay Bangkal, and others, including minors and 
generations yet unborn.  The High Court recognized their 
legal standing. 
In Arigo, the High Court ruled that the petitioners had 
the standing to sue.  It explained:
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Locus standi is “a right of appearance in 
a court of justice on a given question.” 
Specifically, it is  “a party’s personal and 
substantial interest in a case where he has 
sustained or will sustain direct injury as 
a result” of the act being challenged, and 
“calls for more than just a generalized 
grievance.”  However, the rule on standing 
is a procedural matter which this Court 
has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs 
like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and 
legislators when the public interest so 
requires, such as when the subject matter 
of the controversy is of transcendental 
importance, of overreaching significance to 
society, or of paramount public interest.
One significant decision is Resident Marine Animals of 
Tañon Strait, where the petitioners were the resident marine 
mammals of the protected seascape Tañon Strait, which 
is located between the islands of Negros and Cebu.  The 
marine mammals, through their “human representatives,” 
filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and injunction to 
enjoin the DOE, et al., from implementing a service contract 
involving the exploration, development, and exploitation—
including a seismic survey and oil drilling—of the country’s 
petroleum resources in and around the Tañon Strait.  The 
High Court gave due course to the petition, explaining that 
the citizens who represented the marine mammals were 
considered their stewards. 
It may be recalled that in Oposa, the Court held that a 
suit may be brought in the name of generations yet unborn.  
Here, the Court did not squarely address the issue on the 
need to give resident mammals legal standing because the 
RPEC allows any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to 
bring suit to enforce environmental laws.  It pronounced:
 
“Moreover, even before the Rules of 
Procedure for Environmental Cases became 
effective, this Court had already taken a 
permissive position on the issue of locus 
standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, 
we allowed the suit to be brought in the 
name of generations yet unborn “based 
on the concept of intergenerational 
responsibility insofar as the right to 
a balanced and healthful ecology is 
concerned.” Furthermore, we said that the 
right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a 
right that does not even need to be stated 
in our Constitution as it is assumed to exist 
from the inception of humankind, carries 
with it the correlative duty to refrain from 
impairing the environment. 
 
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the 
Resident Marine Mammals legal standing 
has been eliminated by our Rules, which 
allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward 
of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our 
environmental laws. It is worth noting here 
that the Stewards are joined as real parties in 
the Petition and not just in representation 
of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, 
Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in 
their petition that there may be possible 
violations of laws concerning the habitat of 
the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore 
declared to possess the legal standing to file 
the petition.”30
In Segovia, the Supreme Court reiterated that the RPEC 
liberalized the requirements on standing and allowed the 
filing of citizen’s suit for the enforcement of rights and 
obligations under environmental laws.  It also stated that 
in a writ of kalikasan, it is sufficient that the person filing 
represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental 
damage subject of the writ. 
(2) Upholding Constitutional Provisions and 
       Environmental Laws
The High Court recognized the right to a healthful 
and balanced ecology under Article 2, Section 16 of the 
Constitution as a basis in the environmental cases filed. 
Again, in Resident Marine Animals of Tañon Strait, the 
Court upheld the constitutional provisions on the approval 
of service contracts as well as the prohibition of exploitation 
activities in protected areas.  The former National Integrated 
Protected Areas System and the Philippine Environmental 
Impact Statement System (EISS)  were emphasized.
In most of the cases involving the special writs 
of kalikasan and mandamus, the EIS law, the ECC and 
its regulations were taken up. The importance of the 
environmental impact assessment process and the EISS as a 
whole was tackled by the Supreme Court.  
Notably, in Redmont Consolidates Mines Corp., the 
Supreme Court affirmed the CA Decision concerning 
the violation of existing laws committed by the mining 
companies. Relating this with the farmers’ case in Narra, 
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Palawan (which was mentioned in the introduction of this 
study) involving Narra Nickel Mining and Development 
Corporation, the trial court held the mining companies 
liable for damages and the rehabilitation of the mined-out 
areas. The trial court, however, dismissed the case against 
the public officials and stated that there was not enough 
evidence to hold the officials liable.  Unfortunately, the trial 
court failed to appreciate the farmers’ arguments regarding 
the numerous violations made by the small-scale mining 
companies and the failure of the public officials to consider 
these legal issues when they endorsed and issued the small-
scale mining permits.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Narra bears repeating:
 
“To reiterate, Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 
Constitution reserves the exploration, 
development, and utilization of natural 
resources to Filipino citizens and 
“corporations or associations at least 
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned 
by such citizens.” Similarly, Section 3(aq) 
of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 
considers a “corporation xxx registered in 
accordance with law at least sixty per cent 
of the capital of which is owned by citizens 
of the Philippines” as a person qualified to 
undertake a mining operation. Consistent 
with this objective, the Grandfather Rule 
was originally conceived to look into 
the citizenship of the individuals who 
ultimately own and control the shares 
of stock of a corporation for purposes 
of determining compliance with the 
constitutional requirement of Filipino 
ownership. It cannot, therefore, be denied 
that the framers of the Constitution 
have not foreclosed the Grandfather Rule 
as a tool in verifying the nationality of 
corporations for purposes of ascertaining 
their right to participate in nationalized or 
partly nationalized activities. xxx
The avowed purpose of the Constitution 
is to place in the hands of Filipinos the 
exploitation of our natural resources. 
Necessarily, therefore, the Rule 
interpreting the constitutional provision 
should not diminish that right through the 
legal fiction of corporate ownership and 
control. But the constitutional provision, 
as interpreted and practiced via the 1967 
SEC Rules, has favored foreigners contrary 
to the command of the Constitution. 
Hence, the Grandfather Rule must be 
applied to accurately determine the actual 
participation, both direct and indirect, of 
foreigners in a corporation engaged in a 
nationalized activity or business.”
(3) Upholding the Local Government Code provisions on 
       prior consultations
In Boracay Foundation, the Supreme Court held that 
the reclamation project is classified as a national project 
that affects the environmental and ecological balance of 
local communities.  This, the Court held, requires prior 
consultation with the affected local communities and prior 
approval by the appropriate sanggunian—which were not 
complied  with.  Hence, the Court ordered the following: 
(i) that the respondent government 
agencies (a) cooperate with the DENR 
in its review of the reclamation project 
proposal and (b) secure approvals from 
local government units and hold proper 
consultations with  other stakeholders;
(ii) respondents shall immediately 
cease and desist from continuing the 
implementation of the project covered by 
ECC-R6-1003-096-7100 until further orders 
from the Court;
(iii) respondent Philippine Reclamation 
Authority shall closely monitor the 
submission by respondent Province of the 
requirements to be issued by respondent 
DENR-EMB RVI in connection to the 
environmental concerns raised by petitioner.
(4) Application of Precautionary Principle
In Greenpeace, et al., the High Court applied the 
precautionary principle, justifying that the three features—
uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible harm, and the 
possibility of serious harm—were present.  It found a 
preponderance of evidence showing that the release of 
GMOs into the environment threatens to damage not 
just the field trial sites, but also ecosystems, which will 
eventually lead to the people’s health once the eggplants 
are consumed as food.  Thus, the High Court, among others, 
prohibited the field testing of Bt talong and temporarily 
enjoined GMOs from being tested and commercialized.
The Court, however, later set its decision aside and 
instead dismiss the petition for being moot, following the 
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completion of the Bt talong field trials and the expiration of 
the biosafety permits.
Notably, in Mosqueda, where the petitioners pleaded 
that the Supreme Court should look at the merits of the 
ordinance based on the precautionary principle, the 
Supreme Court ruled otherwise. The petitioners argued 
that under the precautionary principle, the City of Davao is 
justified in enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 to prevent harm 
to the environment and human health despite the lack of 
scientific certainty.
The High Court stated that they could not see 
the presence of all the elements that would merit the 
application of the precautionary principle. According to 
the Court, there has been no scientific study. “Although 
the precautionary principle allows lack of full scientific 
certainty in establishing a connection between the serious 
or irreversible harm and the human activity, its application 
is still premised on empirical studies.  Scientific analysis is 
still a necessary basis for effective policy choices under the 
precautionary principle.”
(5) Converting Environmental Protection Order (EPO) into a 
      Writ of Continuing Mandamus
In Boracay Foundation, the Supreme Court converted 
the TEPO into a writ of continuing mandamus.  While RPEC 
provides for this, it will ultimately depend on the High 
Court’s appreciation of the factual and legal basis of an 
environmental case.   The Court was convinced that the 
petitioner was not part of the consultations conducted by 
the provincial government.
The High Court required the respondents, among 
others, their concerned contractor/s, and/or their agents, 
representatives or persons acting in their place or stead, to 
immediately desist from continuing the implementation of 
the project until further orders from the Court. 
(6) Sustaining the Mandates of Government Agencies 
Still in Boracay Foundation, the High Court, in converting 
the TEPO to a writ of continuing mandamus, required the 
concerned government agencies to undertake activities in 
line with their mandates: 
1.   Respondent Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources-Environmental 
Management Bureau Regional Office VI 
shall revisit and review the following 
matters:
a. its classification of the reclamation 
project as a single instead of a co-
located project; 
b. its approval of respondent Provinces 
classification of the project as a mere 
expansion of the existing jetty port in 
Caticlan, instead of classifying it as a 
new project; and 
c.  the impact of the reclamation project 
to the environment based on new, 
updated, and comprehensive studies, 
which should forthwith be ordered by 
respondent DENR-EMB RVI.
2.     Respondent Province of Aklan shall 
perform the following:
 
a.     fully cooperate with respondent 
DENR-EMB RVI in its review of the 
reclamation project proposal and 
submit to the latter the appropriate 
report and study; and b.    secure 
approvals from local government 
units and hold proper consultations 
with non-governmental organizations 
and other stakeholders and sectors 
concerned as required by Section 27 
in relation to Section 26 of the Local 
Government Code.
  
3. Respondent Philippine Reclamation 
Authority shall closely monitor the 
submission by respondent Province 
of the requirements to be issued by 
respondent DENR-EMB RVI in connection 
to the environmental concerns raised 
by petitioner, and shall coordinate with 
respondent Province in modifying the 
MOA, if necessary, based on the findings of 
respondent DENR-EMB RVI.
 
4.     The petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. 
and the respondents The Province of Aklan, 
represented by Governor Carlito S. Marquez, 
The Philippine Reclamation Authority, and The 
DENR-EMB (Region VI) are mandated to submit 
their respective reports to this Court regarding 
their compliance with the requirements set forth 
in this Decision no later than three (3) months 
from the date of promulgation of this Decision. 
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Challenges
Meanwhile, there are challenges that law enforcement 
agencies, citizens, and civil society groups need to contend 
with in the litigation of environmental cases. 
(1) Critical role of scientific and technical evidence
Time and again, environmental champions have 
reminded us that environmental law is 99% science.  
Matters such as deforestation, pollution and biodiversity-
related crimes, to name a few, are replete with scientific 
and technical concepts that require expert testimony and 
object and documentary evidence to establish the violation 
of an environmental law and the legal basis for special civil 
actions.  Without the needed scientific evidence, the Court 
may not be convinced of the merits of our cases.  
In Casiño, the Supreme Court upheld the CA finding that 
the Casiño group had failed to substantiate its claims that 
building the assailed coal-fired power plant would cause 
environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated in 
the writ of kalikasan.  The Court said that the experts’ alleged 
statements could not be given weight as none of them 
testified before the CA to confirm the pertinent contents 
of the Final Report.  It further noted that the case records 
showed no reason on the petitioners’ failure to present the 
expert witnesses.
In this case, the Supreme Court raised an important 
concern: “Here, where the right to a healthful and balanced 
ecology of a substantial magnitude is at stake, should we not 
tread the path of caution and prudence by compelling the 
testimonies of these alleged experts?”  However, after due 
consideration, the Supreme Court decided as follows: 
“xxx based on the statements in the Final Report, 
there is no sufficiently compelling reason to 
compel the testimonies of these alleged expert 
witnesses for the following reasons.
First, the statements are not sufficiently 
specific to point to us a flaw (or flaws) in the 
study or design/implementation (or some 
other aspect) of the project which provides 
a causal link or, at least, a reasonable 
connection between the construction and 
operation of the project vis-à-vis potential 
grave environmental damage. In particular, 
they do not explain why the Environmental 
Management Plan (EMP) contained in 
the EIS of the project will not adequately 
address these concerns.
Second, some of the concerns raised in the 
alleged statements, like acid rain, warming 
and acidification of the seawater, and 
discharge of pollutants were, as previously 
discussed, addressed by the evidence 
presented by RP Energy before the appellate 
court. Again, these alleged statements do 
not explain why such concerns are not 
adequately covered by the EMP of RP Energy.
Third, the key observations of Dr. Cruz, while 
concededly assailing certain aspects of the 
EIS, do not clearly and specifically establish 
how these omissions have led to the issuance 
of an ECC that will pose significant negative 
environmental impacts once the project is 
constructed and becomes operational. The 
recommendations stated therein would 
seem to suggest points for improvement 
in the operation and monitoring of the 
project,but they do not clearly show why 
such recommendations are indispensable 
for the project to comply with existing 
environmental laws and standards, or how 
non-compliance with such recommendations 
will lead to an environmental damage of the 
magnitude contemplated under the writ of 
kalikasan. Again, these statements do not 
state with sufficient particularity how the 
EMP in the EIS failed to adequately address 
these concerns.
Fourth, because the reason for the non-
presentation of the alleged expert witnesses 
does not appear on record, we cannot 
assume that their testimonies are being 
unduly suppressed.”
 (2) Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In several cases, respondents have argued that since 
there is an administrative appeal provided for, the 
petitioners are duty bound to follow this process first before 
seeking recourse from the courts. 
In Boracay Foundation, the High Court did not agree with 
respondents’ appreciation of the applicability of the rule on 
exhaustion of administrative remedies.  It said:
 
“We are reminded of our ruling in Pagara 
v. Court of Appeals, which summarized 
our earlier decisions on the procedural 
requirement of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, to wit:
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The rule regarding exhaustion of 
administrative remedies is not a 
hard and fast rule. It is not applicable 
(1) where the question in dispute is 
purely a legal one, or (2) where the 
controverted act is patently illegal or 
was performed without jurisdiction 
or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) 
where the respondent is a department 
secretary, whose acts as an alter ego 
of the President bear the implied 
or assumed approval of the latter, 
unless actually disapproved by him, 
or (4) where there are circumstances 
indicating the urgency of judicial 
intervention, Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 
L-21897, October 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; 
Abaya vs. Villegas, L-25641, December 17, 
1966, 18 SCRA; Mitra vs. Subido, L-21691, 
September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127.  Said 
principle may also be disregarded when 
it does not provide a plain, speedy 
and adequate remedy, (Cipriano vs. 
Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291), when there 
is no due process observed (Villanos 
vs. Subido, 45 SCRA 299), or where the 
protestant has no other recourse (Sta. 
Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637).”
Similarly, in Dolot, the High Court did not sustain the 
argument that the petitioners should have exhausted 
administrative remedies by filing a case before the PA, 
which had jurisdiction over mining disputes under the 
Philippine Mining Act. It ruled that resorting to the PA was 
useless and unnecessary because the petition filed did 
not involve a mining dispute.  Petitioners were protesting 
alleged negative environmental impacts of the small-scale 
mining operations, the governor’s authority to issue mining 
permits, and the indifference of the DENR and local officials. 
Such matters need not require the exercise of technical 
knowledge and expertise of the Panel of Arbitrators.
(3) Establishing the requisites for Writ of Kalikasan and Writ 
      of Continuing Mandamus
The Supreme Court continued to reiterate the key 
requirements of these two special writs in their decisions. 
In Braga, the Court did not  issue a writ of mandamus 
because the Sasa Wharf Modernization Project had not yet 
reached the construction stage.  The bidding process had not 
even been concluded when the petition was filed. As such, 
the Court held that the petition for a writ of continuing 
mandamus was  premature:
 
“The writ of continuing mandamus cannot 
be resorted to when the respondent is 
not the person obliged to perform the 
duty under the law (as is the case under 
the EIS System) or when the period for 
the respondent to perform its legal duty 
has not yet expired (as is the case with the 
consultation requirements of the LGC).”
In Arigo, the Supreme Court denied the petition for a 
writ of kalikasan with prayer for a TEPO.  It explained that 
the petition became moot since the USS Guardian, which 
ran aground over the Tubbataha Reefs, had already been 
removed when petitioners sought recourse from the Court. 
The project assailed in Braga can typify the “build-build-
build” projects that are being assailed and opposed by local 
communities and civil society groups.  Ideally, projects 
that threaten forests, marine ecosystems, biodiversity, 
and culture should be carefully studied and not even be 
considered in any development plan.  Affected stakeholders 
must be consulted and participate in the process, as held 
in Boracay Foundation, where the petitioner was not a 
participant in the consultation process.  
As such, before planning on any extractive or heavy 
infrastructure development project, local government 
units must take cognizance of the state of their locality’s 
natural resources. Planning for development projects that 
could destroy ecosystems, impede biodiversity conservation 
efforts, cause community displacement, and prevent climate 
resilience, among others, should be scrutinized from the 
time these are conceived.  If citizens wait until the bidding 
process, the development project can essentially proceed.  
By then, it would be too costly and too late to change the 
development direction in a specific area.
Justice Marvic Leonen, in his concurring and dissenting 
opinion in Casiño, stated that a petition for a writ of 
kalikasan was not the proper remedy since what the 
petitioners assailed was the propriety of the issuance 
and subsequent amendment of the ECCs by DENR for a 
project that has yet to be implemented. He opined that the 
novel action is inapplicable even more so to projects with 
ECCs yet to be issued or can still be challenged through 
administrative review processes. Thus, the extraordinary 
initiatory petition neither subsumed nor substitute for 
“all remedies that can contribute to the protection of 
communities and their environment.” 
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However, Justice Presbitero Velasco had a contrary 
opinion, where he explained the differences between a 
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and a writ of kalikasan 
under Rule 7 of RPEC.  He explained that with the advent of 
RPEC, there had been significant changes in the procedural 
rules that apply to environmental cases.  He identified eight 
areas where a certiorari petition and kalikasan petition 
differ from each other:
“1. Subject matter.  Since its subject matter 
is any ‘unlawful act or omission,’ a Rule 
7 kalikasan petition is broad enough to 
correct any act taken without or in excess 
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of 
discretion amounting to lack or excess of 
jurisdiction which is the subject matter of 
a Rule 65 certiorari petition. Any form of 
abuse of discretion as long as it constitutes 
an unlawful act or omission involving 
the environment can be subject of a Rule 
7 kalikasan petition. A Rule 65 petition, 
on the other hand, requires the abuse 
of discretion to be “grave.” Ergo,a subject 
matter which ordinarily cannot properly 
be subjectof a certiorari petition can be the 
subject of a kalikasan petition.
2. Who may file. Rule 7 has liberalized the 
rule on locus standi, such that availment 
of the writ of kalikasan is open to a broad 
range of suitors, to include even an entity 
authorized by law, people’s organization, 
or any public interest group accredited 
by or registered with any government 
agency, on behalf of persons whose right 
to a balanced and healthful ecology is 
violated or threatened to be violated. Rule 
65 allows only the aggrieved person to be 
the petitioner.
3. Respondent. The respondent in a Rule 
65 petition is only the government or its 
officers, unlike in a kalikasan petition 
where the respondent may be a private 
individual or entity.
4. Exemption from docket fees. The 
kalikasan petition is exempt from docket 
fees, unlike in a Rule 65 petition. Rule 
7 of RPEC has pared down the usually 
burdensome litigation expenses. 
5. Venue. The certiorari petition can be filed 
with (a) the RTC exercising jurisdiction over 
the territory where the act was committed; 
(b) the Court of Appeals; and (c) the Supreme 
Court. Given the magnitude of the damage, 
the kalikasan petition can be filed directly 
with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme 
Court. The direct filing of a kalikasan 
petition will prune case delay.
6. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
This doctrine generally applies to a certiorari 
petition, unlike in a kalikasan petition.
7. Period to file. An aggrieved party has 60 
days from notice of judgment or denial 
of a motion for reconsideration to file a 
certiorari petition, while a kalikasan petition 
is not subject to such limiting time lines.
8. Discovery measures. In a certiorari petition, 
discovery measures are not available unlike 
in a kalikasan petition. Resort to these 
measures will abbreviate proceedings.”
(4) FPIC in relation to the Environmental Compliance 
      Certificate (ECC)
Still in Casiño, the Supreme Court held that since the ECC 
is not the license or permit contemplated under  Section 59 
of  the IPRA and its implementing rules, there is no need to 
secure the Certification of Non-Overlap (CNO)  beforehand. 
The Court likewise refrained itself, for reason of equity, 
from invalidating the LDA between RP Energy and theSBMA, 
explaining that it was only in this case that it first ruled that 
a CNO should have been secured prior to the consummation 
of the said LDA under Section 59 of IPRA.
Alas, this decision can put at risk the assertion of 
indigenous peoples (IPs) communities of their rights as part 
of the EIA process. The ECC is required for every project. Does 
this mean then that before a project applies for an ECC, it 
must secure first an FPIC? Shouldn’t the DENR require all 
project proponents to secure first an FPIC before allowing 
them to submit their ECC application?
To avoid further confusion, it is important that the 
DENR and NCIP harmonize their processes. Otherwise, the 
rights and interest of IP communities will be put in jeopardy 
from several extractive and development projects within 
ancestral domains.
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Insights
The 12 cases studied provide us with important 
jurisprudence to strengthen our efforts in using the RPEC 
and our environmental laws to protect our environmental 
rights and our natural resources.  Such jurisprudence may 
be a good start but, as of this writing, these cases cannot yet 
adequately exemplify the key environmental challenges 
faced by many local communities. 
Several cases lie in trial courts, the CA, and the Supreme 
Court pending resolution.  We need to monitor the progress 
and impact of these cases on the ground. 
In the focus group discussions (FGD) organized by 
the Alternative Law Groups, there was a consensus that 
many citizens, especially local communities affected 
by environmental problems, are not yet aware of the 
opportunities provided by the RPEC.  The FGD also showed 
that many affected communities cannot avail of remedies 
under RPEC because of lack of adequate information on 
their rights and remedies, as well as access to legal resources. 
Thus, public interest environmental lawyers are 
challenged to continue honing their legal skills and deepen 
their understanding on the use of the special writs and 
other remedies under RPEC through, among others, taking 
stock of the Supreme Court decisions in the last eight 
years.  Justice Leonen’s concurring and dissenting opinion 
in the RP Energy case is an important consideration for 
us as we pursue our advocacy work and public interest 
environmental lawyering, thus: 
“xxx Environmental advocacy is primarily 
motivated by care and compassion for 
communities and the environment. It can 
rightly be a passionately held mission. 
It is founded on faith that the world as 
it is now can be different. It implies the 
belief that the longer view of protecting 
our ecology should never be sacrificed for 
short-term convenience.
However, environmental advocacy is 
not only about passion. It is also about 
responsibility. There are communities 
with almost no resources and are at a 
disadvantage against large projects that 
might impact on their livelihoods. Those 
that take the cudgels lead them (sic) as they 
assert their ecological rights must show 
that they have both the professionalism 
and the capability to carry their cause 
forward. When they file a case to protect 
the interests of those who they represent, 
they should be able to make both allegation 
and proof. The dangers from an improperly 
managed environmental case are as real to 
the communities sought to be represented 
as the dangers from a project by proponents 
who do not consider their interests.
The records of this case painfully chronicle 
the embarrassingly inadequate evidence 
marshalled by those that initially filed 
the Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan. Even 
with the most conscientious perusal of the 
records and with the most sympathetic 
view for the interests of the community 
and the environment, the obvious 
conclusion that there was not much 
thought or preparation in substantiating 
the allegations made in the Petition 
cannot be hidden.  Legal advocacy for the 
environment deserves much more.”31
Another challenge is enhancing our existing 
community empowerment efforts to enable communities 
and ordinary citizens to avail of the remedies provided 
by RPEC. Public interest environmental litigation efforts 
cannot stand alone.  Would-be petitioners and complainants 
need to be fully aware of their role in making the RPEC work 
in their favor.
In engaging the government, we need to keep on 
emphasizing the public trust doctrine; that is, the State is 
a trustee of our common resources and must preserve its 
common use for the public. The State has the responsibility 
to protect what is considered as a public right and is 
mandated to take affirmative state action for effective 
management of resources. 
On the other hand, as stewards and trustees of our 
natural resources and environment for the present and 
future generations, we as citizens are empowered to 
question the ineffective management of our environment 
and natural resources. Environmental justice cases are part 
of public interest litigation, which impacts present and 
future generations. Judicial decisions on environmental 
cases are, therefore, significant.  This is where RPEC and 
public interest litigation play a crucial role.  
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1 A study undertaken by the Environmental Legal Assistance Center, Inc. (ELAC) under a research 
grant from the Alternative Law Groups’ (ALG) Hustisya Natin Program (particularly, monitoring of special 
cases).
2 The mining companies consisted of three small-scale mining companies (Narra Nickel Mining 
and Development Corporation, Patricia Louise Mining and Development Corporation and Palawan Alpha 
South Mining and Development Corporation) and a foreign mining company, Mighty Beaut Minerals, Inc. 
(MBMI). 
3 In the Philippine Judicial Academy’s (Philja) 2011 Sourcebook on Environmental Rights and Legal 
Remedies, it states that Environmental Justice stems from a growing recognition that the Right to the 
Environment is a fundamental human right which ought to be protected (page 28). The Philja Sourcebook 
noted varying concepts of Environmental Justice among groups. The United States Environmental 
Protection Agency defines it as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people 
regardless of race, color, national origin or income with respect to the development, implementation 
and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies.” Others view it as “the equitable 
distribution of burdens of the environmental harms among various groups”.
4 Supreme Court of the Philippines. The Rationale and Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for 
Environmental Cases. 2010, page 50. 
5 Adapted from RPEC and The Rationale and Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for 
Environmental Cases. 2010.
6 Section 3, RPEC. 
7 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993 
8 Boracay Foundation, Inc.v Province of Aklan, G.R No. 196870,  June 26, 2012.
9 Supreme Court, Supra. p. 81.
10 Supreme Court, Supra, page 159. 
11  https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jun2012/gr_196870_2012.html, June 26, 2012.
12  See https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/aug2013/gr_199199_2013.html, August 27, 2013.
13  See http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2014junedecisions.php?id=383, June 4, 2014.
14  See https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/gr_206510_2014.html, September 16, 2014.
15  https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/feb2015/gr_207257_2015.html, February 3, 2015.  
16 See http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015aprildecisions.php?id=356, April 21, 2015.
17 See https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/apr2014/gr_195580_2014.html, April 21, 2014.
18  Id.
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19  See https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jun2015/gr_194239_2015.html, June 16, 2015.
20  Id.
21  Id.
22  Id.
23  See http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015decemberdecisions.php?id=1106 , December 8, 2015.
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25  Id.
26  See http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2016septemberdecisions.php?id=850, September 13, 2016.
27   http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2016augustdecisions.php?id=721, August 16, 2016.
28  https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/mar2017/gr_211010_2017.html, March 7, 2017.
29 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792. 
30  Resident Marine Mammals of Tanon Strait, et al. vs. DOE, et al., G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015.
31 See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marvic Leonen in the  Consolidated Cases involving 
the Casiño Group and former DENR Secretary Paje and other government officials in G.R. No. 207257,  G.R. No. 
207276,  G.R. No. 207282 and G.R. No. 207366, February 3, 2015.
REFERENCES
1. Supreme Court, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
2. Supreme Court, Rationale and Annotation to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
3. G.R. 196870, June 26, 2012.
4. G.R. No. 199199, August 27, 2013.
5. G.R. No. 195580; April 21, 2014.
6. G.R. No. 179669; June 4, 2014.
7. G.R. No. 20510, September 16, 2014.
8. Consolidated Cases involving the Casiño Group and former DENR Secretary Paje and other 
government officials in G.R. No. 207257,  G.R. No. 207276,  G.R. No. 207282 and G.R. No. 207366, February 3, 2015.
9. G.R. 194209; June 16, 2015.
10. G.R. No. 181527; April 21, 2015.
11. G.R. No. 209271; December 8, 2015.
12. G.R. No. 189185; August 16, 2016.
13. G.R. No. 223076; September 13, 2016.
14. G.R. No. 211010; March 7, 2017.
 HUSTISYA NATIN   76
AGRARIAN REFORM
KAISAHAN (Kaisahan tungo sa Kaunlaran ng Kanayunan at Repormang Pansakahan 
or Solidarity Towards Countryside Development and Agrarian Reform) is a social 
development organization promoting a sustainable and humane society through the 
empowerment of marginalized groups in rural areas, especially among farmers and 
farmworkers, to undertake their own development, participate fully in democratic 
processes and demand their rightful share in the stewardship of the land and the fruits of 
their labor.
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FROM ESTRIBILLO TO CARRIEDO: 
Affirming the indefeasibility of agrarian reform titles 
under the Philippine agrarian reform programs  
Atty. Mary Claire Demaisip
Agrarian Reform in the Philippines is viewed as a vehicle to realize social change that will even out the distribution of wealth, resources and opportunities 
among Filipinos.  Former Department of Agrarian Reform 
(DAR) Secretary Virgilio delos Reyes mentioned that in 
promote social justice, agrarian reform has three goals: “a) 
to restitute social wrongs so lands were given to tillers or the 
farmworkers, b) to reduce rural poverty by working towards 
making the awarded land productive and income-earning, 
and c) diffuse wealth thereby achieving a stable society.”1
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes the State’s 
mandate of undertaking agrarian reform.  Article XIII, 
Section 4 provides:
“The State shall, by law, undertake an 
agrarian reform program founded on the 
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, 
who are landless, to own directly or 
collectively the lands they till or, in the case 
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share 
of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State 
shall encourage and undertake the just 
distribution of all agricultural lands, subject 
to such priorities and reasonable retention 
limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking 
into account ecological, developmental, 
or equity considerations, and subject to 
the payment of just compensation. In 
determining retention limits, the State shall 
respect the rights of small landowners. The 
State shall further provide incentives for 
voluntary land-sharing. “
Under the agrarian reform program’s land transfer 
scheme,  agricultural lands belonging to owners in excess of 
the retention area allowed by applicable laws are acquired 
by the State and distributed to qualified farmer beneficiaries 
(FBs). This was in accordance with two laws: (1) Presidential 
Decree No 27 (P.D. No. 27), covering agricultural lands 
devoted for rice and corn; and (2) Republic Act No. 6657, 
or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), for all 
agricultural lands regardless of the crops planted. 
 FBs who qualified under either law are awarded 
land titles as proof of ownership: Emancipation Patents 
(EPs) and Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).  EPs 
are government-issued land titles under P.D. No. 27, which 
was enacted on October 21, 1972.  On the other hand, CLOAs 
are land titles issued under the CARL, which was enacted 
on June 15, 19882 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program Extension with Reforms (CARPER) or R.A. No. 9700 
enacted on August 7, 2009.3  
 
As provided in Republic v. CA,4 a certificate of title is the 
evidence to property in favor of the person whose name 
appears on it.  It serves as a legal instrument that secures the 
ownership and tenure of the farmers to their land.5 
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Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under PD 27 
P.D. No. 27 mandated the coverage of tenanted 
agricultural lands devoted to rice and corn.  It provides 
that “[t]he tenant farmer, whether in land classified as 
landed estate or not, shall be deemed owner of a portion 
constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not 
irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated[.]”6  Landowners, 
on the other hand, may retain an  area of not more than 
seven (7) hectares.  Before EPs may be issued to qualified 
tenant farmers, P.D. No. 27 requires that they be full-fledged 
members of a duly recognized farmer’s cooperative and pay 
the amortizations in full to the said land.7  
To operationalize the implementation of P.D. No. 27, P.D. 
No. 2668 was issued on August 4, 1973.  It outlined the process 
of registration and transfer of titles of landholdings prior 
to and after qualified tenant farmers have fully complied 
with the requirements for the grant of a title under P.D. 
No. 27.  Subsequently, on July 17, 1997, Executive Order 228 
was issued, setting the guidelines to determine the value of 
remaining unvalued rice and corn lands subject to P.D. No. 
27.  It also provided the manner of payment by the FBs and 
the modes of compensation to the landowner.9
Although P.D. No. 27 states that tenant farmers shall be 
deemed owners of the land, they still need to comply with 
conditions set forth in the law before having full ownership 
of the land under the OLT program.  Until then, they have 
an inchoate ownership on the land awarded to them.  As 
proof of this inchoate right, DAR issued a Certificate of Land 
Transfer (CLT) to the tenant farmers. 
H. De Leon, in his textbook Agrarian Reform and Taxation, 
defined a CLT as “a document issued to a tenant-farmer, 
which proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land 
primarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued 
in order for the tenant- farmer to acquire the land. This 
certificate prescribes the terms and conditions of ownership 
over the said land and likewise describes the area and 
location of the landholding. A CLT is the provisional title 
of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is 
awaiting full payment of the land’s value or for as long as 
the beneficiary is an ‘amortizing owner’.”10  
After a tenant farmer has fully complied with the law’s 
requirements, an EP shall be issued by the DAR in his or her 
favor.11  As explained In Del Castillo v. Orciga:12
“Land transfer under PD No. 27 is effected 
in two (2) stages: (1) issuance of a CLT 
to a farmer-beneficiary as soon as DAR 
transfers the landholding to the farmer-
beneficiary in recognition that said person 
is a “deemed owner”; and (2) issuance of 
an Emancipation Patent as proof of full 
ownership of the landholding upon full 
payment of the annual amortizations or 
lease rentals by the farmer or beneficiary.”
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) 
under R.A. 6657 
R.A. 6657 was enacted pursuant to the 1987 
Constitution’s mandate to establish an agrarian reform 
program aimed at the redistribution of agricultural lands 
to landless tillers.13  The law expanded the land coverage 
under CARP to all agricultural lands regardless of tenurial 
arrangements and crops planted therein.14  In implementing 
CARP, land distribution is complemented with support 
services delivery, such as farm input and machineries.  
Under the law, FBs will be awarded an area of not 
exceeding three hectares.15  Landowners, on the other hand,  
are entitled to a retention area of five hectares, while their 
children may be awarded three hectares provided that 
they comply with the legal requirements and qualify as 
preferred beneficiaries under CARP.16  Moreover, distribution 
of all agricultural lands covered by the program shall be 
completed within 10 years from the law’s effectivity.17 
In 1998, R.A. No. 853218 was enacted, providing for 
additional funding for CARP in the next 10 years.  
In 2009, R.A. No. 9700, or the CARPER, was legislated to 
amend certain CARL provisions.  Among others, it infused 
new funding for CARP implementation and introduced 
reforms to the existing law.  CARPER further provided for 
the continuing acquisition and distribution of agricultural 
lands until they are all distributed.  Subsequently, DAR 
issued rules and regulations to govern the implementation 
of the land acquisition and distribution (LAD) under CARP.19
 
FBs go through the lengthy LAD process, which 
culminates in the awarding of land they can cultivate and 
make productive.  As proof of their ownership, the DAR 
issues CLOAs to them. 
After identifying the qualified FBs, the DAR will survey 
the subject landholding to segregate coverable and non-
coverable areas.20  Together with the Land Bank of the 
Philippines (LBP), DAR will conduct a joint field investigation 
for the valuation of land covered under CARP.21  The LBP 
then determines the initial valuation of the landholding.  
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Afterwards, it will furnish DAR, through its provincial office 
(DARPO), a Memorandum of Valuation (MOV) informing the 
agency of its computation.22
The landowner will be informed by the DAR, through 
its Provincial Agrarian Reform Program Officer (PARPO), of 
the valuation of the land through the service of the Notice 
of Land Valuation and Acquisition (NLVA).23 Simultaneously, 
the PARPO will transmit his Order to Deposit Landowner’s 
Compensation to the LBP.  The LBP, in turn shall issue  a 
Certificate of Deposit (COD) upon receipt of the said Order.  
The PARPO shall transmit copies of the COD and the 
Advanced Survey Plan (ASP) of the landholding to the 
Register of Deeds (RoD) and request for the issuance of a 
Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic 
of the Philippines (RP).  Upon receipt of the request, the RoD 
shall immediately issue the RP title for the CARP covered 
area and a separate title to the retention and non-coverable 
areas in the name of the landowner.
As a general rule, DAR shall take immediate possession 
of a landholding after the LBP has issued the COD.24  It shall 
also proceed with the distribution process to the qualified 
beneficiaries upon completion of the requirements 
specified in the law.25
As stated in the LAD implementing rules, FBs already 
have usufructuary rights over the landholding from the 
time the DAR takes constructive or actual possession of the 
property until the CLOA awarding.26  “Pending the award 
of the CLOA and for purposes of establishing usufructuary 
rights, the DAR, upon issuance of the COD and upon actual 
possession of the land, shall inform the ARBs that they have 
been identified and qualified to receive the land.”27
In the award and distribution of land to the FBs, the 
ROD has the ministerial duty to: (1) issue the land title 
in the name of the RP after the LBP has certified that the 
claim proceeds were deposited in the landowner’s name, 
constituting full payment in cash and bonds with due 
notice to the landowner; (2) Register the CLOA generated by 
DAR; (3) Cancel previous titles; and (4) Issue a title for the 
landowner’s retained area and other non-coverable areas.28
Upon registering the CLOA, the ROD shall release it to 
the LBP as the mortgagee financing institution.  The LBP 
will then provide two sets of certified true copies of the 
CLOA to the PARPO.  In turn, the PARPO will transmit one 
set of the copies to the ARBs.  As owners of the awarded 
land, the FBs shall pay annual amortizations to the LBP 
beginning one year from the date of the CLOA registration.  
If occupancy took place after the CLOA registration, the 
annual amortization shall start one year from actual 
occupancy.29  “The LBP shall be the responsible repository of 
the encumbered CLOAs until the time of their release to the 
ARBs upon full payment of the land amortization, and the 
cancellation of the encumbrance.”30 
Indefeasibility of Titles
As mentioned, a land title is the evidence of the owner’s 
right corresponding to the extent of his/her interest, and 
by which means he can maintain control, possession and 
enjoyment of the property. 31  It cannot be assailed through 
a collateral attack, and altered, modified, or cancelled except 
in a direct proceeding in accordance with  law.32  Once 
issued and registered in the ROD, it becomes the primary 
evidence of land ownership.  The indefeasibility of titles is 
an essential doctrine in land ownership and is entrenched 
in jurisprudence.  In Abobon v. Abobon:33
“First of all, a fundamental principle in land 
registration under the Torrens system is 
that a certificate of title serves as evidence 
of an indefeasible and incontrovertible 
title to the property in favor of the person 
whose name appears therein. The certificate 
of title thus becomes the best proof of 
ownership of a parcel of land; hence, 
anyone who deals with property registered 
under the Torrens system may rely on the 
title and need not go beyond the title. This 
reliance on the certificate of title rests on 
the doctrine of indefeasibility of the land 
title, which has long been well-settled 
in this jurisdiction. It is only when the 
acquisition of the title is attended with 
fraud or bad faith that the doctrine of 
indefeasibility finds no application.” 
 
Similarly, in Decaleng v. The Philippine Episcopal Church:34
“It is a hornbook principle that a certificate 
of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible 
title to the property in favor of the person 
whose name appears therein.”57 In order 
to establish a system of registration by 
which recorded title becomes absolute, 
indefeasible, and imprescriptible, the 
legislature passed Act No. 496, which took 
effect on February 1, 1903. Act No. 496 placed 
all registered lands in the Philippines 
under the Torrens system. The Torrens 
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system requires the government to issue a 
certificate of title stating that the person 
named in the title is the owner of the 
property described therein, subject to liens 
and encumbrances annotated on the title 
or reserved by law. The certificate of title 
is indefeasible and imprescriptible and 
all claims to the parcel of land are quieted 
upon issuance of the certificate. Presidential 
Decree No. 1529, known as the Property 
Registration Decree, enacted on June 11, 1978, 
amended and updated Act No. 496.”
However, under prevailing laws and jurisprudence, 
the indefeasibility of the owner’s title may be discredited 
in cases where it was acquired through fraud, bad faith, or 
misrepresentation.35  Baguio v. Republic of the Philippines, 
et. al.36 declared that the “indefeasibility of a title does not 
attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.  The 
registration of a patent under the Torrens System merely 
confirms the registrant’s title.  It does not vest title where 
there is none because registration under this system is not 
a mode of acquiring ownership.”  As stated in Sacdalan vs. 
Court of Appeals, “The Torrens Title does not furnish a shield 
for fraud.”37 
Indefeasibility of EPs and CLOAs
Under our agrarian reform laws, EPs and CLOAs are titles 
issued by the government in favor of the FBs.  As such, they are 
accorded the same recognition and protection as other titles 
issued under the Torrens System and registered in the RoD. 
In 2006, the Supreme Court in Estribillo v. DAR38 
categorically established the indefeasibility of EPs and 
CLOAs as titles of lands awarded to FBs.  It stated:
“The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of 
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic 
Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the 
Torrens system of registration. The Property 
Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter 
IX27 on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs 
and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be 
as indefeasible as certificates of title issued 
in registration proceedings.”
The Supreme Court further ruled:
“After complying with the procedure, 
therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential 
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the 
Property Registration Decree (where the 
DAR is required to issue the corresponding 
certificate of title after granting an EP to 
tenant-farmers who have complied with 
Presidential Decree No. 27), the TCTs issued 
to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire 
the same protection accorded to other TCTs. 
“The certificate of title becomes indefeasible 
and incontrovertible upon the expiration 
of one year from the date of the issuance of 
the order for the issuance of the patent, x x x. 
Lands covered by such title may no longer be 
the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, 
nor can it be decreed to another person.”
DAR v. Estribillo
G.R. No. 159674, June 30, 2006
Facts
The petitioners are recipients of EPs over parcels of 
land in Agusan del Sur.  These lands were formerly 
part of a forested area, which have been denuded 
as a result of logging operations of respondent, 
Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI).  The petitioners were 
among those who occupied and tilled these areas.
In 1956, HMI acquired the land from the Republic 
through Sales Patent No. 2683.  It was later issued 
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P30771661.
On October 21, 1972, P.D. No. 27 was issued, 
mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be 
brought under the OLT program and awarded to FBs.
HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, 
requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings 
be placed under OLT.  Receiving compensation for 
the property, HMI allowed the petitioners and other 
occupants to cultivate the landholdings, though the 
same may be covered under said law.
HMI, through its representatives, actively 
participated in all relevant proceedings, including 
the determination of the average gross production 
per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land 
Production.  It was also a signatory of an undated 
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Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement 
(LPTA), which covered the 527.8308 hectares of land.  
The LPTA was submitted to the LBP in 1977.
In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was 
conducted and approved.  From 1984 to 1998, the 
corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 
527.8308 hectares of land were issued to petitioners, 
among others.
 
In December 1997, HMI filed before the Regional 
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA 
Region XIII petitions seeking the declaration 
of the erroneous coverage under P.D. No. 27 of 
277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings.  
HMI claimed that: (1) the area was not devoted to 
either rice or corn; (2) it was untenanted; and (3) no 
compensation had been paid.
On November 27, 1998, the RARAD rendered a 
Decision declaring  the TCTs and EPs awarded to the 
petitioners void.  It reasoned that the land covered 
was not devoted to rice and corn, and that there had 
been no established tenancy relations between HMI 
and the petitioners when P.D. No. 27 took effect.
The petitioners appealed to the Department of 
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), which 
then affirmed the RARAD Decision.  Thus, they 
elevated their case to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for 
violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of 
Civil Procedure.
Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court 
was filed, contending that: (1) there had been 
compliance with Rule 7, Section 5; and (2) EPs are 
ordinary titles, which became indefeasible one year 
after the registration.
Issue
Whether the EPs issued to Estribillo, et al. are 
accorded the same protection as to other TCTs. 
Ruling
Yes.  The EPs issued to the petitioners are titles 
registered under the Torrens System; thus, they 
are accorded the same treatment and protection 
granted to other TCTs. 
 The Court ruled that Certificates of Title (COTs) 
issued pursuant to EPs are as indefeasible as TCTs 
issued in registration proceedings.  Therefore, after 
complying with the procedure under Section 105 of 
P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree—
where DAR is required to issue the corresponding 
COT after granting an EP to farmer-tenants who 
complied with P.D. No. 27—the TCTs issued to the 
petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquired the same 
protection accorded to other TCTs.  
Moreover,“[t]he certificate of title becomes 
indefeasible and inconvertible upon the expiration 
of one year from the date of issuance of the order for 
the issuance of the order of the issuance of patent, 
xxx.  Lands covered by such title may no longer be the 
subject matter of the cadastral proceeding, nor can it 
be decreed to another person.” 
The Court further noted that the EPs themselves, 
like CLOAs in CARL, are enrolled in the Torrens 
System of Registration, and that the Property 
Registration Decree devotes its Chapter IX on the 
subject of EPs.  EPs and CLOAs are, the Court ruled, 
entitled to be as indefeasible as COTs issued in 
registration proceedings.
The indefeasibility of EPs and CLOAs was 
institutionalized in Section 9 of CARPER, which amended 
Section 24 of CARL.  It provides:
“SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries (AS AMENDED 
BY SECTION 9 OF R.A. No. 9700).  — The rights 
and responsibilities of the beneficiaries 
shall commence from their receipt of 
a duly registered emancipation patent 
or certificate of land ownership award 
and their actual physical possession 
of the awarded land. Such award shall 
be completed in not more than one 
hundred eighty (180) days from the date of 
registration of the title in the name of the 
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That 
the emancipation patents, the certificates 
of land ownership award, and other titles 
issued under any agrarian reform program 
shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible 
after one (1) year from its registration 
with the Office of the Registry of Deeds, 
subject to the conditions, limitations and 
qualifications of this Act, the property 
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registration decree, and other pertinent 
laws. The emancipation patents or the 
certificates of land ownership award 
being titles brought under the operation 
of the Torrens System, are conferred with 
the same indefeasibility and security 
afforded to all titles under the said system, 
as provided for by Presidential Decree No. 
1529, as amended by Republic Act No. 6732.  
(Emphasis supplied.)
Issues on the Indefeasibility of EPS and CLOAS
Despite being an established principle in law and 
jurisprudence, the indefeasibility of EPs and CLOAs has still 
been assailed.  In 2016, the Supreme Court in Department 
of Agrarian Reform v. Carriedo39 ruled that CLOAs are not 
equivalent to a Torrens Certificate of Title and, therefore, are 
not indefeasible.  It stated:
“Finally, petitioners cannot argue that 
the CLOAs allegedly granted in favor of 
his co-petitioners Corazon and Orlando 
cannot be set aside. They claim that CLOAs 
under R.A. No. No. 6657 are enrolled in the 
Torrens system of registration which makes 
them indefeasible as certificates of title 
issued in registration proceedings. Even 
as these allegedly issued CLOAs are not in 
the records, we hold that CLOAs are not 
equivalent to a Torrens certificate of title, 
and thus are not indefeasible.
CLOAs and EPs are similar in nature to a 
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in ordinary 
land registration proceedings. CLTs, and in 
turn the CLOAs and EPs, are issued merely 
as preparatory steps for the eventual 
issuance of a certificate of title. They do not 
possess the indefeasibility of certificates of 
title. Justice Oswald D. Agcaoili, in Property 
Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land 
Titles and Deeds), notes, to wit:
Under P.D. No. 27, beneficiaries are issued 
certificates of land transfers (CLTs) to entitle 
them to possess lands. Thereafter, they are 
issued emancipation patents (EPs) after 
compliance with all necessary conditions. 
Such EPs, upon their presentation to the 
Register of Deeds, shall be the basis for the 
issuance of the corresponding transfer 
certificates of title (TCTs) in favor of the 
corresponding beneficiaries.
 
Under R.A. No. No. 6657, the procedure 
has been simplified. Only certificates of 
land ownership award (CLOAs) are issued, 
in lieu of EPs, after compliance with all 
prerequisites. Upon presentation of the 
CLOAs to the Register of Deeds, TCTs are 
issued to the designated beneficiaries. CLTs 
are no longer issued.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to 
beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the 
landowner from retaining the area covered 
thereby. Under AO No. 2, series of 1994, an 
EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land 
covered is later found to be part of the 
landowner’s retained area. 
 
The issue, however, involving the issuance, 
recall or cancellation of EPs or CLOAs, is 
lodged with the DAR, which has the primary 
jurisdiction over the matter.” 
Nonetheless, two years later, the Supreme Court reversed 
this Decision upon DAR’s Motion for Reconsideration.40  It 
cited the Estribillo case and Section 24 of CARL, as amended, 
and held that a “CLOA is a document evidencing ownership 
of the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by the DAR, 
and contains the restrictions and conditions provided for in 
the CARL and other applicable laws.”
Even with the existence of recognized precepts on the 
indefeasibility of EPs and CLOAs, the Supreme Court in 
the 2016 Carriedo case did not refer to these legal bases in 
its ruling.  Instead, it contradicted itself by going against 
settled jurisprudence and undermined the doctrine on the 
indefeasibility of EPs and CLOAs as enshrined in CARPER.
The 2016 Carriedo Decision reduced the issuance of 
EPs and CLOAs to mere preparatory steps in the eventual 
issuance of a Certificate of Title.  It relegated the status 
of EPs and CLOAs from being incontrovertible proofs of 
ownership to preliminary documents necessary for the 
issuance of a land title.  It diminished the value of EPs and 
CLOAs as evidence of the FBs’ land ownership to titles that 
are vulnerable to legal attacks.  
Because the concept of the indefeasibility of EPs 
and CLOAs is well-supported in law and jurisprudence, it 
behooves the Supreme Court to have utilized and applied 
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its established ruling and the pertinent legal provisions on 
the legal issue at hand.  However, it took the Court two years 
to reverse its ruling and issue the 2018 Carriedo Decision, 
reaffirming the indefeasibility of EPs and CLOAs.  Had there 
been no Motion for Reconsideration filed, and had the 
Decision become final, around 2.9 million ARBs would have 
had to deal with its legal implications.  The ruling in the 
2016 Carriedo case would have weakened the farmers’ hold 
over the lands awarded to them.
DAR, et al. vs. Romeo C. Carriedo
G.R. No. 176549, January 20, 2016
Facts
The petitioner, Pablo Mendoza, became a tenant of a 
five-hectare agricultural land, which was originally 
part of the 73.3157 hectares of land owned by 
Roman De Jesus.  They executed a Contrato King 
Pamamuisan, where Mendoza would pay De Jesus 25 
piculs of sugar every crop year as lease rental.  This 
eventually became P2,000.00 per crop year as the 
land was no longer devoted to sugarcane. 
When Roman died, his wife Alberta and two sons, 
Mario and Antonio, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial 
Succession with Waiver of Right, dividing the 
agricultural land into equal shares.  Mario later sold 
to respondent Romeo Carriedo approximately 70 
hectares of the land, which included the portion 
tenanted by Mendoza.  Mendoza alleged that he did 
not know of and consent to the sale.  Carriedo then 
sold the land to the People’s Livelihood Foundation, 
Inc. (PLFI). Except for the portion tenanted by 
Mendoza, the landholdings were subjected to 
Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme 
and were awarded to FBs .
A. Ejectment Case
Carriedo filed before the PARAD of Tarlac a 
Complaint for Ejectment and Collection of Unpaid 
Rentals against Mendoza.  
The PARAD ruled that Mendoza had knowledge of 
the sale; thus, he could not assail the validity of the 
conveyance.  Mendoza violated Section 2 of P.D. No. 
816, Section 50 of R.A. No. 119918, and Section 36 
of R.A. No. 3844.  The PARAD declared the leasehold 
contract terminated and ordered Mendoza to vacate 
the premises. 
On Mendoza’s appeal, the DARAB affirmed the PARAD 
Decision.  Ruling that Carriedo owned the land, it 
found that the deed of sale was unregistered did not 
affect Carriedo’s title to the land.  By virtue of his 
ownership, Carriedo was subrogated to the rights and 
obligation of the former landowner, Roman.
Mendoza then filed a Petition for Review before the 
Court of Appeals.  Affirming the DARAB Decision, 
the Court of Appeals ruled that Mendoza’s reliance 
on Section 6 of CARL as ground to nullify the sale 
between De Jesus and Carriedo was misplaced, since 
the provision was limited to retention limits.  The 
registration was not a condition for the validity of 
the contract of sale between the parties.  Mendoza’s 
subsequent Motions for Reconsideration and New 
Trial were denied.
B. Redemption Case 
Mendoza filed a Petition for Redemption before 
the PARAD, which dismissed his petition on the 
grounds of litis pendentia and lack of the required 
certification against forum-shopping.  Moreover, 
the petition was dismissed the petition pending the 
resolution of the ejectment case before the Court 
of Appeals.  Its outcome partakes of a prejudicial 
question, which determines the tenability of 
Mendoza’s right to redeem the land under tenancy.
Mendoza appealed to DARAB.  Reversing the PARAD 
Decision, the DARAB granted Mendoza redemption 
rights over the land, ruling that at the time Carriedo 
filed his complaint for ejectment on October 1, 1990, 
he was no longer the owner of the land, having sold 
the land to PLFI in June 1990.  Thus, the cause of 
action pertained to PLFI, not to him.  The DARAB also 
ruled that Mendoza was not notified of the land sale 
to Carriedo and of the latter’s subsequent sale of it 
to PLFI.  The absence of the mandatory requirement 
of notice did not stop the running of the 180-day 
period within which Mendoza could exercise his 
redemption right.  DARAB denied Carriedo’s Motion 
for Reconsideration.
Thus, Carriedo filed a Petition for Review before the 
Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals reversed 
the DARAB ruling and held that Carriedo’s land 
ownership had been conclusively established and 
affirmed by the Supreme Court.  Mendoza was not 
able to substantiate his claim that when Carriedo 
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filed the ejectment case, he was no longer the owner 
of the land at the time.  Moreover, the Court of Appeals 
held that DARAB erred when it ruled that Mendoza 
was not guilty of forum-shopping.  Mendoza did not 
appeal the Court of Appeals’ Decision.
 
C. Coverage Case
Mendoza, his daughter Corazon Mendoza, and 
Orlando Gomez filed a Petition for Coverage of 
the land under CARP.  They claimed that they had 
been in physical and material possession of the 
land as tenants since 1956, and has made the land 
productive.  They prayed that an order be issued 
placing the land under CARP, and that the DAR, the 
PARO, and the MARO of Tarlac City be ordered to 
proceed with the acquisition and distribution of the 
land in their favor.  The Regional Director issued an 
Order granted the petition. 
Carriedo filed a Protest with Motion to Reconsider 
the Order and to Lift Coverage, alleging that only 
learned of the Petition for Coverage upon receipt 
of the Order.  He received a copy of a Notice of 
Coverage dated October 21, 2002 from MARO Maximo 
E. Santiago, informing him that the land had been 
placed under the coverage of the CARP. The Regional 
Director denied Carriedo’s protest. 
Carriedo appealed to the DAR Central Office.  The 
DAR Central Office, through Secretary Rene C. Villa, 
affirmed the Regional Director Order, ruling that 
Carriedo was no longer allowed to retain the land 
due to his violation of CARP provisions.  It further 
ruled that his act of disposing his agricultural 
landholdings amounts to the exercise of his 
retention right, or a valid waiver of such right in 
accordance with applicable laws and jurisprudence.  
However, it did not rule whether Mendoza was 
qualified to be a farmer-beneficiary of the land. 
Carriedo filed a Petition for Review before the Court 
of Appeals, which reversed the DAR Central office 
Order and declared the land as Carriedo’s retained 
area.  In so ruling, the Court of Appeals declared 
that the right of retention is a constitutionally-
guaranteed right, subject to certain qualifications 
specified by the legislature.  It serves to mitigate the 
effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing 
the rights of the landowner and the tenant by 
implementing the doctrine that social justice was 
not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the 
landowner.  The Court of Appeals also held that 
Carriedo did not commit any of the acts under Section 
6 of DAR Administrative Order No. 02-03, which would 
constitute waiver of his retention rights.
Issue
Whether Carriedo has the right to retain the land. 
Ruling
Yes, Carriedo did not waive his right to retain the land.
The Supreme Court cited the 1987 Constitution, 
which expressly recognizes landowner retention 
rights in its Article XIII, Section 4, as implemented 
by Section 6 in CARP, as interpreted under Section 6 
of A.O. No. 02-03. 
According to the Court, the Court of Appeals 
correctly held that Carriedo “[n]ever committed any 
of the acts or omissions above-stated (DAR AO 02-03).  
Not even the sale made by the herein petitioner 
in favor of PLFI can be considered as a waiver of 
his right of retention. Likewise, the Records of the 
present case is bereft of any showing that the herein 
petitioner expressly waived (in writing) his right of 
retention as required under sub-section 6.3, section 
6, DAR Administrative Order No. 02-S.2003.”
As to the indefeasibility of CLOAs, the Court held 
that they are not equivalent to a Torrens certificate 
of title and, thus, are not indefeasible.  In ordinary 
land registration proceedings, it explained, CLOAs 
and EPs are similar to CLTs; like CLTs, they are 
issued merely as preparatory steps for the eventual 
issuance of a certificate of title.    
The Court further cited Justice Oswald D. Agcaoili’s 
Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land 
Titles and Deeds), which reads:
Under PD No. 27, beneficiaries are issued 
certificates of land transfers (CLTs) to entitle 
them to possess lands. Thereafter, they are 
issued emancipation patents (EPs) after 
compliance with all necessary conditions. 
Such EPs, upon their presentation to the 
Register of Deeds, shall be the basis for the 
issuance of the corresponding transfer 
certificates of title (TCTs) in favor of the 
corresponding beneficiaries.
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Under RA No. 6657, the procedure has 
been simplified. Only CLOAs are issued, 
in lieu of EPs, after compliance with all 
prerequisites. Upon presentation of the 
CLOAs to the Register of Deeds, TCTs are 
issued to the designated beneficiaries. CLTs 
are no longer issued.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries 
does not absolutely bar the landowner from 
retaining the area covered thereby. Under AO No. 
2, series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled 
if the land covered is later found to be part of 
the landowner’s retained area. (Citations omitted; 
underscoring supplied.)
DAR, et al. v. Romeo C. Carriedo
G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018
Facts
The issue originated from the Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Decision dated January 20, 
2016 filed by DAR.
DAR contended that it had been denied due process 
when it was not afforded the opportunity to refute 
the allegations against the validity of DAR A.O. No. 
05-06 before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme 
Court.  Claiming that it was not notified of either 
the petition before the Court of Appeals—as well 
as its proceedings and Decision—DAR insisted that 
the Supreme Court reconsider the Court of Appeals 
Decision on the issues involving the enforcement 
and validity of its regulations.
First Issue
Whether Carriedo’s previous sale of his 
landholdings to PLFI can be treated as the exercise 
of his retention rights, such that he can no longer 
lawfully claim the subject landholding as his 
retained area.
Ruling
Yes. 
The Supreme Court agreed with DAR’s argument 
that in applying Item No. 4 of A.O. No. 05-06, the 
subject landholding cannot be considered as the 
retained area of Carriedo anymore because he has 
already exercised his right of retention after selling 
his landholdings without DAR clearance.  Sometime 
in June 1990, Carriedo unilaterally sold to PLFI his 
agricultural landholdings with approximately 
58.3723 hectares, which the Court found as 
tantamount to Carriedo’s exercise of his right of 
retention under the law.
Second Issue
Whether Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 and the relevant 
provisions of the CARL are valid.
Ruling
Yes.  The Court stated that both the Constitution 
and CARL underscore the agrarian reform program’s 
underlying principle of endeavoring a more 
equitable and just distribution of agricultural 
lands with equity considerations, among 
others.  Moreover, the Court agreed with DAR’s 
argument that the objective of A.O. No. 05-06 is 
equitable, explaining that to ensure the effective 
implementation of the CARL, previous sales of 
landholding without DAR clearance should be 
treated as the landowner’s exercise of retention 
rights. 
Moreover, the Court ruled that the equity in A.O. 
No. 05-06 is apparent and easily discernible.  It 
is presumed that by selling his landholdings, 
the landowner has already received an amount 
(as purchase price) commensurate to the just 
compensation conformable with the constitutional 
and statutory requirement.  Equity dictates that 
he can no longer claim, either in the guise of his 
retention area or otherwise, that which he has 
already received in the previous sale of his land.
The Court also agreed with DAR that A.O. No. 
05-06 is the regulation adopted by the agency 
precisely to prevent these perceived dangers in the 
implementation of CARL.  
The Court ruled that this interpretation is 
consistent with the agrarian reform program’s 
objective to distribute land to the landless farmers 
and farmworkers.  Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 provides 
the consequences in situations where a landowner 
has sold portions of his or her land with an area 
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more than the statutory limitation of five hectares.  
In such scenarios, Item No. 4 of A.O. No. 05-06 treats 
the sale of the first five hectares as the exercise of 
the landowner’s retention rights.  This is because 
the landowner has already chosen, disposed of, and 
has been duly compensated for the area that he is 
entitled to retain under the law.  Further, Item No. 4 
of AO 05-06 is consistent with Section 70 of CARL, as 
it treats the sale of the first five hectares (in multiple 
or a series of transactions) as valid, such that the 
same already constitutes the retained area of the 
landowner.  The legal consequence arising from 
the previous sale of land eliminates the prejudice 
in equitable land distribution that may befall the 
landless farmers and farmworkers.
Third Issue
Whether CLOAs possess the indefeasibility accorded 
to a Torrens certificate of title.
Ruling
Yes.  According to the Court, a CLOA is a document 
evidencing ownership of the land granted or 
awarded to the beneficiary by DAR.  It contains the 
restrictions and conditions provided in the CARL 
and other applicable laws.  Section 24 of CARL, as 
amended, states:
Sec. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. — The rights 
and responsibilities of the beneficiaries 
shall commence from their receipt of 
a duly registered emancipation patent 
or certificate of land ownership award 
and their actual physical possession 
of the awarded land. Such award shall 
be completed in not more than one 
hundred eighty (180) days from the date of 
registration of the title in the name of the 
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That 
the emancipation patents, the certificates 
of land ownership award, and other titles 
issued under any agrarian reform program 
shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible 
after one (1) year from its registration 
with the Office of the Registry of Deeds, 
subject to the conditions, limitations and 
qualifications of this Act, the property 
registration decree, and other pertinent 
laws. The emancipation patents or the 
certificates of land ownership award 
being titles brought under the operation 
of the torrens system, are conferred with 
the same indefeasibility and security 
afforded to all titles under the said system, 
as provided for by Presidential Decree No. 
1529, as amended by Republic Act No. 6732. 
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Court also cited Estribillo v. Department of 
Agrarian Reform, which held:
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding 
public land patents and the character of 
the certificate of title that may be issued by 
virtue thereof, is that where land is granted 
by the government to a private individual, 
the corresponding patent therefor is 
recorded, and the certificate of title is 
issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is 
automatically brought within the operation 
of the Land Registration Act, the title issued 
to the grantee becoming entitled to all the 
safeguards provided in Section 38 of the 
said Act. In other words, upon expiration of 
one year from its issuance, the certificate 
of title shall become irrevocable and 
indefeasible like a certificate issued in a 
registration proceeding. 
The Court also found that EPs, like CLOAs, are 
enrolled in the Torrens system of registration.  The 
Property Registration Decree devotes Chapter IX on 
the subject of EPs.  Thus, it ruled, EPs and CLOAs are 
entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title 
issued in registration proceedings.
Other Threats to FBs’ Land Tenure Security 
Despite the indefeasibility of EPs and CLOAs, FBs are 
constantly confronted with threats to their security of 
land tenure.  Although the Supreme Court upheld the 
indefeasibility of FBs’ land titles in several of its landmark 
rulings, there were also cases where the legitimacy of their 
land ownership was invalidated. 
The Supreme Court has declared that the mere 
issuance of titles in favor of the of FBs does not place their 
ownership beyond attack and scrutiny.41  Titles issued in 
their favor may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, 
rules, and regulations.42 
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In Ayo Alburo v. Matobato,43 the Supreme Court granted 
the cancellation of the EP issued to Liberty Ayo Alburo in 
favor of Uldarico Matobato.  It found that Ayo Alburo has 
committed acts prohibited under P.D. No. 27, warranting the 
invalidation of her title.  In its ruling, which was affirmed by 
the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, the PARAD stated:
“From 1985 up to the present, it is the 
private petitioner44 who tilled the land 
and gave shares to the private respondent. 
He also paid the land amortization with 
the Land Bank in 1985 and 1986. In effect 
private respondent45 has taken the shoes 
of a landlord, an inimical practice the 
Agrarian Reform Program among others 
is designed to abolish if not eradicate. 
Having tolerated private petitioner in the 
cultivation of the land in question and 
received shares for the past eleven (11) years 
is no different at all from having installed a 
tenant. Farmer beneficiaries are prohibited 
from installing tenants on the land they 
acquired under P.D. 27. xxx even a transfer 
of the right to use or cultivate the land 
constitutes a grave violation of P.D. 27 and 
its implementing rules and regulation. xxx”
Erroneously issued titles to FBs have been cited as 
grounds for cancellation of EPs or CLOAs.  The Supreme 
Court has rendered titles invalid because of improper or 
inadequate compliance with the acquisition process under 
agrarian reform laws. 
In Delfino v. Anasao,46 the Court found that the 
landowner’s retention right was not complied with as he 
was not allowed to choose the portion  comprising his 
retention area.  It ruled that:
“While we agree with Secretary 
Pangandaman in holding that Delfino had 
partially exercised his right of retention 
when he sold two hectares to SM Prime 
Holdings, Inc., after his application 
for retention was granted by Secretary 
Garilao, we cannot affirm the portion of 
the February 2, 2006 Order which decreed 
that the remaining three hectares shall 
be taken “either from the 4.8120 hectares 
covered by TCT Nos. T-21711 (T-49744) and 
T-216233.”40 Such directive encroaches 
on the prerogative expressly given to 
landowners under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 
to choose their area of retention.”
In this case,47 the Supreme Court modified the DAR Order 
limiting the assignment of the remaining retention area to 
the 4.8120 hectares of the landholding corresponding to the 
area not covered by the OLT.  In so doing, it sanctioned the 
invalidation of the EPs awarded to Anasao, et al. 
EPs and CLOAs are also subjected to invalidation upon 
findings that the requirement of due process was not 
observed in the acquisition of the land under agrarian 
reform laws.  This was the case in Jugalbot v. Court of 
Appeals48 and Roxas v. Court of Appeals.49  In both cases, 
the Notices of Coverage of the subject landholdings were 
not properly served and received by the landowner, or 
authorized representatives.  
In Jugalbot, the Court found:
“Firstly, the taking of subject property was 
done in violation of constitutional due 
process. The Court of Appeals was correct 
in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was 
denied due process because the DAR failed 
to send notice of the impending land 
reform coverage to the proper party. The 
records show that notices were erroneously 
addressed and sent in the name of Pedro 
N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not 
the proper party in the instant case. The 
ownership of the property, as can be gleaned 
from the records, pertains to Virginia A. Roa. 
Notice should have been therefore served on 
her, and not Pedro N. Roa.”
The Court further held:  
By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals 
applies to the case at bar since there was 
likewise a violation of due process in the 
implementation of the Comprehensive 
Agrarian Reform Law when the petitioner 
was not notified of any ocular inspection 
and investigation to be conducted by the 
DAR before acquisition of the property was 
to be undertaken. Neither was there proof 
that petitioner was given the opportunity 
to at least choose and identify its retention 
area in those portions to be acquired. Both 
in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law 
and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of 
retention and how this right is exercised, is 
guaranteed by law.
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 Since land acquisition under either 
Presidential Decree No. 27 and the 
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern 
the extraordinary method of expropriating 
private property, the law must be strictly 
construed. Faithful compliance with 
legal provisions, especially those which 
relate to the procedure for acquisition of 
expropriated lands should therefore be 
observed. In the instant case, no proper 
notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by the 
DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular 
inspection and investigation. Hence, any act 
committed by the DAR or any of its agencies 
that results from its failure to comply with 
the proper procedure for expropriation of 
land is a violation of constitutional due 
process and should be deemed arbitrary, 
capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave 
abuse of discretion.”
In Jugalbot, the Court ordered the cancellation of the 
FBs’ EP on the ground that it was issued without factual 
and legal basis.  In Roxas, the Court gave the DAR a chance 
to correct its procedural lapses and remanded the case to 
the agency.  In both cases, DAR’s error in the conduct of the 
LAD process cast doubt on the FBs’ right to own lands under 
agrarian reform.
Another threat to the FBs’ ownership is the declaration 
of their lands as erroneously covered despite already being 
adjudged as owners.  In the case of Aninao vs. Asturias50 the 
lands covered by the FBs’ EPs were found to be mineral 
lands and, thus outside the ambit of agrarian reform.51 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that:
“. . . the more compelling reason arguing 
for the propriety of the DAR’s assailed 
nullification action is its determination 
that the property in question ‘had long 
ceased to be agricultural and converted 
to mineral land even before it was placed 
under OLT coverage.’ For, lands classified as 
mineral are exempt from agrarian reform 
coverage. There is, to be sure, adequate 
evidence to support DAR’s finding on 
the mineralized nature of the land. The 
DAR mentioned one in page 8 of its Order 
of August 4, 2000, referring to the study 
made in May 1965 of the then Bureau of 
Mines which reported that “ample reserves 
of calcitic limestone and tuffeceous shall-
sandstone suitable as basic raw materials for 
portland cement manufacture are available 
in . . . more than 339 hectares . . . Baha and 
Talibayog, Calatagan.” Not to be overlooked 
is the 25-year Mineral Production Sharing 
Agreement22(MPSA) entered into in July 
1997 by and between respondent and the 
Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources covering 2,336.8 hectares of 
land situated in Baha, Talibayog, Punta 
and Hukay, Calatagan, Batangas, including 
the disputed property, for the sustainable 
development and utilization of limestone 
and other mineral deposits existing within 
the contract mining area. And for a third, 
the DENR has issued in favor of respondent 
an Environmental Clearance Certificate 
(ECC) for its cement plant complex within 
the disputed area and authorizing it to 
conduct limestone and shale quarrying 
operations thereat.”
Notably, at the time of coverage under P.D. No. 
27, the lands were classified as agricultural.  No 
proclamation or law was passed changing or legally 
reclassifying the lands from agricultural to mineral.  
As an effect of this Decision, the EPs issued to the 
FBs were invalidated and subjected to cancellation 
proceedings in the DAR. 
Conclusion
For farmers, land is at the core of their existence.  More 
than a source of livelihood, it is a symbol of a better life for 
them and their families—a legacy that they can pass on to 
their children for generations to follow. 
Most farmers who took a chance at owning the piece 
of land they tilled have done so in the hope that in making 
their lands productive, they may free themselves from 
poverty.  This is mainly why they availed of the government’s 
agrarian reform program. 
 The Constitution has secured the framework in 
establishing an agrarian reform program that will breathe 
life into the Social Justice principle enshrined in its 
provisions. Founded on the rights of landless farmers and 
farmworkers, the agrarian reform program shall undertake 
the just distribution of all agricultural lands in the country.52
The indefeasibility of EPs and CLOAs is among the 
principles that farmers rely on to safeguard the stability and 
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credibility of land tenure and ownership under our agrarian 
reform laws.  Our laws and jurisprudence establishing this 
principle guarantee the realization of redistributing land 
to landless farmers.  To comply with this constitutional 
mandate, our jurisprudence must, therefore, fortify the legal 
principles that protect the sanctity and integrity of land 
ownership.  It should not water down, let alone reverse, the 
gains of agrarian reform with decisions that run counter to 
doctrines on land tenure security. 
The laws, rules, and regulations set the guidelines 
in implementing the agrarian reform program and 
ensuring the protection of all stakeholders.  Inasmuch as 
the landowners’ right should be respected and protected, 
it should not be used to prejudice the rights of FBs.  In 
many instances, the implementation of agrarian laws 
is confronted with resistance from landowners, such as 
when they refuse to cooperate or participate in the LAD 
process, or when they file cases against DAR or FBs, among 
others.  These factors should be assessed in weighing 
information, evidence, and bases for the implementation 
and interpretation of existing laws, rules, and regulations.
For its part, DAR should also ensure the effective and 
efficient implementation of the LAD process.  On several 
occasions, the FBs’ land ownership is put at risk and 
invalidated because of procedural lapses in the acquisition 
process of the agrarian laws.  In all cases where EPs and 
CLOAs are cancelled because of erroneous title issuances—
brought by DAR’s incomplete or lack of compliance with 
the LAD process—it is the farmers who fatally suffer the 
consequences of these errors. 
 Ultimately, the success of our agrarian programs will 
be measured by attaining of irreversible gains in securing 
the farmers’ rights and improving their lives.  It is thus 
imperative that the government fulfill its role in protecting 
the right of all Filipinos to human dignity,  and reducing 
social and economic inequalities for the common good.53   
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A REPORT ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS IN 
METRO MANILA AND THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE OF 
THE VICTIMS' FAMILIES  
Atty. Mario Maderazo 
INTRODUCTION
Police operations under the Duterte Administration’s war on drugs are conducted in urban poor communities usually through buy-
bust operations or, as dubbed by the administration, 
“Oplan Tokhang.” However, such operations have 
resulted in numerous killings of not only suspected 
drug personalities, but even bystanders termed as 
“collateral damage,” and unlawful warrantless arrests. 
According to The Drug Archive Philippines,1 the 
Ateneo Policy Center has compiled a list of 5,021 
drug-related deaths from news reports from May 10, 
2016 to September 29, 2017. From these deaths, most 
were typically tricycle drivers, construction workers, 
vendors, farmers, jeepney barkers, garbage collectors, 
or were unemployed. Forty percent (40%) of these 
killings happened within Metro Manila, mostly in 
the cities of Manila, Quezon, and Caloocan, while 60% 
occurred in the provinces. Furthermore, 2,753 persons 
or 55% were allegedly committed by police officers 
during police operations, 1,907 persons or 38% were 
killed by mostly unknown assailants, and 355 or 7% 
were found dead, often with gunshot or stab wounds, 
and in many cases, with hand-written cardboard signs 
left beside their bodies saying they were drug pushers.2
Unfortunately, it is rare that the victims’ families, 
or the victims themselves, resort to legal remedies 
by filing cases in court. This is due to the prevailing 
atmosphere of fear and impunity of the persons 
responsible. One of these places is in Tondo, Manila. 
Reporters from news network Rappler tracked the 
reported killings in Police Station 2 – Moriones and 
conducted interviews with people who alleged that 
their family members were summarily executed by 
police officers, among them PO3 Ronald Alvarez.3 
One of the alleged victims was Joseph.4 His mother 
Nina5 and his cousin James6 witnessed how Joseph had 
been allegedly killed by PO3 Alvarez and another police 
officer. But according to the incident report by the 
investigators, the anti-criminality patrol of the area 
chanced upon Joseph and some other men doing a 
drug transaction. A certain PO1 Sherwin Mipa followed 
Joseph inside the basement of a shanty where Joseph 
turned on the police officer and fired two shots. PO1 
Mipa fired back and killed him. Nina finds this account 
of the incident utterly false, but she is unwilling to file 
a case against the police officers. She said, “Will they 
pay attention to me? We’re little people nobody pays 
attention to. They salvage the big ones, don’t they? So I 
did nothing.” 
Another alleged victim was Ralph.7 According 
to his relatives, PO3 Alvarez, along with four armed 
men in civilian clothes, allegedly forcibly entered the 
shanty where Ralph lived. He was shot four times and 
died. But according to the police reports, the police 
officers were undertaking a Tokhang Operation when 
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Ralph suddenly drew out his gun and fired shots at 
the police officers, which caused the police officers 
to retaliate. According to SPO2 Charles John Duran, 
the case investigator, when he arrived at the crime 
scene, he was surrounded by neighbors who told him 
that no encounter took place. Duran said, “They were 
saying he didn’t fight back, but I told them, if there’s a 
witness, come with us. They didn’t want to go with us. I 
told them to come to Homicide if they had time. They 
didn't want to.” Duran added that the spot report he 
wrote was largely based on the incident report by the 
Delpan PCP. Without the witnesses willing to sign the 
affidavits, he is constrained to believe the version of 
the police officers due to the presumption of regularity 
in the performance of duty. 
From the perspective of the victims and/or their 
families, this study will look into the factors that 
hinder the victims of extrajudicial killings (EJKs) or 
illegal arrests to seek legal remedies in the courts of 
law within the framework of Access to Justice.
For the purposes of this study, EJK is defined as 
“all acts and omissions of State actors that constitute 
violations of the general recognition of the right to 
life embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the United Nations Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the UNCRC and similar other human 
rights treaties to which the Philippines is a State party.”8
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The American Bar Association Rule of Law 
Initiative in its Access to Justice Assessment Tool9 (“the 
Tool”) states that access to justice requires that citizens 
must be able to avail of justice institutions to obtain 
solutions to common justice problems. It stresses that 
unless citizens have access to justice, the State will 
fail to provide any protection to vulnerable groups 
and the rights and duties enshrined in constitutions, 
laws, and international treaties will be deemed 
meaningless. For access to justice to exist, justice 
institutions must function effectively to provide fair 
solutions to the citizens’ justice problems. The Tool 
laid down the six elements of Access to Justice which 
are: Legal Framework, Legal Knowledge, Advice and 
Representation, Access to a Justice Institution, Fair 
Procedure, and Enforceable Solution. 
These elements are defined as follows:
1. Legal Framework refers to laws and 
regulations that establish citizens’ 
rights and duties and provide 
citizens with mechanisms to solve 
their justice problems; 
2. Legal Knowledge refers to the citizens’ 
awareness of their rights and duties 
and the mechanisms available to 
solve their justice problems; 
3. Legal Advice and Representation 
identifies how citizens can access 
the legal advice and representation 
necessary to solve their justice 
problems; 
4. Access to a Justice Institution 
identifies both the formal and 
informal justice institutions, 
characterized as affordable, accessible 
and can timely process cases; 
5. Fair Procedure refers to justice 
institutions, whether formal 
or informal, which ensure that 
citizens have an opportunity to 
present their case and that disputes 
are adjudicated impartially and 
without improper influence 
and, where cases are resolved by 
mediation, citizens can make 
voluntary and informed decisions 
to settle; and, 
6. Enforceable Decision refers to 
justice institutions that are able to 
enforce their decisions, including 
through the use of sanctions.
METHODOLOGY
The study covers EJK cases in Metro Manila under 
the Monitoring component of the Hustisya Natin 
Project being implemented by the Philippine Alliance 
of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA). The access to 
information on cases filed in court provides a major 
limitation in conducting the study. Hence, the study 
covers only the cases monitored and investigated by 
PAHRA, its partners, and the Commission on Human 
Rights (CHR).
Data for this report were collected through a focus 
group discussion (FGD) where the participants were 
 HUSTISYA NATIN   96
selected based on the recommendations of PAHRA and 
its partners in terms of their willingness to undergo 
the FGD. The participants were duly informed that 
their personal information would be kept confidential. 
The FGD was conducted in Filipino.
Supplementary to the responses of the FGD are 
the cases of HRVs documented by PAHRA’s partner 
organizations.10 The documentation of EJK victims 
begins with the interview of the families and witnesses 
of the incidents who reported the HRV cases either 
directly to the organizations or through other networks 
(such as the Catholic Church, the media groups, from 
legal and medical missions). From these interviews, data 
are encoded into a database from where themes and 
emerging patterns are found and analyzed. The answers 
of the FGD respondents were compared with these 
narratives in the said documented cases to widen and 
triangulate the analysis.
Likewise, to further enhance the assessment of the 
Access to Justice Framework, the CHR was requested 
to provide copies of Resolutions of HRV cases related 
to the drug war waged by the Philippine government 
from 2016 to the present.
A review of relevant laws and secondary sources 
was also conducted before assessing the information 
culled from the FGD, the documented cases, and the 
case records from CHR.
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Related Policies
To properly assess the legal framework in which 
Duterte’s war on drugs is conducted, the related 
laws, policies, and rules that make up this legal 
framework must be examined. These policies serve 
as the minimum standard to which the reality of the 
war on drugs must conform; thus, should the policy 
implementation not match the intent and desire of 
the policy itself, then it would be difficult to conclude 
that our domestic criminal justice system is accessible 
and properly working.
Additionally, the Rome Statute and its applicability 
were also examined as a related international policy. 
The Rome Statute serves as an alternative remedy 
should domestic legal remedies prove inaccessible. 
Thus, in assessing the domestic legal framework, a 
comparative assessment of the international legal 
framework was made.
Domestic Policy
The 1987 Philippine Constitution
The 1987 Philippine Constitution has listed various 
human rights and access to justice principles that 
serve as fundamental guides that the government uses 
in implementing various laws and policies. 
These human rights and access to justice principles 
include the right to due process and the equal 
protection clause;11 the right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures;12 the right to free access to the 
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal 
assistance;13 the right against torture, force, violence, 
threat, intimidation;14 the right to bail;15 the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty and to have a 
speedy, impartial, and public trial;16 the right not to be 
compelled to be a witness against oneself;17 the right 
against double jeopardy;18 and the prohibition of ex 
post facto laws and bills of attainder.19
The Department of Justice (DOJ)
As the government's principal law agency, the 
DOJ serves as the government's prosecution arm. It 
administers the government's criminal justice system 
by investigating crimes, prosecuting offenders, and 
overseeing the correctional system. Through its 
offices and constituent or attached agencies, it is also 
the government's legal counsel and representative 
in proceedings requiring the services of a lawyer, 
implements the Philippine laws on the admission and 
stay of aliens within its territory, and provides free 
legal services to indigent and other qualified citizens.20
Through the National Bureau of Investigation 
(NBI) and the National Prosecution Service (NPS), 
the DOJ investigates the commission of crimes and 
prosecutes offenders. Meanwhile, through the Office 
of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Office of the 
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), the DOJ acts as 
the legal representative of the Government, its agencies, 
and instrumentalities, including government-owned 
and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, and 
officials and agents in any proceeding, investigation, or 
matter requiring legal services.
The DOJ, through the Department of Justice Action 
Center (DOJAC), acts on complaints, requests for legal 
assistance, and queries of walk-in and over-the-phone 
clients. The DOJAC has been established and launched in 
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every region nationwide, with members of the NPS and 
the Public Attorneys’ Office tasked with staffing them.21
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
As a response to the atrocities committed during 
President Ferdinand Marcos’ declaration of martial 
law, the 1987 Philippine Constitution defined the 
creation of the CHR.22 As an independent National 
Human Rights Institution, it is mandated to conduct 
investigations on HRVs against marginalized and 
vulnerable sectors of society, specifically involving 
civil and political rights.23 Among others, its functions 
include: exercising visitorial powers over jails, prisons, 
or detention facilities; monitoring  the government’s 
compliance with international treaty obligations 
on human rights; and recommending to Congress 
effective measures in promoting human rights and 
providing compensation to HRV victims.24
Criminal Procedure
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules 
110-127 of the Rules of Court) provides the standard 
procedure in prosecuting and/or defending a criminal 
case in court. Generally, a criminal complaint is 
instituted by first being filed before the Office of the 
Public Prosecutor that has jurisdiction over the place 
where the offense was committed. Complainant and 
accused will undergo a Preliminary Investigation (PI) 
before a public prosecutor. This is part of the right to 
due process of both parties. When the investigating 
public prosecutor finds probable cause, he or she files 
an Information in Court. A warrant of arrest shall be 
issued by the presiding judge where the Information 
was filed for cases cognizable by the regional trial 
court that has jurisdiction over the case.
There are also lawful warrantless arrests, where 
a person may be arrested even without the prior 
institution of a criminal complaint in court. Under the 
Rules of Court and the Constitution, it is only allowed 
in the following instances:
(a) When, in the presence of the 
arresting officer, the person to be 
arrested has committed, is actually 
committing, or is attempting to commit 
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been 
committed, and the arresting officer 
has probable cause to believe based 
on personal knowledge of facts or 
circumstances that the person to be 
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a 
prisoner who has escaped from a penal 
establishment or place where he is 
serving final judgment or is temporarily 
confined while his case is pending, or 
has escaped while being transferred 
from one confinement to another.25
Most of the drug-related arrests are done without 
arrest warrants. These are usually done during buy-
bust or entrapment operations. 
All  persons who are arrested or are in police 
custody have the right to bail. This right is absolute 
before or after conviction in cases filed with the 
first level courts.26 For cases filed before second level 
courts or the Regional Trial Courts, the right to bail 
is available before the Regional Trial Court convicts 
one of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion 
perpetua, or life imprisonment. Upon conviction, bail 
becomes discretionary.
Upon the filing of Information before the 
appropriate court, an accused is then arraigned to be 
apprised of the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him or her. Following this is the pre-trial, 
where the possibility of plea bargaining, stipulation 
of facts, determination of issues to be resolved during 
trial, identification of witnesses, and pre-marking 
of documentary exhibits happen. On trial, both the 
prosecution and the defense are given the opportunity 
to present their respective witnesses and evidence. 
Subsequently, judgment is rendered.
Accused, upon conviction at the Regional Trial 
Court, may file an Appeal before the Court of Appeals or 
the Supreme Court as appropriate. Should the accused 
be acquitted, the prosecution cannot file an appeal.
To safeguard the right of an accused to speedy 
trial, the Supreme Court has issued the Guidelines for 
Continuous Trial. This is also an offshoot of the rise in 
the drug cases filed in court.27
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Administrative Order No. 35 (series of 2012)
On November 22, 2012, President Benigno Aquino 
issued Administrative Order No. 35, or The Inter-
Agency Committee On Extralegal Killings, Enforced 
Disappearances, Torture, and Other Grave Violations of 
the Right to Life, Liberty, and Security of Persons (IAC). 
The committee was formed to serve as the 
government’s institutional machinery dedicated to 
the resolution of unsolved cases of political violence 
in the form of extralegal killings (ELKs), enforced 
disappearances (ED), torture, and other grave violations 
of the right to life, liberty, and security of persons.
Its functions include inventorying all cases of ELKs, 
ED, torture, and other grave violations of the right to life, 
liberty, and security of persons perpetrated by both state 
and non-state agents; classifying the cases as unsolved, 
under investigation, under preliminary investigation, 
and under trial; prioritizing unsolved cases for 
action by assigning special investigation teams (SIT); 
designating and mobilizing the SITs in various cases 
for the immediate investigation and prosecution of the 
perpetrators; and monitoring and updating a database 
of the progress of all inventoried cases.28
Republic Act No. 9165
 Even before Duterte introduced his version 
of the war on drugs, the Philippines has already 
enacted Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive 
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. This law limited the 
applicability of the Revised Penal Code (enacted in 
1930), repealed the previous Dangerous Drugs Act 
of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), and amended the penalties 
provided in R.A. No. 7659 (by removing the death 
penalty for violations of the law).
R.A. No. 9165 penalizes various acts in 
connection to illegal drugs, such as the:
• Importation, sale, delivery, 
distribution, manufacture, 
possession, use, and prescription of 
drugs and its essential chemicals; 
• Maintenance of and being 
employed in a drug den; 
• Manufacture, delivery, and 
possession of equipment and other 
drug paraphernalia; 
• Cultivation of plants that are 
sources of drugs; and, 
• Planting of evidence.
The penalties range from a fine of Php10,000 to 
Php500,000 and imprisonment of six months and one 
day to life imprisonment; likewise, accessory penalties 
include disqualification from the exercise of civil and 
political rights.
Aside from the penal provisions, R.A. No. 9165 
also provides the procedure by which the law is 
implemented. For instance, the Philippine Drug 
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) is designated as the 
agency that “shall take charge and have custody of all 
dangerous drugs…” Following such designation, the 
law, as amended by R.A. No. 10640, outlines the chain 
of custody that must be followed for the subsequent 
prosecution of the crime. Likewise, plea bargaining has 
been explicitly prohibited to any person charged with 
violating the law, regardless of the imposable penalty. 
As for drug traffickers and pushers, the resort to the 
Probation Law has also been prohibited.
As to community involvement, the law provides 
for the engagement of the private sector, the local 
government units, and even providing for treatment 
and rehabilitation.
 
Administrative Matter No. 18-03-16-SC 
In August 2017, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
provision of RA No. 9165 disallowing plea bargaining 
was struck down as unconstitutional for violating 
the rule-making power of the Supreme Court granted 
by the Constitution. Following this, the Court issued 
Administrative Matter No. 18-03-16-SC, which provides 
the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases.
The Court has clarified that plea bargaining is 
still generally prohibited when the case involves an 
imposable penalty of life imprisonment (or death) and 
for violations of Section 5 of the law, on the illegal sale 
and trade of all other dangerous drugs except shabu 
and marijuana. In other instances, the accused can 
bargain for a lesser offense. For example, in cases of 
possession of 0.01 to 4.99 grams of shabu, which carries 
a penalty of 12 years and one day to 20 years and a fine 
of Php300,000 to Php400,000, the accused can bargain 
for the lesser offense of possession of equipment 
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and other paraphernalia, which entails a penalty of 
six months and one day to four years and a fine of 
Php10,000 to Php50,000).
 
People v. Lim (G.R. No. 231989) 
In September 2018, the Supreme Court provided 
another policy regarding the war on drugs, this time 
concerning the chain of custody that must be followed. 
In People v. Lim, the Court outlined the following 
mandatory policy:
1. “In the sworn statements/affidavits, 
the apprehending/seizing officers 
must state their compliance with the 
requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. 
No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR. 
2. In case of non-observance of the 
provision, the apprehending/
seizing officers must state the 
justification or explanation 
therefore as well as the steps they 
have taken in order to preserve the 
integrity and evidentiary value of 
the seized/confiscated items. 
3. If there is no justification or 
explanation expressly declared in 
the sworn statements or affidavits, 
the investigating fiscal must not 
immediately file the case before 
the court. Instead, he or she 
must refer the case for further 
preliminary investigation in order 
to determine the (non) existence of 
probable cause. 
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the 
case despite such absence, the court 
may exercise its discretion to either 
refuse to issue a commitment order 
(or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the 
case outright for lack of probable 
cause in accordance with Section 5, 
Rule 112, Rules of Court.” 
Art. 11, Revised Penal Code
 An oft-cited legal principle invoked by the 
anti-illegal drug operatives is that of valid self-
defense. In their narrative, during an anti-illegal drug 
operation, the culprits allegedly fight back, leaving 
law enforcement agents no other option but to 
defend themselves.
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code 
provides the following:
 
“Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. 
– The following do not incur any 
criminal liability: 
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his 
person or rights, provided that the 
following circumstances concur: 
 
First, unlawful aggression; 
 
Second, reasonable necessity of 
the means employed to prevent 
or repel it; and, 
 
Third, lack of sufficient 
provocation on the part of the 
person defending himself.”
These three elements must be present when the 
culprits are killed for the claim of valid self-defense 
to prosper. This would also remove the categorization 
of the incident as an EJK since it would fall under a 
circumstance justified by the law.
 
International Policy
Rome Statute 
 Recognizing the need to ensure the prosecution 
of the most serious crimes, the international 
community has created the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which provides a 
remedy in international law that is complementary to 
the internal law of States.
 The ICC was given the ability to exercise 
its functions and powers in the territories of its 
State parties and even in the territory of other 
States, pursuant to a special agreement. Among the 
crimes within its jurisdiction are crimes against 
humanity, such as murder, imprisonment, enforced 
disappearances, and torture. What qualifies these acts 
as crimes against humanity is their commission as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population and with the accused 
having knowledge of such attack.
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 As for the principle of complementarity, the 
Rome Statute provides that a case can be dismissed for 
inadmissibility when the ICC finds, among others, that:
“(a) The case is being investigated 
or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry 
out the investigation or prosecution;
 
(b) The case has been investigated 
by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it and the State has decided not 
to prosecute the person concerned, 
unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute.”
In determining the existence of this unwillingness, 
the ICC shall consider whether there is one or more of 
the following circumstances:
“(a) The proceedings were or are being 
undertaken or the national decision 
was made for the purpose of shielding 
the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; 
 
(b) There has been an unjustified 
delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned 
to justice; 
 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not 
being conducted independently or 
impartially, and they were or are being 
conducted in a manner which, in the 
circumstances, is inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned 
to justice.”
In determining inability, the ICC shall consider 
“whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the 
State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary 
evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry 
out its proceedings.”
 
Relevant Institutions
State Institutions
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
The CHR, an NHRI established by the 1987 
Philippine Constitution, is mandated to conduct 
investigations on HRVs against marginalized and 
vulnerable sectors. Article XIII on Social Justice 
and Human Rights defined the creation of the 
Commission. It is an “A” accredited NHRI, fully 
complying with the Paris Principles adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly in 1995.
The Ombudsman
The Office of the Ombudsman was created through 
the 1987 Philippine Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, 
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. It is a 
fiscally autonomous body independent from any other 
branch of government,29 headed by an Ombudsman 
who could be removed from office only by way of 
impeachment.30 It has an extraordinary range of 
oversight and investigative authority over the actions 
of all public officials, employees, offices, and agencies. 
Not only can it investigate on its own or on complaint 
any official act or omission that appears to be illegal, 
unjust, improper, or inefficient, but it can also prod 
officials into performing or expediting any act or duty 
required by law. Likewise, it can stop, prevent, and 
control any abuse or impropriety in the performance 
of such duties, as well as require the submission of 
documents relative to contracts, disbursements, and 
financial transactions of government officials to ferret 
out any irregularities.31
Non-State Human Rights Institutions
BALAY Rehabilitation Center, Inc.  
The BALAY Rehabilitation Center, Inc. provides 
psychosocial services and advocacy support to persons 
deprived of liberty due to political circumstances, 
as well as survivors of torture and other forms of 
organized political violence. It also provides services to 
survivors of massacres and extra-judicial killings and 
their families.32
101   HUSTISYA NATIN
Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND)
FIND, a nationwide mass organization of families 
and friends of the disappeared victims and surfaced 
desaparecidos, advocates for human rights and 
participative empowerment.33
Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)
FLAG is a nationwide human rights lawyers 
organization committed to the protection and 
promotion of human rights and civil liberties. It was 
founded in 1974 by Jose W. Diokno, Lorenzo Tanada, 
Sr., and Joker Arroyo.  Among its many advocacies are 
those against political repression, military and police 
abuses, and the death penalty.34
Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through 
Alternative Legal Services (IDEALS)
IDEALS is a local nonprofit that addresses the 
legal and technical needs of the marginalized, 
disempowered, and vulnerable groups, particularly 
farmers, persons, and communities affected by 
disasters and victims of HRVs.
Medical Action Group (MAG)  
       
MAG, founded on April 16, 1982, consists of doctors 
and concerned individuals who saw the need for the 
health sector to collectively respond and speak against 
the grave human rights violations perpetrated by the 
Marcos regime.35
Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA)
PAHRA was formed as an alliance of individuals, 
institutions, and organizations committed to the 
promotion, protection, and realization of human 
rights in the Philippines. Among its founding 
members are organizations and individuals that were 
at the forefront of the struggle against the dictatorship 
under the Marcos regime. Through its initiative, 
the Philippine Declaration of Human and People’s 
Rights was adopted in December 1993 during the 
Human Rights Summit, which PAHRA convened. This 
Declaration led to the adoption of The Human and 
Peoples’ Rights Declaration of the Philippines, which is 
meant to be the Philippines’ contribution to the long-
envisioned ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.36
Philippine Human Rights Information Center (PhilRights)
PhilRights is the research and information arm 
of PAHRA, providing information, documentation, 
research, and analyses.37
 
Task Force Detainees of the Philippines
The Task Force Detainees of the Philippines is a 
national human rights organization that documents 
HRVs, assists the victims and their families in their 
material and legal needs, and conducts human rights 
education work.38
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION
The main method for research was the creation 
of a FGD with the families of the victims of HRVs, 
specifically of EJKs. The participants are clients of the 
partner organizations under PAHRA who willingly 
agreed to participate in the FGD to share their stories. 
The purpose of the FGD is to assess the three elements 
of Access to Justice which are: Legal Knowledge, Advice 
and Representation, and Access to a Justice Institution.
Profile of FGD Participants
SEX
Male Female
2 9
CITY OF RESIDENCE
Caloocan Manila Navotas
2 9 1
HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
Elementary 
Graduate
3rd Year 
High School
High School 
Graduate
College 
Graduate
2 4 4 1
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EMPLOYMENT
Construction 
Worker
Hairdresser Laundry 
Woman
Sampaguita 
Vendor
Fisherman Teacher None
1 2 1 1 1 1 4
NUMBER OF CHILDREN
1 Child 2 Children 3 Children 5 Children 6 Children 9 Children None
1 3 1 3 1 1 1
CIVIL STATUS
Common Law 
Relationship
Married Widowed
4 5 2
ESTIMATED MONTHLY INCOME
~ Php 2,500 ~ Php 4,800
~ Php 
7,000
~ Php 10,800 None
1 2 1 2 5
Questions Asked
1. Ano sa pagkakaintindi niyo ang karapatang 
pantao? (What is your understanding of 
human rights?)
2. Sa kaso ninyo, meron bang paglabag sa 
karapatang pantao? (In your case, do you think 
there was a violation of human rights?)
3. Bakit merong paglabag ng karapatang pantao? 
(Why do you think there are human rights 
violations?)
4. Saan niyo natutunan ang konsepto ng karapatang 
pantao? (Where did you learn about the concept 
of human rights?)
5. Meron bang government effort para ipaalam ang 
karapatang pantao? (Are there government 
efforts to educate people about human rights?
6. Saan kayo unang lumapit? (Where did you first 
go to after the incident?)
7. Saan pa ba pwede? (Where else do you think you 
can go to?)
8. Nabigyan ba kayo ng tulong ng pulis? (Did the 
police help you?)
9. May tiwala ba kayo sa kanila? (Do you trust the 
police?)
10. Meron pa ba sa komunidad niyo na pwedeng 
lapitan? (Is there anyone else in your 
community you can approach?)
11. May nilapitan rin bang ibang org? (Did you 
approach any other organization?)
12. Lumapit ba kayo sa CHR? (Did you approach the 
Commission on Human Rights?)
13. Nakasampa ba kayo ng kaso? (Were you able to 
file a case?)
14. Bakit hindi kayo nagsampa? (Why did you not file 
a case?)
15. Ano ang gusto niyong makamit kaya kayo 
nagsampa ng kaso? (What do you hope to attain 
by filing a case?)
16. Lumapit ba kayo sa abugado? (Did you approach 
a lawyer?) 
17. Kung may pera kayo, kukuha ba kayo ng abugado? 
(If you had the means, would you hire a 
private lawyer?)
18. Ano ang tulong na binigay ng fiscal? (What help 
did the public prosecutor provide?) 
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19. Ano masasabi niyo sa mga humawak ng kaso 
niyo? (What can you say about the lawyers who 
handled your cases?)
20. Meron pa bang ibang org na nagbibigay sa inyo ng 
legal services? (Were there other organizations 
that provided legal services to you?)
21. Meron ba kayong kakayahan para magbayad ng 
mga pangangailangan sa kaso? (Do you have 
the financial capacity to pay for the necessary 
expenses for filing a case?)
22. Meron bang nananakot o nagbabanta sa inyo 
nung nagdesisyon kayo na magsampa ng kaso? 
(Did you receive threats when you decided to 
file a case?)
23. Gaano kahaba yung panahon mula sa insidente 
hanggang sa lumapit na kayo sa pwedeng 
magbigay ng tulong? (How long did it take you 
to approach someone for help?)
24. Nahirapan ba kayo kumuha ng mga dokumento? 
(Did you have difficulty in gathering the 
necessary documents?) 
25. Lumapit ba kayo sa police chief o sa ibang may 
kapangyarihan? (Did you approach the local chief 
of police or anyone else in a position of power?)
26. Ano pa ang kailangan niyo na legal services? 
(What are your other legal needs?) 
27. May plano pa ba kayong magsampa ng kaso? (Do 
you still plan on filing a case?)
28. Sa tingin niyo ba ay makukuha niyo ang gusto 
niyong makamit na hustisya? (Do you think you 
will be able to attain the justice you seek?)
29. Pagkatapos ng administrasyon na ito, sa tingin 
niyo makukuha niyo ang hustisya? (After this 
current administration, do you think you will 
be able to attain the justice you seek?)
Profile of Documented Cases
 
The following graphs show the profiles (sex, age, civil status, educational attainment, and employment) of 
the victims who were documented by the partner organizations of PAHRA and used to supplement the FGD.
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DATE OF 
INCIDENT
PLACE OF 
INCIDENT
ALLEGED 
VICTIM
ALLEGED 
PERPATRATORS ALLEGED HRV
INITIATION OF 
THE COMPLAINT
DATE OF 
RESOLUTI ON 
FROM THE 
CHR
FINDINGS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS
May 24, 2016 Jaen, Nueva Ecija O.B. Police Senior 
Inspector D.R.
Police Senior 
Inspector W.B.
Police Senior 
Inspector A.A.
Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Motu proprio 
investigation of 
the CHR
March 29, 
2017
Case closed and 
terminated as there is 
no finding of human 
rights violation due 
to the refusal of the 
family members to 
pursue the case further, 
without prejudice to the 
reopening should new 
witnesses come forward.
July 7, 2016 Pasay City, Metro 
Manila
J.B.
R.B.
Police Officer 
II A.B.
Police Officer 
I M.T.
Police Officer I
D.L.S.
Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Illegal Arrest
Motu proprio 
investigation of 
the CHR
October 11, 
2016
Respondents are liable 
for human rights viola-
tion.
For forwarding to 
the Office of the 
Ombudsman for filing of 
appropriate criminal and 
administrative cases.
Financial assistance to 
the heirs of the victim, to 
amount of Php 10,000.00.
July 13, 2016 Tugegarao City, 
Cagayan
M.M. Philippine Drug 
Enforceme nt 
Agency (PDEA) 
Assistant 
Regional 
Director R.Y.
Investigating 
Agent V, Chief of 
Operations A.L.L.
Investigating 
Officer I M.J.G.
Investigating 
Officer II G.R.C.
Investigating 
Officer I J.M.M.
Investigating 
Officer I J.T.
John Does of 
PDEA
Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Through the 
initiatives of 
the heirs of the 
victims
January 9, 
2017
Case closed and 
terminated as 
administrative and 
criminal complaints 
had already been filed at 
the Office of the Deputy 
Ombudsman for Luzon.
Financial assistance to 
the heirs of the victim 
shall be given.
July 17, 2016 Roxas, Isabella M.A. R.H. and a 
certain John Doe
Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Motu proprio 
investigation of 
the CHR
April 10, 2017 Case closed and 
terminated as this is a 
case of a common crime 
perpetrated By assailants 
who are private persons.
CHR Data
A total of 13 Resolutions/cases were provided by the CHR, as follows:
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July 25, 2016 Aurora, Isabela C.A. R.C. Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Motu proprio 
investigation of 
the CHR
March 7, 2017 Case dismissed as this 
is a case of a common 
crime perpetrated by an 
assailant who is a private 
person.
July 26, 2016 Lasam, Cagayan E.B.
W.V.
Police Chief 
Inspector E.U.
Police 
Superinten dent 
L.U.
Police Officer 
III J.B.
Police Officer 
II A.C.
Senior Police 
Officer IV R.A.
Senior Police 
Officer I J.D.
Police Officer 
II G.P.
Police Officer 
II B.P.
Police Officer 
II E.D.
Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Through the 
initiatives of 
the heirs of the 
victims
January 24, 
2017
Respondents are liable 
for human rights 
violation.
For case monitoring of 
the cases filed by the 
complainants with the 
Ombudsman.
July 26, 2016 Valenzuela City, 
Metro Manila
A.A. Police Officer 
III R.C.
Police Officer 
II J.B.
Police Officer II
Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Through the 
initiatives of 
the heirs of the 
victims
May 30, 2017 Respondents are liable 
for human rights 
violation.
For forwarding to 
the Office of the 
Ombudsman for filing of 
appropriate criminal and 
administrative cases.
Financial assistance to 
the heirs of the victim, to 
amount of Php 10,000.00.
July 26, 2016 Manila City, 
Metro Manila
B.D. Police Officer 
II R.S.
Police Inspector 
R.G.
Senior Police 
Officer II L.R.
Senior Police 
Officer II
C.J. Jr.
Police Officer 
III R.F.
Police Officer 
III R.S.
Police Officer 
I R.P.
Police Officer 
I L.T.
Violation on the 
Right to Life
Through the 
initiatives of 
the heirs of the 
victims
March 30, 2017 Respondents are liable 
for human rights 
violation.
For forwarding to 
the Office of the 
Ombudsman for filing of 
appropriate criminal and 
administrative cases.
Financial assistance to 
the heirs of the victim, 
subject to the submission 
of the required 
documents.
107   HUSTISYA NATIN
August 1, 2016 Cauayan City, 
Isabela
J.B. C.M. Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Motu proprio 
investigation of 
the CHR
May 3, 2017 Case dismissed as this 
is a case of a common 
crime perpetrated by an 
assailant who is a private 
person.
August 10, 2016 Abulug, Cagayan G.G. Unidentified 
Assailant
Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Through the 
initiatives of 
the heirs of the 
victims
January 16, 
2017 
There is a human rights 
violation.
Case is archived, subject 
to CHR’s monitoring 
as perpetrator is still 
unidentified.
Financial assistance to be 
given to the heirs of the 
victim.
September 22, 
2016
Baguio City, 
Benguet
C.O. Unidentified 
Assailant
Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Motu proprio 
investigation of 
the CHR
There is a human rights 
violation.
Financial assistance to 
the heirs of the victim, 
amounting to Php 
10,000.00.
Case closed and 
terminated, without 
prejudice to the filing 
of a case against the 
perpetrator when 
identified.
January 8, 2017 Caloocan City, 
Metro Manila
H.R.K. 
(17 y.o.)
Police 
Superintendent 
W.B.
Senior Police 
Officer IV
B.B. II
Police Officer III 
A.M.
Police Officer III 
C.H.
Police Officer III 
H.N.
Police Officer 
III P.A.
Police Officer 
III C.T.
Police Officer 
II F.U.
Police Officer 
I J.T.
Police Officer 
I M.B.
Police Officer I 
M.M.
Police Officer 
I Z.C.
Police Officer 
I M.O
Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Planting of 
Evidence under 
Sec. 29 of RA No. 
9165
Through the 
initiatives of 
the heirs of the 
victims
June 8, 2017 Respondents are liable 
for human rights 
violations.
For forwarding to 
the Office of the 
Ombudsman for filing of 
appropriate criminal and 
administrative cases.
Financial assistance to 
the heirs of the victim, 
subject to the submission 
of the required 
documents.
 HUSTISYA NATIN   108
August 15, 2017 San Jose Del 
Monte, Bulacan
J.A. Joint elements 
of Police 
Community 
Precint-4, City 
of San Jose Del 
Monte, Bulacan, 
and
Provincial 
Public Safety 
Company (PPSC) 
4th Maneuver 
Platoon
Arbitrary 
Deprivation of 
Life
Motu proprio 
investigation of 
the CHR
February 1, 
2018
The victim was killed 
in an armed encounter 
against the respondents.
Case closed and 
terminated due to the 
blatant and express 
disinterest of the victim’s 
family in proceeding 
further with the 
investigation.
From these 13 cases, seven were initiated motu 
proprio by the CHR, while six were initiated through 
the initiative of the victims’ heirs.
Eight of the 13 cases received were found to be 
HRVs, specifically Arbitrary Deprivation of Life. From 
these eight cases, six had known assailants, while two 
had unknown assailants. From the six cases who had 
known assailants, five were allegedly perpetrated by 
the members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), 
while one incident was allegedly perpetrated by the 
members of the PDEA. Those who were identified as 
the perpetrators from the PNP include: two Police 
Superintendents, one Police Chief Inspector, three Police 
Senior Inspectors, one Police Inspector, two Senior Police 
Officers IV, two Senior Police Officers II, one Senior Police 
Officer I, seven Police Officers III, nine Police Officers II, 
ten Police Officers I, and the whole Community Precinct 
- 4 and the 4th Maneuver Platoon of the Provincial 
Public Safety Company of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. 
Meanwhile, those who were identified as perpetrators 
from the PDEA include: one PDEA Regional Director, one 
Investigating Agents V, three Investigating Officers 1, 
and one Investigating Officer II. 
The eight HRV cases occurred in the cities of 
Manila, Pasay, Caloocan, and Valenzuela (all within 
Metro Manila); the city of Baguio (within the province 
of Benguet); and in the city of Tuguegarao and the 
municipalities of Lasam and Abulug (all within the 
province of Cagayan), respectively.  From the eight HRV 
cases, four were recommended to be filed before the 
Office of the Ombudsman for the filing of appropriate 
criminal and administrative charges against the 
perpetrators, while two cases are for monitoring 
by the CHR as the victims’ relatives have already 
filed appropriate charges before the Ombudsman. 
The two remaining cases with unknown assailants 
were archived, without prejudice to the reopening 
of the case upon discovery of new evidence and 
witnesses. Lastly, in seven of the eight HRV cases, it was 
recommended that the victims’ family members be 
given financial assistance. 
Two of the 13 cases were not conclusively resolved 
as HRV cases perpetrated by the elements of the 
PNP due to the family members’ refusal of further 
investigation. In one of these cases, the victim’s family 
members specifically requested that the investigation 
be terminated for fear of possible reprisal from the 
state agents. The cases happened in the city of San Jose 
Del Monte (within the province of Bulacan) and in the 
municipality of Jaen (within the province of Nueva 
Ecija), respectively. 
Lastly, three of the cases were found not to 
be incidents of HRVs as the alleged perpetrators 
were identified as private persons. These incidents 
happened in Cauayan City and the municipalities of 
Roxas and Aurora, all within the Isabela Province.
MAIN REPORT
The flow of the FGD was divided into the three 
elements of the Access to Justice Framework, 
starting with Legal Knowledge, then Advice and 
Representation, and finally the Access to a Justice 
Institution. The elements of Legal Framework, Fair 
Procedure, and Enforceable Decision were not covered 
in the FGD as none of the participants have an active 
case filed in court.
Legal Knowledge
All the participants had an idea of what human 
rights are. They expressed that it is a system of 
accessible and equal justice for all, regardless of 
socioeconomic standing. Expounding on this idea, 
they manifested that they simply knew when their 
rights were being violated even if they were unable to 
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pinpoint what those rights were. They explained that 
the concept of human rights was not formally taught 
to them; instead, they were taught as children by their 
families and in school to distinguish what is right and 
wrong. From here, they concluded that what they had 
experienced were violations of their human rights. 
As examples, they cited that in the cases of EJKs, they 
said that their relatives, the victims, were summarily 
and mercilessly killed without giving them a chance 
to explain or to be arrested instead and to have the 
opportunity to change their ways.
Such interpretation is consistent with most, if not 
all, the cases that PAHRA has documented. Despite lack 
of formal education, they understood that what had 
been done to their relatives was immoral and unjust.
It could be drawn from their answers that there is 
a general grasp of what they are entitled to in terms 
of safeguarding their human rights. However, the 
lack of education and information dissemination of 
what these exact rights are and how they are enforced 
shows that the element of Legal Knowledge still has 
a long way to go. They knew that EJKs are wrong; 
however, their statement that they preferred instead 
that their relatives—whom they admit were involved 
with illegal drugs—be arrested shows that there is no 
understanding of the mechanisms of due process, 
the presumption of innocence, and other concepts of 
human rights.
Worse, the participants have little to no trust in 
the institutions that have the duty to defend their 
rights. They have no trust in the police because they 
know that the violators are the police themselves. 
As for the CHR, the Department of Justice, and any 
other government office or agency, the participants 
said either they do not know these agencies and the 
services they offer or, if they do know, they were not 
much help.
The problem with government institutions also 
extends to the nongovernment organizations. Usually, 
the participants had to wait for these organizations 
to find them, and the help they provided were not 
always what they wanted or needed, which are mostly 
financial support  and legal aid.
The concerns with both government and 
nongovernment institutions exacerbates the 
difficulty in attaining legal knowledge. Although the 
nongovernment sector seeks to mitigate this issue, 
their efforts are not enough to fully bridge the gap. 
Advice and Representation
All respondents stated that they were unable to 
secure private legal counsel because of the high lawyer 
fees. This is expected given their income. As such, they 
were constrained to rely on the public prosecutors 
and the public attorneys. Unfortunately, as they 
shared, they did not receive the help they expected. 
Some manifested that they lost hope because the 
public prosecutors made the process longer and more 
difficult, while some public attorneys gave detrimental 
advice such as accepting the terms of the plea bargain 
even if the victims were arrested without warrants and 
had no involvement with illegal drugs at all.
These responses were again shared by the 
narratives collated in the documented cases. In 
connection with the element of Legal Knowledge, 
almost all the victims’ families stated that they did not 
know the laws, rules, terms, and the legal process as 
a whole . Thus, they relied heavily on what the public 
prosecutors and public attorneys told them, without 
the ability to supply alternatives or recommendations.
As with Legal Knowledge, the Advice and 
Representation is anchored not only on the institutions 
in the legal system but also on the people’s knowledge 
of them. The families here already have to overcome a 
huge barrier in accessing Advice and Representation, 
i.e., the high cost of proper legal counsel, and when 
they are unable to, they are forced to seek the help of 
those who are not as inclined to provide the best legal 
advice and representation due to various reasons, such 
as the number of assigned cases, lack of resources, and 
political pressures, among others.
 
Access to Justice Institution
For this element, the respondents had mixed 
answers, specifically on the non-monetary costs of 
accessing justice institutions. Aside from the financial 
cost of taking days off from work to attend to their 
cases, paying various fees, and other financial costs, 
a set of respondents said that they were able to ask 
for help from both state and non-state institutions. 
However, the larger set maintained that they not only 
mistrusted the state institutions, but were also afraid 
of approaching them because they did not know if 
these institutions would turn on them, or they did 
not think they could help. Almost all the respondents, 
thus, turned to non-state institutions for help.
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The documented cases also back up this narrative. 
Most of the families have had difficulty requesting 
for legal documents related to their cases for the 
same monetary and non-monetary costs. As can be 
gleaned from their profiles, the victims are poor who 
have low income jobs. Likewise, they were usually 
the breadwinners of the families they left behind. 
This sudden loss of income is a huge burden for the 
families who would rather spend on day-to-day living 
expenses rather than on filing a case. As for the non-
monetary costs, fear, threats, and mistrust play a huge 
part in the inability of these families to approach the 
justice institutions. Coupled with the lack of legal 
knowledge, then what is left is for the families to 
simply accept their circumstances in defeat.
 This is likely the biggest hurdle that must be 
overcome when it comes to Access to Justice for the 
HRV victims and their families. Even if there is a lack 
of legal knowledge and the inability to receive proper 
legal advice and representation, access to a justice 
institution would have been able to mitigate those 
shortcomings. However, the state institutions are far 
out of reach and the non-state institutions are having 
difficulty addressing the huge demand for justice.
CONCLUSIONS
Legal Knowledge
The families know their rights based on what is 
generally accepted as good or bad. Deprivation of the 
right to life of their family members as a result of EJKs 
are perceived negatively, but there is no understanding 
of its normative content, such as the mechanisms of 
due process, presumption of innocence, and other 
concepts of human rights. Their concept of human 
rights was mainly drawn from their families or at 
school. This may suggest that other formal institutions 
that are supposed to provide human rights education 
have not influenced their legal knowledge. They 
have become aware of their human rights only after 
a human rights group has helped them in dealing 
with their EJK case. This is worsened by their lack of 
appreciation for the formal institutions such as DOJ, 
PAO, and CHR, which are supposed to protect, respect, 
and promote human rights. If ever they know such 
institutions, there is a question of trust on how these 
institutions can help them. 
Moreover, assuming that the victims’ families 
decide to pursue criminal and administrative actions, 
they still need to address several factors in their 
quest to access justice. One of these factors is the 
direct financial burden, such as paying filing fees 
and other court costs. While the victims’ families do 
not need to pay for a legal representative as they are 
already represented by the State in these actions, 
there is a strong likelihood that these family members 
will be burdened by travel and opportunity costs, 
such as travel time in attending the court hearings. 
Another factor is when the family members may be 
intimidated or harassed by the State agents, leading 
them to abandon their action and fail in holding the 
perpetrators to account.
Advice and Representation
The respondents’ economic status is the key 
deterrent for them to seek legal help from private 
lawyers. Reliance on  the legal aid provided by the 
DOJ through the public prosecutors and PAO lawyers 
is the usual means of accessing legal advice and 
representation. However, there is much to be desired 
from the services provided by the public prosecutors 
and/or public attorneys, whom they have sought 
for legal advice and representation. The level of 
appreciation of the services provided by the public 
prosecutor and/or PAO may also be correlated with 
their legal knowledge.
Access to a Justice Institution
Although we have sufficient formal rules and 
institutions to address HRVs, access to justice 
institutions by the families of the victims of EJK is 
determined by monetary and non-monetary costs. 
Monetary costs includes not only the actual cost of 
filing a complaint or pursuing a case in court but also 
include financial cost of taking days off from work 
to attend to their cases. Non-monetary costs refer to 
the various other factors that affect their desire to 
pursue their case, such as fear of retribution from the 
perpetrators, mistrust of the institutions that should 
be helping them with their cause, and even the lack 
of legal knowledge to properly participate in their 
attainment of justice.
Meanwhile, when the CHR finds a human rights 
violation in an incident exists, it recommends that 
a case be filed before the Office of the Ombudsman 
for the prosecution of the appropriate criminal and 
administrative actions. But such findings are only 
recommendatory, and it is still within the prerogative 
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of the victims’ families to pursue the case or not. 
In cases that the CHR initiated motu proprio, the 
Commission may recommend the prosecution of 
the cases to the Ombudsman. However, there is a 
strong possibility that such cases will be dismissed as 
witnesses who are essential in pursuing the criminal 
and/or administrative actions are often unwilling to 
come forward and testify. 
Thus, in every case filed before the Office of the 
Ombudsman, the initiative of the victims’ families 
is vital. Without it, there would be no legal actions 
against the perpetrators, and they will not be held 
accountable. However, it is helpful to note that such 
persons who were found by the CHR as perpetrators 
of HRVs will not be given clearances by the CHR 
whether or not a case was filed before the Office of the 
Ombudsman against them.
 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Working on the legal knowledge of the victims’ 
families is where the path to accessing justice begins. 
In the short term, they should be provided with legal 
knowledge on how to pursue their case in court. Asking 
the right questions on how the case proceeds will enable 
them to confidently engage the public prosecutor and/
or public attorney with the end goal of safeguarding 
their rights and ensuring a speedy disposition of their 
case. Understanding the legal process may enable them 
to deal with their lack of trust in the existing formal 
access to justice institutions. Other skills such as basic 
legal documentation may provide them with practical 
knowledge that they can use in case they are faced with 
similar situations within their family or community. 
In the long term, it will be helpful if the families 
will be oriented to seek further accountability from 
the State or its agents who are responsible for the 
systematic violation of their rights. Legal knowledge 
focusing on claim-making against State agents could 
be done through their collective undertaking. The 
experience of the martial law victims is instructive on 
the required legal documentation, level organization 
of the claimants, and public advocacy in seeking 
compensation for HRV victims.
 As rights-holders and victims of HRVs, they can 
seek accountability from the State by developing and 
providing a counter narrative to the justifications 
of the drug war of the Duterte Administration. They 
themselves, or with the help of human rights groups, 
can document their own stories—a crucial step 
in seeking legal remedies. These stories may be a 
source of information, albeit information should be 
translated to evidence for it to be useful in seeking 
legal remedy in court. Hence, a good documentation 
of the EJK cases is important and the victims’ families 
should be oriented in this regard. 
As for the HRV cases that the CHR has 
recommended to the Office of the Ombudsman for 
filing, or have already been filed, the progress of these 
cases on trial—if they are indeed already on trial—
should be monitored as it will elucidate the present 
status of access to justice when it comes to HRVs being 
waged by State agents. Some of the criteria that should 
be monitored include: (a) whether the prosecution 
is willing and able to hold the alleged perpetrators 
accountable; and, (b) whether the prosecution 
represented by lawyers are unbiased, fair, 
and efficient.
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